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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis intends to contribute to an enhanced understanding of environmental 
conflicts and their resolution. To accomplish this task the thesis will ascertain the 
role that value and interests play in environmental conflicts in order to establish an 
adequate basis upon which they can be resolved. In the process, the thesis will 
also examine three different approaches, namely, the Standard Approach; the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework; and the Structured Decision 
Making (SDM) approach. First, the standard approach is informed by the 
understanding that focusing on interests instead of human values makes the 
resolution of conflicts more tractable. In contrast, this thesis argues that an 
exclusive focus on interests, in the context of environmental conflict resolution, is 
inadequate in some important respects because there are other factors to be 
considered such as the environmental impacts at the root of the conflict. Second, 
the thesis examines the focus on impacts that characterises EIAs. It argues that 
this approach remedies the limitations of the standard approach insofar as 
impacts are understood in terms of object value. However, the EIA approach does 
not provide much guidance on how to deal with conflicting human values. Third, 
taking into account the fact that the standard approach does not address the 
question of object value, while the EIA addresses object value but does not deal 
directly with human values, the thesis examines the SDM approach to 
environmental risk decisions. The thesis argues that while the SDM approach 
claims to deal with conflicts involving human values head-on, it does not provide a 
viable alternative in terms of environmental conflict resolution. This is because it 
fails to recognise the key distinction between human values and object value 
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despite acknowledging the presence of multiple value dimensions as a major 
obstacle to value trade-offs and therefore to the resolution of value conflicts. 
Finally, the thesis recommends an adequate basis upon which environmental 
conflicts can be resolved.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental problems and challenges have been on the increase as societies 
all over the world face stresses from rapid social change, population growth, 
economic pressures, and increased industrial activities in the face of dwindling 
environmental resources (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 7). Consequently, 
environmental conflicts have been on the increase as the pressures to use and 
protect the environment increases (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, p. 1). In the 
process environmental consciousness has been a significant factor in the 
occurrence of environmental conflicts (see section 1.4). Environmental 
consciousness refers to the personal or social acceptance of certain values which 
in turn translates into willingness to take on responsibility, interest, and a 
commitment to protect and care for the environment1.  
The genesis of environmental consciousness has been widely attributed to 
the interplay of various factors, particularly during the 1970s, which set the stage 
for civic action and efforts that have culminated in a global movement. What 
started in various places as responses to seemingly local environmental issues 
and problems has undergone transformation and expanded into a phenomenon of 
global proportions (McCormick 1991, p. 1). The mobilisation of these issues in the 
public domain resulted in the efforts of this movement being ‘increasingly reflected 
in legislation, public policy, the creation and operation of public environmental 
agencies’ (ibid., p. 1). Notably, progress in scientific research and an increasing 
body of scientific knowledge has for the most part provided impetus for 
environmental concerns. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) is often cited 
among pioneering works. The publication exposed the dangers of indiscriminate 
use of pesticides as a serious threat to biodiversity and habitats as it resulted in 
progressive or cumulative poisoning of both human and wildlife habitats.  
In a policy context the increase in environmental conflicts poses a 
significant governance challenge in terms of balancing the competing demands of 
meeting social/economic needs and ensuring sound environmental management. 
In view of this challenge, the need to resolve environmental conflicts and to 
                                                          
1
 To this extent environmental consciousness has a deeper meaning than mere environmental awareness. 
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address the problems these conflicts present has been widely acknowledged by 
governments as a priority policy concern. In short, as societies continue to 
develop in the face of environmental constraints, the need to address 
environmental conflicts has become inevitable and increasingly important. The 
challenge is to integrate ecological, economic, and social goals in order to 
promote ecologically viable, economically, and socially desirable conditions. 
In looking at environmental conflict resolution and decision making in 
general, it is also worthwhile to note the significance of the political and economic 
context in which they take place. Given the apparent ideological divide between 
developers and environmentalists, differences in power attributes (such as 
resources and political influence) can also pose challenges in the process of 
resolving conflicts (cf. Burton 1990, p. 189). In general, power and economic 
imbalances can negatively affect the degree or quality of participation by some 
stakeholders2. For example, local communities may not only lack adequate 
information and resources, but they may also feel threatened by statements 
issued by public officials3. However, taking into account the broad range of 
stakeholders in environmental issues, (namely, Government, business, local and 
international NGOs and the general public), one would appreciate that the political 
and economic context for environmental conflict resolution is complex, diverse 
and dynamic. While one cannot ignore or even underestimate the challenges 
noted above, this discussion will not delve much into them. In setting the above 
issue aside, the approaches discussed in this thesis will be understood as 
communicative and consultative processes through which consensus can be built 
and disputes resolved (cf. Helleiner 2000, p.16) as opposed to being driven 
entirely by governmental or financial muscle (see section 4.1.2).  
The contribution of this thesis is to broaden and deepen the understanding 
of environmental conflicts by articulating the distinctive roles that value and 
interests play in these conflicts in order to determine an adequate basis upon 
                                                          
2
 As Gerald Helleiner (2000, p. 6) observes, ‘in political systems, whether, “democratic”, oligarchic or 
dictatorial, whether national or international, money talks and hence the old saying that “he who pays the 
piper calls the tunes” may still be generally be true. 
3
 For example, one public official issued a statement at a public hearing emphasizing that ‘the Government of 
Zambia is full support of the [proposed] mining project and anyone found hindering such projects will be dealt 
with severely’ (African Mining Consulting Limited 2008, Environmental Impact Statement, Mkushi Copper 
Project). 
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which they can be resolved. The thesis stresses the need to distinguish between 
human values and object value in dealing with environmental conflicts involving 
multiple value dimensions. This perspective has not been fully explored, 
particularly within the field of environmental philosophy.  
In addition, environmental conflict resolution has not received much 
attention from environmental philosophers (Schmidtz 2002, p. 420). The thesis 
also intends to bridge, or at least narrow the gap between environmental 
philosophy and environmental policy. To this effect, the thesis makes an important 
contribution to the provision of a conceptual analysis within which decisions 
arising from environmental conflict resolution can be properly understood and 
justified.  
The thesis is divided into six chapters as outlined below: 
The first chapter presents the conceptual framework and analysis of key 
concepts, viz. value and interests. The sense in which these concepts will be 
understood in this thesis is specified, taking into account the fact that these two 
terms are often ambiguously defined in many discussions in the literature, as well 
as in ordinary usage. The nature of environmental conflicts is also examined in 
order to assess the role that value and interests play in such conflicts.  
The second chapter explores some issues about intrinsic value. This notion 
is relevant to the provision of a complete account of value. Intrinsic value is also 
relevant to an understanding of the nature of some environmental conflicts as 
noted in chapter 1. As a major source of disagreements, concerns about intrinsic 
value can significantly influence the character of some environmental conflicts. 
However, being a major source of disagreements also means that intrinsic value 
does not seem to have a special role to play in the resolution of environmental 
conflicts (see sections 2.2 to 2.4). Nevertheless, an appreciation of the different 
senses in which the concept can be understood and the context in which they are 
relevant is crucial in dealing with disagreements about intrinsic value, as well as in 
appreciating the distinctive roles that human values and object value can play in 
environmental conflicts. While the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental 
value is applicable to both human values and object value the significance of and 
concerns about intrinsic values vary from one context to the other. 
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Chapter 3 presents an appraisal of the standard view on conflict resolution 
in an attempt to appreciate the insights behind this approach to conflict resolution. 
Taking into account the explanation of environmental conflicts presented in 
chapter 1, this chapter explains why an exclusive focus on interests is inadequate 
in terms of dealing with different types of environmental conflict. With the help of a 
detailed example, the chapter also illustrates how attending to environmental 
impacts helps us to appreciate the root cause of environmental conflicts.  
Chapter 4 illustrates insights that can be learnt from attending to object 
value in terms of environmental decision-making and environmental conflict 
resolution in particular. The purpose is to set the framework for understanding the 
value implications of decisions that may arise from the resolution of environmental 
conflicts. In discussing this matter this chapter focuses on the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) framework. With respect to conflict resolution, 
stakeholder participation through public hearings and meetings form an essential 
part of the EIA process. The chapter also makes use of two examples to ensure 
that the arguments put forward are not detached from the practical demands of 
environmental conflict resolution. The chapter concludes by arguing that, while the 
EIA framework deals with object value, it does not offer much guidance in terms of 
dealing with conflicting human values in the process of resolving environmental 
conflicts. 
In view of the fact that the standard approach and the EIA framework do 
not deal adequately with conflicting human values, chapter 5 looks at the 
structured decision making (SDM) approach as explained by Robin Gregory 
(2002). In particular, the chapter examines his attempt to tackle the challenge 
posed by multiple value dimensions in relation to environmental risk-decisions and 
value trade-offs. The chapter analyses the specific measures he proposes and 
concludes that this approach does not surmount the concerns raised by the 
standard approach. The main problem is that while claiming to deal with multiple 
value dimensions, Gregory fails to recognise the key distinction between human 
values and object value. The thesis then illustrates the shortcomings of the 
tendency to confound these two different kinds of value in an attempt to resolve 
environmental conflicts that involve multiple value dimensions.  
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Chapter 6 offers a comparative assessment of the significance of value and 
interests in the process of resolving environmental conflicts. In particular, it 
assesses the advantages of attending to the value implications of decisions as 
compared to an exclusive focus on interests. The purpose is to determine an 
adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be resolved. Drawing on 
insights from various sources in the literature, the chapter also explores 
alternative ways of understanding and dealing with conflicts involving multiple 
value dimensions. This is addressed by comparing holistic approaches, such as 
systems thinking, with the tendency to consider individual values against each 
other that characterises some other perspectives on value conflicts. The chapter 
finally examines how the interconnections among human values and object value 
can help in resolving environmental conflicts given that human values are not at 
the root of many of these conflicts.  
Taking into account the analyses and arguments in all the chapters, the 
thesis concludes that taking into account interests, human values and object value 
should constitute an adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be 
resolved. As opposed to the focus on interests that characterises the standard 
approach, this thesis argues that both human values and object value are relevant 
to environmental conflicts.  
In view of the challenges faced by the SDM approach in dealing with value 
conflicts involving multiple value dimensions, I argue that it is important whenever 
necessary to address human values and object value in a different manner. 
Taking into account the fact that the difficulties associated with human values with 
regard to conflict resolution do not apply to object value, attending to object value, 
or at least to the interconnections between the two, is helpful in the process of 
resolving environmental conflicts.  
The thesis concludes with the recommendation that an adequate basis for 
environmental conflict resolution should take into account the following4: (1) 
                                                          
4
 As Smith and Pangsapa (2009, p. 335) observe ‘the environmental priorities of each situation vary. Different 
ecological and cultural conditions prevail within a particular biome, so we should be suspicious of universal 
solutions and perfect answers; they are unlikely to be effective. We do not require a “blueprint” ̶  an ideal 
“ecotopia” ̶  worked out to the last detail, but we need to work towards a “green print”  ̶ that is, a set of working 
principles that acknowledge the complexity, uncertainty and interdependency between society and nature in 
order to develop flexible strategies…’  
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attending to subjective interests as opposed to focusing on human values may be 
helpful in the resolution of some environmental conflicts; (2) the pursuit of certain 
objective interests may be preferred to adhering to some human values; (3) 
certain human values should be adhered to at the expense of certain subjective 
interests; and (4) ultimately, object value has a central role to play in an informed 
attempt to resolve environmental conflicts.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS OF TERMS 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the key concepts in this thesis, 
namely, value and interests. With the help of insights from various sources in the 
literature, the chapter explores the different senses in which value and interests 
can be understood. In particular, the attempt is to secure an understanding of 
‘value’ and ‘interests’ that is clear and as comprehensive as possible, given that 
these terms are often ambiguously defined. Overall, this analysis is informed by 
the intention to provide a critical assessment of the roles that value and interests 
play in environmental conflicts and in the resolution of such conflicts. The chapter 
will also provide an explanation of the nature of environmental conflicts. The 
purpose is to set out a conceptual framework informing the rest of the discussions 
in this thesis. This will allow for the relevant comparisons and distinctions to be 
drawn among the different approaches to conflict resolution discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  
The chapter begins with an exploration of the concept of value in section 
1.1. This is followed by an examination of the notion of interests in section 1.2. 
Finally, the key distinctions among the different senses in which value and 
interests can be understood are highlighted, articulated and defended in section 
1.3. This is followed by a detailed exploration of the nature of environmental 
conflicts in section 1.4.  
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1.1 Value 
 
In this section I shall explore and specify the relevant senses in which value can 
be understood. In addition to reducing ambiguities, a thorough explanation of the 
concept is also required for an adequate understanding of the role that value can 
play in environmental conflicts and their resolution. 
As Ralph Barton Perry rightly points out, there seems to be no ‘established 
and universal meaning’ (Perry 1954, pp. 2-3) of value because the concept can 
mean ‘different things in different contexts.’ He writes:  
Theory of value is in search of a preferred meaning. The problem is to define, that is, give 
a meaning to the term, either by selecting from its existing meanings, or by creating a new 
meaning (ibid.). 
This does not mean ‘that this giving of a meaning to the term ‘value’ is an arbitrary 
matter, dictated by the caprice, or mere personal convenience, of the author’, 
rather; there must be some criteria by which ‘the definition is justified or rejected’ 
(ibid.). Criteria for justifying or rejecting definitions of value are often based on 
some meta-theoretical assumptions or convictions (which in philosophical 
discussions can either be metaphysical or metaethical)5.  
It is either inevitable or convenient in discussions such as this one to set 
aside the ‘semantic and metaphysical disputes’ about value in order to attend to 
the more practical concerns (Anderson 2003, preface, p. xiii). Setting aside the 
                                                          
5
 One of the metaphysical questions is whether value is located in the object (holder) or in the subject 
(beholder) (cf. Rolston III 2010, p. 131, Nunez 1999, p. 106). However, once it is recognised that value arises 
from interactions between subject and objects, one can comprehend the value of say hard work, a particular 
diet, or an object without needing to ask where it is located, whether in the subject or in the object. The key 
issue in meta-theoretical concerns about value is about determining the relationship between value and 
valuing. The assumption in this discussion is that understanding the nature of value requires an 
understanding of the process of valuing. In fact, when used as a verb the term value also implies valuing. In 
brief, questions about valuing ‘have to do with what precisely is going on when we ascribe value to 
something’ (Zimmerman 2010, p. 10). In some discussions other terms such as valuations (Sunstein 1997) or 
evaluations (Zimmerman 2010) are used instead of valuing. While some such as Anderson (1993) distinguish 
between valuing and evaluation, for instance, this discussion will treat these variations in terminology as 
semantic differences. The key question with regard to valuing, valuations or evaluations is about whether 
value is merely imposed on something or whether it is a matter of acknowledging the value that something 
has. In dealing with this question the following observations are fundamental: (a) Explaining why something is 
of value might help to explain why people value it; (b) to explain why people value something may be to 
explain why it is of value; (c) certain explanations of why people value what they value may undermine the 
conviction that the things valued are of value (Harman 2000, p. 197).In short, the issue is whether or not there 
is ‘something about the things that we value, some attributes that they have, for example, that are the 
legitimate basis for our valuing them’ (MacKinnon 2012, p. 341, cf. McShane 2007).  
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meta-theoretical controversies, the concept of value appears to be both lucid and 
nebulous. It can be lucid if used in some specific or concrete sense as when we 
refer to the value of a particular object. It becomes nebulous once we recognize 
the different senses in which the term value can be used. Hence, it is important to 
be specific about the sense in which one is using it6. 
This thesis will therefore distinguish between human values and object 
value. Generally, human values can be understood as desirable goals, ideals, or 
ideas that serve as guiding principles in the life of persons, groups or other social 
entities, such as organizations (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Hebel 1998). These are 
values held by human beings: at least, they represent ideas, ideals, or concerns 
they wish to uphold. In contrast to human values, object value can be defined as 
‘the quality of a thing which makes it desirable, desired, or an object of interest’ 
(Angeles 1981, p. 310). The distinction between human values and object value is 
not meant to undermine any linkages between these two different kinds of value. 
Rather, it is helpful in dealing with ambiguities about value, as well as in dealing 
with some of the meta-theoretical controversies. If a claim is not precise in terms 
of which of the two different kinds of value it is dealing with then it can be 
misleading, especially if one takes into account that there are different kinds of 
human values (see section 1.1.1) as well as object of value. 
Assuming, as I want to, that a single theory of value may be insufficient, 
what is required is a mapping of the concept which distinguishes different kinds of 
value. The notion of human values will be explained further in sub-section 1.1.1 
while 1.1.2 will deal with object value. The relevance and significance of the 
distinction between the two different kinds of value will be explored further in 
sections 5.2 to 5.6 and 6.3. 
                                                          
6
 Consider the following claim by J. Baird Callicott for instance: ‘Value is, as it were, projected onto natural 
objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, 
there would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right and wrong; only impassive phenomena 
would remain’ (Callicott 1989, p. 147). There does not seem to be any problem with this claim if one relates it 
specifically to human values, especially in view of the value terms involved, namely, good and evil, beauty 
and ugliness, right and wrong. However, if that is not what Callicott had in mind, then there are some 
problems with the above claim. In view of the distinction between human values and object value one would 
expect some reference to the properties of objects, especially in the context of object value. Basing the value 
of objects entirely on subjective feelings does not provide a full explanation of the value of certain objects. For 
example, it is difficult to see how the value of one’s organs (e.g. heart, lungs, liver and so on) can depend 
entirely on subjective feelings as opposed to their functions.Value or valuing is not only about preference. It is 
also about affirming that the thing valued ‘merits or deserves to be valued by valuers’ (McShane 2007, p. 49). 
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In view of the recognition that there are different kinds of value, definitions 
need not be the main points of contestation. Rather, what is contestable is the 
range of things to which we can apply particular definitions of value. In fact, this is 
the main disagreement between economists and ethicists. This is understandable 
because what the term ‘value’ implies in economics is different from what it 
implies in ethics, or at least in some ethical theories. Many authors, such as 
Anderson (1993), for example, have acknowledged this problem to explain the 
gap between ethics and economics. For example, one concept that is closely 
associated with value in both ethics and economics is ‘goods’. But the term is 
understood differently in ethics as compared to economics. In ethics, the term 
means ‘worth’ whereas in economics it is understood as denoting ‘commodities’. 
What this also implies is that while the terms ‘value’ and ‘good’ are often used 
interchangeably, they are not equivalents. As Johan Brӓnnmark notes  
…even at the level of thin evaluative notions there are at least two potential objects of 
analysis, the good and the valuable, and it cannot be presumed that they amount to the 
same thing, although it would be very surprising if they were not even overlapping 
(Brӓnnmark 2009, p. 333). 
The expectation in this discussion is that in attempting to reconcile the different 
perspectives on value, an enhanced understanding of the concept will come into 
view. It would appear that what many authors fail to resist is the urge to work with 
a single theory of value in spite of the recognition that the concept is much more 
complex than any single theory might allow. To put this issue into perspective, an 
example will help. In his book, The Science of Wealth, Amasa Walker (1866) 
attempts to answer the following questions: ‘What, then, is value? When does an 
article or commodity possess value?’ An article or commodity has value, he 
claims, ‘… when it is an object of man’s desire, and can be obtained only by 
man’s efforts’ (Walker 1866, chapter III). 
Walker’s conception of value above represents classical economic theory 
or thinking about value. This is pertinent because concerns about the economic 
value of natural resources are also central to an appreciation of environmental 
conflicts. 
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There is also an attraction in Walker’s claims which I wish to note before 
attending to the limitations. The attraction stems from the caution not to conflate 
value with other terms that are often used to define it, such as desire for instance, 
as that often leads to confusion where value may be seen as being synonymous 
with desires.  
Walker’s conception of value is objectionable not because it is false or 
incorrect; rather, it is the application of this particular conception of value to things, 
such as atmospheric air or the heat of the sun, which is objectionable. These 
things seem to be outside the scope of Walker’s theory of value given that his 
focus is on things that can be exchanged. His views are representative of classical 
economic thinking about value the influence of which many moral philosophers or 
ethicists such as Anderson are opposed to. In fact, the concern is not only that it 
would seem impractical to exchange certain things; it is also about whether or not 
some things should be exchanged. According to Anderson (1993, p. xi) the 
question is whether everything should be up for sale. Another obvious question is 
whether only exchangeable things have value.  
The fundamental issue behind Anderson’s challenge to the market 
approaches as represented in the above question is the need to appreciate that 
there are different kinds of values at stake, some of which should not be left to the 
rules or dynamics of the market. Her point is: 
If different spheres of social life, such as the market, the family, and the state, are 
structured by norms that express fundamentally different ways of valuing people and 
things, then there can be some ways we ought to value people and things that can’t be 
expressed through market norms (ibid., p. xiii). 
Other spheres, in addition to the ones mentioned above, would include charitable 
or religious organizations (cf. Sunstein 1997, p. 234). Differentiating between the 
relevant spheres is helpful in terms of contextualising value concerns7. As 
compared to Walker for whom value concerns seem to centre on the market 
                                                          
7 This differentiation of value domains is crucial because as Sunstein claims: ‘Distinctions among kinds of 
valuations are highly sensitive to the particular setting in which they operate. In one setting (say, the 
workplace), the prevailing kinds of valuation might be quite different from what they are elsewhere (say, the 
home or the ballot box)’ (Sunstein 1997, p. 235).  
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sphere in terms of ‘exchange power’, Anderson claims that her theory 
‘emphasizes the richness and diversity of our concerns and finds a place for a full 
range of responses to what we value’ (Anderson 1993, p. xii). In her view, ‘to 
value something is to have a complex of positive attitudes toward it, governed by 
distinct standards for perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct’ (ibid., 
p. 2). 
Walker is concerned about how an object or commodity comes to possess 
value and about the influence this value has on people in terms of its relation to 
other commodities or services. It is for this reason that he uses the term ‘power’8 
to express value. In contrast, Anderson is more concerned about how we should 
respond to people or things we value. In her view, for example, to care about 
something is to be emotionally involved in what concerns the object of care, which 
in turn is an expression of how someone values something or someone else. 
Overall, Anderson’s concern is about the need to recognise the ‘richness and 
diversity’ of responses to the things we value.  
Furthermore, Anderson distinguishes between what she calls ‘a person’s 
values’ and ‘an object’s values’ a distinction similar to the one this thesis makes 
between human values and object value in subsequent sections. In her view, a 
person’s values are ‘whatever standards she accepts for evaluating persons, 
actions, and things’ and ‘an object’s values consist of whatever properties it has, 
in virtue of which it meets various standards of value’ (Anderson 1993, p. 3). 
Insofar as the value of objects is what is at issue, the main difference between 
Walker’s and Anderson’s views are the following: First, Walker’s account seems to 
allow only two standards or criteria of value, namely, desire and effort, whereas 
Anderson’s view is open to various standards of value. Second, unlike Anderson, 
                                                          
8 ‘…the term “value” always expresses precisely power in exchange, and no other power or fact. 
Desirableness is not value. Utility is not value. No objects are more useful and desirable than atmospheric air, 
the light of the day, the heat of the sun; yet these have no value. They will exchange for nothing, because any 
one may have all he wishes without effort …The use of this term, in its strictest sense, is of the utmost 
importance. If confounded with anything, or taken into any partnership, the whole science is thrown into 
confusion’ (Walker 1866, chapter III). 
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Walker does not make reference to the properties of an object in terms of 
explaining its value.  
In dealing with different kinds of value this thesis will use a ‘basic value 
classification’ which distinguishes between human values and object value. This is 
the first level at which I want to qualify Perry’s claim to the effect that value can 
mean different things in different contexts. Distinguishing between human values 
and object value is helpful in terms of a comprehensive mapping and appreciation 
of the different kinds of value thereby contributing to an enhanced understanding 
of the concept. A clear understanding of the concept is also crucial to an adequate 
explanation of the role that value can play in environmental conflicts and in the 
resolution of such conflicts. In what follows, I will further explore each of the two 
terms, viz., human values and object value. 
1.1.1 Human values 
 
While ‘human values are often expressed in terms of morals and ethics’ (Hebel 
1998, p. 382) there are different kinds of human values ̶ economic, religious, 
aesthetic, ecological, scientific, and so on. This is the second level at which this 
analysis qualifies Perry’s claim that value can mean different things in different 
contexts. The first level, as noted in the previous section, involves the distinction 
between human values and object value. The second level involves the distinction 
between different kinds of human values. 
In the study of human values, some authors, for example, Schwartz (1994, 
p. 35) have come up with elaborate lists of what they claim to be the relevant 
human values. However, such lists are not exhaustive in view of the fact that 
values appear to be too numerous or unlimited to be captured by any particular 
catalogue. For this reason any particular list of values should only be considered 
as providing some examples of the relevant human values in question, e.g., love, 
truth, respect, honesty, wealth, power, creativity, and so on. My interest in citing 
these examples is not to venture into a detailed discussion of each of these 
values. Rather, my intention is to provide some indication of what is here being 
referred to as human values. 
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In terms of human values, the term ‘values’ has been used variously to 
refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, 
wants, goals, needs, aversions and attractions, and many other kinds of selective 
orientations’ (Williams 1979, p. 16). In view of the numerous terminologies above 
which are used variously to refer to values, determining which of these would be 
appropriate in defining human values depends on the standpoint from which one 
is looking at the matter. The first is an individual’s point of view, which can also be 
referred to as a person’s values (cf. Anderson 1993, p. 3). Terms such as 
pleasures, likes, preferences, desires, wants, attractions, and aversions in 
defining values may be used in this particular sense (e.g., a desire for or aversion 
to luxury or fame). Overall, the view ‘that each individual has a set of values 
appears undisputed’ (Hebel 1998, p. 395).  
Second, some scholars such as Morgan (1986) and Hall (1994) have noted 
that groups also have values which help to structure and provide meaning to the 
group’s existence. I shall refer to this second aspect of human values as ‘shared 
values’. Distinguishing between a person’s values and shared values is helpful in 
terms of dealing with the terminological laxities involved in discussing human 
values as well as in assessing the value of certain things. This is pertinent 
because some things (e.g. respect and trust) have value irrespective of our 
personal attitudes and preferences. However, in looking for values that seem to 
be prevalent in a particular group or community, it may be worthwhile also to look 
out for values that may be unique to individuals.  
The above notwithstanding, it is possible for individuals to adopt shared 
values such as respect or cooperation as part of their own ‘personal values’. 
Nevertheless, an appreciation of the understanding that a person’s values and 
shared values are not equivalents is helpful to a theory of human values. 
Appreciating the above distinction can be hindered by the urge to fit the different 
aspects of human values into a single explanatory framework, which may 
constrain our appreciation of the significance of human values with regard to 
conflict situations. The next subsection looks at another kind of value, namely, 
object value. 
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1.1.2 Object value 
 
In looking at object value we have to appreciate that the term object may 
encompass a wide range of things including policies, decisions and actions, states 
of affairs, institutions, systems, and physical objects. However, an issue that 
needs attending to is the fact that some explanations of the value of objects make 
reference to the properties of objects while others do not. For instance, while both 
Walker and Anderson talk about the value of objects, Walker does not make 
reference to the properties of objects in terms of explaining how/why an object 
comes to possess value. In contrast, in distinguishing between a ‘person’s values’ 
and ‘an object’s values’, Anderson makes reference to the properties of an object 
in virtue of which it meets certain standards we set individually or collectively. I 
shall return to this point later.  
The understanding of object value in this thesis is primarily focused on the 
qualities or properties of an object which makes it desirable, desired, or an object 
of interest (cf. Angeles 1981). I explore the notion of ‘interests’ in detail in section 
1.2. In what follows I will consider the terms ‘desirable’ and ‘desired’ briefly.  
The terms desirable and desired are related in some way given that one 
can desire what is desirable. However, we can also ask whether what is desired is 
desirable. Something is not desirable simply because it is desired by someone. 
The term desirable has an objective connotation if it is correct to suppose that to 
be desirable means that something is appropriate, required, necessary or needed. 
In contrast, desired has a subjective connotation in that it implies to be desired by 
someone in the sense of being preferred, wanted, anticipated, or sought after. 
Hence, to argue (a) that something can be desired because of its value is not the 
same as to argue (b) that something has value simply because it is desired by 
someone. The difference is that (a) allows for the possibility that something can 
have value even if it is not desired by anybody whereas (b) does not. 
This thesis maintains that object value is largely based on the attributes of 
the object in question. If not, then it is difficult to see how one can persuade or 
convince others about the value of an object or be proven to be wrong about it. In 
short, an object can be said to have object value when it is desirable or an object 
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of interest because of its attributes and these attributes provide reasons for, in 
fact, desiring it. The central issue in appreciating object value is that objects have 
properties which make them desirable or objects of interest. The properties in 
question are not determined by how we respond to the object. Rather, I would 
argue that object value is at stake when one’s response is determined or informed 
by the properties of an object or its actual or potential impact. To this extent there 
is a strong connection between some object values and objective interests.  
For example, food or water is not good for our wellbeing and survival 
merely because we are interested in these objects. Instead we are interested in 
them and they are, in fact, in our interest because they are good for our wellbeing 
and survival. As opposed to Walker’s perspective, for instance, an object cannot 
have object value simply because it is desired by someone. While there is a 
strong link between object value and subjective interests, there is a fundamental 
contrast between object value and subjective interests as I will explain in section 
1.3. What this suggests is that some objects will still have object value even if they 
are not subjectively desired by, or of interest to someone.  
In taking into account the distinction between human values and object 
value, it is possible that certain objects can be wrapped up in human values in 
that humans can give or attach value (i.e., symbolic or sentimental ) to objects, for 
example, national flags, statues and so on. If the value in question has nothing or 
very little to do with the attributes of the object itself, but more to do with human 
events or circumstances surrounding the object, then such value does not amount 
to object value as understood in the context of this discussion. It is also plausible 
that some objects can be considered both in terms of human values and object 
value. For example, cars have utilitarian object value as a mode of transport. 
However, the same cars can also bear human values as symbols of status, 
success, power or luxury. In view of the above, Anderson’s account of an object’s 
values does not seem to be clear enough even though she makes reference to 
the properties of an object. She writes: 
An object’s values consist of whatever properties it has, in virtue of which it meets various 
standards of value. I have proposed that the judgement that an object meets an authentic 
standard of value entails that its meeting that standard makes it sensible for someone to 
value it. The standards of value for objects are the standards of rationality for our 
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responses to them. One of my values could be that bedrooms be cozy. If a given bedroom 
is cozy, then coziness is a value it has (Anderson 1993, pp. 3-4). 
On this conception of an object’s values Anderson (1993, p. 4) concludes ‘a good 
is a bearer or bundle of qualities that meet certain standards or requirements we 
(correctively) set for it.’ In contrast, I would argue that if the properties of objects 
have to meet the standards set by humans, individually or collectively, then 
Anderson’s explanation of an object’s values still falls within the category of 
human values. Hence, both Walker’s and Anderson’s perspectives on value seem 
to relate primarily to human values. Chapter 6 will explain further the significance 
of the distinction between human values and object value that I have adopted in 
this thesis with regard to environmental values.  
In view of the analysis in section 1.1, and sub-sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, one 
would appreciate that in discussions such as this one, concerns about value do 
not call for certainty about the meta-theoretical issues noted in section 1. Rather, 
concerns about value require contextual sensitivity9 to what it means for 
something to have value and the range of things to which certain claims about 
value are applicable. For this reason the distinction between human values and 
object value is fundamental. The next section explores another key concept in this 
thesis, viz. interests.  
1.2 Interests 
 
The term ‘interest’ has generated considerable debate particularly in some 
philosophical discussions in environmental ethics. The reason is because the term 
has been used variously by different authors to apply to all living things: to 
animals in terms of what they desire (e.g. in Singer 1990) and to plants, 
analogously in terms of what they need (cf. Goodpaster 1978; Taylor 1986). In 
view of this varied usage, the question is not whether or not different living things 
have interests or not, but rather what sort of interests each kind of living thing can 
reasonably be said to have, and perhaps to what degree. However, the debate 
                                                          
9
 In his article: “Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature,” T.W. Nunez (1999) has argued this 
point in detail by complementing Holmes Rolston’s ideas about values in nature with Lonergan’s ins ight into 
the connection between understanding and valuing. 
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may not be so much about the meaning of the term ‘interests’ as it is about the 
substantive claims that different authors want to defend. The issues raised above 
stem from the fact that the term interests can be understood in two different 
senses. Understanding these is central to this analysis. This will play an important 
role in explaining the nature of some environmental conflicts as well as in 
comparing some of the approaches to conflict resolution discussed in this thesis. 
First, the term ‘interests’ is used to denote factors which are perceived to 
have the potential to contribute to one’s well-being or the attainment of certain 
objectives (Johnson 1991, p. 141). This is the sense of interests at work in 
reference to what may be considered to be in someone’s best interests. This 
sense of interests also appears to be closely linked with ‘needs’. Needs are 
‘understood as those elements that are necessary for survival’ (Des Jardins 1997, 
p. 212). These are needs which are ‘in our interests’ whether we are conscious of 
them or not. Basically, needs connote biological influences and relate to elements 
such as food, water, and clean air (cf. Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, p. 361). I shall refer 
to this first sense of interests as objective interests. 
Second, interests can also mean what someone actually wants. Wants are 
the immediate desires, preferences, or goals toward which a person is inclined 
(Des Jardins 1997, p. 212). Overall, the second sense or understanding of 
interests is what is at work when reference is made to interested parties or interest 
groups. I shall refer to this second sense of interests as subjective interests10. 
These interests are based on our experiences or conscious decisions, and this 
happens when one is ‘interested in’ something.  
In short, to be interested in something and for something to be in 
someone’s interests are not the same thing. Hence, it is helpful to be specific 
about the sense in which the term ‘interests’ is being used in particular claims so 
as to avoid equivocating (cf. Wenz 1988, p. 289). The above distinction between 
objective and subjective interests is widely recognised in the social theory 
literature. Objective interests are understood in terms of needs or functional 
imperatives that must be fulfilled whereas subjective interests are understood in 
                                                          
10
 If interests are understood in this specific sense then I cannot maintain as Ralph Barton Perry or Warren 
Neill does ‘that interest is the original source and constant feature of all value’ (Neill 1998, p. 60). In my view 
this sort of claim can only be entertained with a vague notion of interests. 
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terms of beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their needs or 
functional imperatives (Alexander 1999, p. 231). In this thesis, however, subjective 
interests will be understood in terms of what people actually want as opposed to 
their beliefs about how to meet their needs.  
What the foregoing analysis suggests is that we can expect a discrepancy 
between what may be in one’s interests (objectively) and what a person actually 
wants or is interested in (subjectively). Hence, it is reasonable to suspect that 
sometimes what people actually want and what is in their interests fail to 
correspond (Attfield 1994, p. 142). In fact, people may have no interest in 
something which may seem to be in their interests (Taylor 1986, p. 63). On the 
basis of this analysis, actors can in certain circumstances act against their own 
best interests (cf. Van Dyke 1962, p. 575). Arguably, what is at work in supposing 
that actors can act against their own best interests is the tendency to weigh what 
they want against what is presumed to be in their interests. It would be difficult to 
explain how actors can act against their own best interests without the distinction 
between the two different senses of interests (e.g., a diabetic wanting sugar). 
When dealing with interests in conflict situations, the distinction between 
what is presumed to be in someone’s interests and what someone actually wants 
is important. Taking into account the plausibility of both senses of the term 
‘interests’, the second sense in terms of what actors actually want is pertinent in 
dealing with conflicts between people. This is important if we don’t want to 
compromise the autonomy and agency of any of the parties to a conflict. Thus, 
attending to what people actually want as opposed to what we think is in their 
interests is not only a practical, but also a democratic requirement. In fact, under 
the standard approach to conflict resolution which will be discussed in chapter 2, 
interests will be understood in the specific sense of what people actually want. As 
compared to this more specific sense of wanting something, the term interest can 
also be vague as it can represent a variety of responses ranging from mere 
curiosity to being actively concerned about something. Hence, as opposed to 
being a limitation, the focus in this analysis has the advantage of avoiding 
confusions which may result from equivocating between different senses of the 
same term as is the case in some discussions about interests.  
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This thesis will set aside concerns about plants given that plants cannot be 
said to have interests in the subjective sense11. In contrast, animals can 
reasonably be said to have interests in both senses of the term.  
The interests of animals are often taken into consideration when dealing 
with conflicts involving people and animals. However, there is a limit to the extent 
to which people can promote the interests of animals, especially animals in the 
wild, because there is a danger that this may amount to interference. However, we 
can still distinguish between interventions and interference. As opposed to 
interference, interventions seem to require that helping some animals for example 
not be at the expense of other animals (e.g. preventing a predator from catching 
its prey) or contrary to the established patterns of interaction and systems in the 
wild. For instance, it is a well-documented fact that hundreds of wild beasts perish 
through drowning when crossing the Mara River on their migration routes between 
Tanzania and Kenya. Someone who cares about the interests of animals might 
find it reasonable to ask if it may not be helpful to construct a bridge or two for the 
animals to cross the notorious crossing points on the Mara River safely. While the 
death or loss of these animals in their hundreds is minimal compared to their total 
population, the concern behind the idea of helping them to cross safely is that 
they are potential or actual victims of drowning. Perhaps a stronger argument 
against building bridges for animals across the Mara River is that it would amount 
to interference, especially taking into account the fact that the crocodiles that 
inhabit the river will be deprived of their annual feast. In fact, visitors to game 
parks are generally advised not to interfere and to let nature take its course. 
                                                          
11 In theory the idea that plants have objective interests analogous to that of other living things may not be 
difficult to appreciate. The question is whether or not such interests can be taken literally, which also raises 
the question of what the practical significance of plants having interests might be in terms of decision making 
(cf. Taylor 1986). The distinction between objective and subjective interests helps to narrow the focus in 
terms of candidates for each of these categories. However, it would seem that drawing boundaries in terms of 
what things to include or exclude in each of these categories, especially the category of objective interests is 
still open to debate. For instance, some have argued that if we can extend objective interests to plants then 
we should also be willing to do the same for machines (cf. Jamieson 2008, p. 147). Whatever the merits of 
this claim might be, the distinction between living and non-living things (animate and inanimate objects) has a 
bearing on the significance of appealing to objective interests. Similarly, the distinction between conscious 
beings (or just the potential for it) and those that do not possess consciousness has a bearing in terms of 
what sort of things can be said to have or not to have subjective interests.Nevertheless, the position in this 
thesis is that appealing to value as opposed to interests will still provide an alternative for making one’s case 
for the preservation of things such as plants as will be explained in chapter 4 and 6. 
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Interference has a negative connotation if it is distinguished from 
intervention. There are many interventions that would seem less controversial 
than what may be termed as interference. For instance, scientists and the relevant 
government agencies or conservation groups often get concerned when wild 
animals are seen to be dying mysteriously. Often, efforts are made to find out the 
cause of death in order to at least save some of the animals that are still alive.  
As indicated at the beginning of this section the key question may not be 
about whether or not different things have interests or not, but rather about what 
sort of interests certain things can reasonably be said to have, and perhaps to 
what degree. It is, however, reasonable to assume that only conscious beings are 
capable of having subjective interests.  
The next section explores some relevant contrasts among the different 
senses of the key concepts I have discussed in section 1.1 and 1.2, namely, 
human values; object value; objective and subjective interests. 
1.3 Relevant contrasts among some key concepts 
 
In exploring the key concepts in this thesis, namely value and interests, the 
analysis in the preceding sections has highlighted the distinction between human 
values and object value in section 1.1, and the distinction between objective and 
subjective interests in section 1.2. These two distinctions will facilitate the relevant 
contrasts to be discussed in this section, viz., the contrasts between object value 
and subjective interests, and between human values and objective interests.  
In view of the contrast between objective value and subjective interests 
there is a basis for challenging the tendency to reduce the value of objects, 
especially objects in the natural environment, to the subjective interests of 
humans. Hence, the point to contrasting object value with subjective interests is to 
assess the role they can play in environmental conflicts and in the resolution of 
such conflicts. Contrasting between object value and subjective interests is 
important to environmental decision-making and conflict resolution as will be 
explained in chapter 4, with regard to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
framework. 
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To argue that there is a sense in which the value of certain objects is 
independent of our subjective interests does not imply that the two cannot 
coincide. Rather, it allows that someone may want something because of its 
value. An appreciation of the contrast between object value and subjective 
interests then makes it plausible to explore the question of whether something has 
value simply because someone is interested in it, or whether someone is 
interested in something because it has value. If something has value simply 
because someone is interested in it, then it is difficult to divorce value from 
interests. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that someone may want 
something because of its value. We do certain things not simply because we are 
interested in doing them but because of the value associated with doing such 
things. In this vein, the contrast between object value and subjective interests is 
intended to underscore the point that there are things that have value irrespective 
of what we may actually want. For example, although some people may not be 
interested in exercising, this does not detract in any way from the value of 
exercising. Alternatively, exercising is not just valuable simply because there are 
some people who are interested in exercising. Rather, people may be interested 
in exercising because of its value and the fact that we may not be interested in 
something does not mean that it does not have any value. 
However, people may want something not because of its value but simply 
because they are interested in it. To push this claim further, one can even 
suppose that it is possible to be interested in something that has no object value. 
Nevertheless, instead of thinking that people can be knowingly interested in 
something that has no value, one would want to think that it is more likely that 
people are often mistaken about what has or does not have value.  
From a personal point of view, some things may seem to be more 
‘valuable’ than others simply because one is interested in them. Nonetheless, the 
only thing this might prove is that one is more attached to the thing one is 
interested in and not necessarily that the thing one is interested in has value or 
that the thing one is not interested in has no value. With regard to object value, for 
instance, the properties or attributes of the object are what matter largely for 
explaining the value of something. ‘It is also why the reasons we give for valuing 
typically make reference to the object’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 68) as opposed to 
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appealing merely to our desires or preferences. For instance, the nutritional value 
of vegetables does not depend on whether one is a vegetarian or one likes 
vegetables or not. Hence, the reason for contrasting object value with subjective 
interests is to underscore the fact that an object can have value irrespective of 
whether someone is interested in it or not.  
The contrast between human values and objective interests can be better 
understood in terms of a distinction between ‘values’ and ‘needs’, given that 
needs constitute one kind of objective interests. ‘[Human] values, which are 
acquired, differ from needs in that the latter are universal and primordial, and 
perhaps genetic’ (Burton 1990, p. 37). Values tend to be culturally or group 
specific12 while needs, especially at the most basic levels, are common to all 
humanity or to all beings of the same kind. Furthermore, needs and values are 
likely to influence behaviour differently, if needs are understood in terms of 
biological influences and values in terms of ideas or ideals13  
The point in distinguishing between human values and objective interests, 
such as needs, is that values can differ from one person or group to another 
whereas their objective interests are likely to be the same. This does not, 
however, imply that objective interests or needs in particular, can never be in 
conflict. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the distinction between needs and 
values can have a significant bearing in terms of how conflicts are resolved. For 
example, a workable solution to a conflict can be found on the basis of needs or 
interests which people may have in common as opposed to attempting to 
reconcile their conflicting values. The standard approach to conflict resolution 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, where the contrast between human 
values and subjective interests is most relevant, explores this insight in detail. 
                                                          
12
 This observation obviously reminds us of the debates between value universalism and relativism. One 
would, however, want to believe that there are values which are (or at least should be) common to all human 
beings, hence the term ‘human values’. What might differ from one individual or group to another are the 
value systems and hierarchy or how the values are organized and galvanized. 
13
 For example, as Hitlin and Piliavin write: ‘Values serve as socially acceptable, culturally defined ways of 
articulating needs – a need for sex might be culturally reconstituted as a value for love … The expression and 
satisfaction of more biological needs can be articulated through cultural prescribed values, but these values 
are not the needs’ (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, p. 361-2; cf. Rokeach 1973). 
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The contrasts alluded to in this section are often presupposed in many 
discussions14. In this thesis, value is understood in terms of human values and 
object value and needs are understood along with objective interests as 
compared to subjective interests. The distinctions among these key terms have 
been articulated and defended. The next section provides a detailed exploration 
and explanation of the nature of environmental conflicts in order to assess the 
roles that the different senses of value and interests play in such conflicts.  
1.4 Environmental conflicts 
 
The notion of conflict may have many meanings in everyday life (Wallensteen 
2002). Even so, conflict is traditionally associated with a breakdown in 
relationships between individuals, groups, communities or nation states, where 
the behaviour of the parties involved (e.g., violence or demonstrations) is often 
what draws attention to conflicts. However, as Peter Wallensteen observes: 
Obviously, conflict is more than the behaviour of the parties. The ‘issue’ refers to the 
incompatible positions taken by the parties motivating their actions. This then is a deeper 
understanding of what conflict is. It contains a severe disagreement between at least two 
sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time. 
Incompatibility appears to be a key to the existence of conflict (Wallensteen 2002, p. 
15). 
Wallensteen’s explanation of conflict above revolves around two related aspects, 
namely, ‘incompatible positions’ and ‘severe disagreements’. I shall explore the 
notion of positions in chapter 3 where it is relevant to the standard approach to 
conflict resolution. The main point to note is that incompatibility is the key factor to 
the existence of conflict when different demands cannot be met by the same 
resource at the same time. This then would be the source of disagreement15. 
Overall, the study of conflict has revealed that conflict is an inevitable part of 
human life and interactions among systems (Myers and Filner 1994, p. 3).  
                                                          
14
 This is the case for example when Werner Ulrich poses the following question: ‘How can we justify the 
value implications of decisions in the face of conflicting values, needs and interests?’ (Ulrich 2009, p. 133). 
15
 Some explanations of conflict highlight the aspect of social conditions (e.g., exploitation of one group by 
another) which create an environment for conflict. As Burton (1990, p. 147) suggests, ‘the major source of 
social conflict at all levels is within institutions and structures, and not within the discretion of individuals, or 
the identity groups to which the individuals look for support.’ 
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To appreciate the nature of environmental conflicts, it is worthwhile to 
distinguish them from other kinds of conflict. Conflicts can be distinguished on the 
basis of source or root causes. The sources of conflict can be political, economic, 
environmental, historical, or cultural (United States Institute of Peace, USIP 2012, 
p. 4). We can distinguish environmental conflicts from all the others, which I shall 
generally refer to as social conflicts. Making the distinction between social and 
environmental conflicts does not entail a denial of the interconnections between 
social and environmental issues. Often there are significant economic or social 
aspects in dealing with environmental issues (cf. Martin-Schranmm and Stivers 
2003, p. 90). This is the reason for example why an EIA may include a social 
impact assessment (SIA). 
However, environmental conflicts are influenced primarily by the condition 
or structure of environmental resources. The term environmental conflict is used 
‘to refer to conflict in which at least one party has concerns about the 
environmental impacts of the other party’s projects’ (Schmidtz 2002, p. 229). 
Environmental impacts can be defined as the consequences of human activities, 
products, or services ‘on environmental resources or receptors of particular value 
or sensitivity’ (SRK Consulting 2006) in relation to human and animal habitats, as 
well as in relation to natural systems such as wildlife, forests, or wetlands. 
In view of the above, we need to distinguish my focus on the policy context, 
in this thesis, from another field of interest in environmental conflicts, namely, 
security studies. It is obvious that large scale violent conflicts, i.e., wars, can 
cause significant environmental destruction and might even leave the environment 
unsafe long after the conflict has been terminated. However, the field of security 
studies looks at how environmental degradation may lead to armed conflicts which 
can be referred to as ‘environmental conflicts’ as well.  
The main difference is that my focus is on the non-violent side of 
environmental conflict while security studies research is more concerned with the 
violent side. However, the understanding of environmental conflicts is the same, 
namely, as having ‘an environmental cause’ of conflict rooted in actual or potential 
human-induced environmental impacts (Libiszewski 1992, p. 4). It is also worth 
noting that while one can show that environmental conflicts do manifest 
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themselves as conflicts over resources, not every conflict over resources is a 
typical example of what we would spontaneously connect with the term 
environmental as understood above16. For example, conflicts over possession of 
or access to resources such as oil or minerals cannot be regarded as 
environmental conflicts per se. Rather they are, by origin, economic or social 
conflicts. However, the consequences from the exploitation of these resources, 
e.g., pollution or environmental destruction are what may lead to environmental 
conflicts. However, and as noted earlier, one cannot ignore the economic or social 
aspects of environmental conflicts. This would also explain why such things as 
draining of marsh areas for human settlement or the construction of wind farms to 
harness electricity can and have been a source of conflict in some areas.  
I agree with Libiszewski’s analysis of what can be properly termed as 
environmental conflicts. Nevertheless, my focus in this thesis is narrower than it is 
in security studies. This difference is not based on the understanding of the 
environmental but on the different aspects of conflict I have chosen to focus on. 
This is evident if we consider the following spectrum for the different stages of 
conflict. 
Table 1: The proposed scale for the stages of conflict 
Stages /Intensity of Conflict Aspects     
 
Cleavage 
 
(Potential conflict) 
    
 
Conflict17 
 
(Manifest: 
Incompatible goals 
are perceived and 
formulated) 
    
 
Crisis 
 
(Sanctions, e.g., 
political/economic 
or grave verbal 
attacks) 
    
 
Grave crisis 
 
(Including military 
threats/skirmishes) 
    
      
                                                          
16
 As Libiszewski (1992, p.3) notes therefore ‘…the involvement of natural resources is evidently not the 
‘differentia specifica’ we mean when we speak about an environmental cause of conflict to distinguish it from 
other causes. For the definition of environmental in our context the concepts of ecosystem and environmental 
change are fundamental, rather than the concept of resource.’ 
17
 My emphasis 
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Source: adapted from Libiszewski 1992 
In view of the above representation of conflict, those in security studies will be 
more focused on the crisis stage. ‘But it could also be necessary to give attention 
to just manifest and in certain cases even potential conflicts in the context of 
serious environmental degradation’ (Libiszewski 1992, p. 9.) 
Libiszewski acknowledges that ‘the quarrels between radical environmentalists 
and industry could be called as well “environmental conflicts” as wars over fresh 
water’ (ibid., p. 7). My focus in this discussion is primarily on quarrels or 
disagreements as noted earlier with reference to Wallensteen. In considering the 
different stages of conflict in table 1, my focus only goes as far as the crisis stage. 
On this basis what many governments and developers may be concerned about, 
as the US government memo on environmental conflict resolution (ECR) explains, 
is as follows: 
o Protracted and costly environmental litigation; 
o Unnecessarily lengthy project and resource planning processes; 
o Costly delays in implementing needed environmental protection measures; 
o Forgone public and private investments when decisions are not timely or are appealed; 
o Lower quality outcomes and lost opportunities when environmental plans and decisions 
are not informed by all available information and perspectives; and 
o Deep-seated antagonism and hostility repeatedly reinforced between stakeholders by 
unattended conflicts (US government 2005). 
Hence, instead of looking at ‘warring factions’ (actual or potential), the focus in this 
discussion is on stakeholders and on their disagreements. In short, my interest in 
environmental conflict resolution is within the context of decision and policy 
making. Those in security studies might maintain, as Libiszewski (1992, p. 7) 
does, that ‘the point we should keep in mind is war and the danger of war, 
including both international and civil wars’, and therefore they will need to explain 
how environmental degradation may lead to war18. In contrast, my focus in this 
                                                          
18
 As Libiszewski (1992, pp. 9-10) acknowledges, this is not only a fundamental question, but a difficult one as 
well. It is difficult because ‘social facts, such as conflicts, cannot be explained by natural facts, such as 
environment, but only by other social facts.’ For this reason a complex model of analysis is needed involving 
three distinct levels, namely, environmental effects, social effects and conflict: ‘The category of social effects 
is interposed between the two variables environment and conflict, serving as an “analytical filter”. It is on this 
level of analysis that the two groups of disciplines represented in the topic, namely natural sciences and 
social sciences, join and are mediated (ibid.).’ 
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discussion does not face the question of explaining how environmental problems 
might lead to war. 
In view of the above understanding of environmental conflicts, this thesis 
will consider environmental conflict resolution as a process involving people with 
differing views, interests and values, who are brought together in a systematic and 
structured way in order to find workable solutions to shared problems about 
environmental issues (U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution 2012). 
In this regard, the main issue in dealing with an environmental conflict is about 
how to address the problem at hand, as opposed to merely meeting the demands 
of the human parties to a conflict. My assumption in this case is that unlike other 
conflicts where there are only two parties, an environmental conflict has three 
parties: In addition to the two human parties that characterise other conflicts, an 
environmental conflict will involve the environment, or some aspects of it, as yet 
another ‘party’ to the conflict. What this means is that decision-makers have a 
third factor to appeal to besides the interests and human values of the parties to a 
conflict. The third factor at issue might be either or both of the following, namely, 
the object value of the environmental aspects at stake, or the interests of other 
living things, such as animals.  
In fact, where animals are involved, it is important to be specific in terms of 
whether the conflict is about people versus people or animals versus people 
(human/animal conflict)19 or, as we shall see with the example in chapter 3, 
animals versus plants. Being specific in this way can help in terms of dealing with 
the concerns at issue. If an environmental conflict is portrayed as being between 
two human parties, then to also appeal directly to the interests of animals or 
plants might imply ‘double counting’ of such interests. This is because this would 
entail considering the interests of animals, as well as the interests of people 
interested in the welfare of such animals (or the flourishing of plants). 
Nevertheless, and in view of the definition of environmental conflicts adopted 
earlier in reference to Schmidtz, the primary focus in this thesis is on people 
versus people conflict, but with significant attention to the environmental factors at 
stake as will be explained in the next section. 
                                                          
19
 This happens when elephants for instance destroy people’s crops or when lions attack cattle.  
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1.5 Some explanations of environmental conflicts  
 
A number of claims have been put forward in terms of conceptualising 
environmental conflicts. This exploration takes note of some of these claims in 
order to stress the need for proper conflict analysis and to facilitate an adequate 
understanding of environmental conflicts. Hence, the task in this section is to 
establish the character of environmental conflicts so as to ascertain what would be 
a comprehensive way of dealing with these conflicts. The discussion begins with 
an explanation of environmental conflicts provided by Crowfoot and Wondolleck 
(1990, p. 1): 
Environmental conflicts are rooted in different values of natural resources and 
environmental quality. Some individuals perceive an intrinsic value in things that are wild 
and natural while others do not. Some see societal obligation to protect species and 
preserve habitat while others do not. Some place priority on maintaining biological 
diversity and environmental integrity for future generations while others place priority on 
harnessing nature’s resources to serve the needs of today’s society.  
Furthermore: 
…the uncertainty surrounding various environmental actions, and the different 
assessments of the risks associated with these actions, cause conflicts … groups assess 
such risks differently, reach different conclusions about appropriate decisions, and 
therefore find themselves in conflict (ibid., p. 7).  
The above explanation of environmental conflicts is a good starting point. In what 
follows, this discussion unpacks Crowfoot’s and Wondolleck’s claims above, so as 
to specify the different issues at stake and to draw out the relevant aspects. The 
issues at stake in Crowfoot’s and Wondolleck’s terms involve the following 
different claims:  
(a) Environmental conflicts are rooted in different values of natural resources and 
environmental quality;  
(b) Some individuals perceive an intrinsic value in things that are wild and natural 
while others do not; and some see societal obligation to protect species and 
preserve habitat while others do not;  
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(c) Some place priority on maintaining biological diversity and environmental 
integrity for future generations while others place priority on harnessing nature’s 
resources to serve the needs of today’s society; and,  
(d) Uncertainty surrounding some environmental actions in terms of their impacts 
or effects. 
All of the above concerns are relevant and each, with the exception of (d), 
represents different aspects of environmental conflicts. In some instances, and for 
theoretical purposes, each of these issues can be understood as representing 
different types of environmental conflicts. In what follows I examine each of the 
above claims in detail, except (c) which will be discussed in the next section. In 
particular, (a) and (b) require some clarifications in view of the analysis of terms 
presented in the previous sections, especially in relation to the basic classification 
of value in terms of human values and object value.  
The claim in (a), namely, that ‘environmental conflicts are rooted in different 
values of natural resources’ is open to interpretation given that Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck do not specify what they mean by different values of natural 
resources. The starting point in considering the interpretation of the above claim is 
to look at the distinction between human values and object value. As such, there 
are at least three possibilities that may lead to conflict.  
First, different human values in relation to the same natural resources may 
be in conflict. Generally, these kinds of conflict would involve different kinds of 
human values, such as economic, aesthetic, moral, religious, scientific, and so on. 
For example people may strongly disagree on whether or not mining should take 
place in a certain area because some are concerned about the economic befits of 
mining whereas others are more concerned about the aesthetic value of the area 
at issue.  
Furthermore, reference to different kinds of values could also imply the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic/instrumental values as the next chapter 
will explain.  
Second, some human values and the object value of some natural 
resources or elements in the natural environment may be in conflict. For example, 
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profit/wealth as human values, in relation to timber production, often conflict with 
the object value of forests in ecological terms with regard to water catchment 
areas, the regulation of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or habitats 
for other species.  
Third, the object value of different natural resources can also be in conflict 
with each other. For example, this may happen when species are introduced into 
a different region where they threaten the survival and existence of other species, 
and sometimes with far reaching implications for entire ecosystems. It is also in 
the third sense that ‘environmental quality’ would be a primary concern as it 
relates to the object value of different things in terms of standards or levels of 
certain elements in the environment, such as the quality of water or air.  
In (b), Crowfoot and Wondolleck raise the concern that some people 
perceive intrinsic value in things in the natural environment whereas others do 
not. They mention the term ‘intrinsic value’ in passing without any detailed 
discussion of what the notion implies. The concept of intrinsic value is by far the 
most controversial of all concepts of value, at least in philosophical discussions. It 
is therefore an issue that will have to be addressed in a separate chapter. For the 
meantime the following can be noted: From the point of view of attempting to 
resolve environmental conflicts, this discussion will take (b), the concern that 
‘some individuals perceive intrinsic value in things that are wild and natural while 
others do not’, as a given.  
The issue in (d), about uncertainty over the effects of certain environmental 
activities, is more of a general concern and does not seem to represent a specific 
type of conflict. Suffice it to note that it is one of the factors that can aggravate any 
type of environmental conflict. Given that an environmental conflict emerges when 
one party has concerns about the environmental impacts of the other party’s 
projects (proposed or implemented), then a conflict can be complex to resolve if 
there is uncertainty about the impacts in question. To appreciate this particular 
issue it would suffice to compare some of the issues that have been prominent on 
the global environmental agenda, namely, ozone layer depletion and climate 
change.  
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The risks associated with the depletion of the ozone layer came to light in 
the early 1980s. It was then established that a hole in, or thinning of, the ozone 
layer exposed people and other life forms to serious risks from harmful radiation 
(ultraviolet rays). In this case it would appear that there was consensus both on 
the causes and effects of ozone layer depletion. As a result, it was easy to initiate 
international measures to curb the problem through the Montreal Protocol of 1987 
and other reinforcement measures that followed. In contrast, the scenario for other 
environmental challenges, such as climate change, has been different. In the case 
of climate change, there have been disagreements both on the causes and the 
risks associated with the problem. Consequently, reaching agreements on this 
matter has proved more problematic as compared to the international response to 
the risks associated with ozone layer depletion.  
While the motivations for the expressed concerns may be various, having 
sufficient knowledge about the impacts at issue is also essential to the analysis of 
environmental conflicts. This is important because sufficient knowledge about the 
impacts is crucial to the assessment of risks. Chapter 4 and 6 will address the 
significance of impacts with regard to environmental decision-making and conflict 
resolution. 
In dealing with (d), about uncertainty in relation to the risks associated with 
some environmental undertakings, it is important to differentiate two issues. The 
first is that the uncertainty can be understood in terms of disagreements about 
factual matters as to whether or not certain activities or products actually do lead 
to or can cause certain impacts. In the context of environmental conflict resolution, 
factual matters pose challenges when they attract different answers from experts 
(Wenz 1988, p. 32). The second is to separate factual disagreements about the 
impacts in question from the value disagreements about whether certain impacts 
and the associated risks are acceptable or not, even though the former does in 
some way inform the latter.  
Environmental conflicts are sometimes aggravated by lack of conclusive 
evidence about the impacts of certain activities on the environment or on human 
health. What this means is that it is difficult to assess risks and later on determine 
whether those risks are acceptable or not in the absence of reliable, conclusive 
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information and evidence. This should not in any way imply that when factual 
matters are settled conclusively, then value questions are also settled. Even when 
the facts are clear, decisions have to be made as to whether the impacts and risks 
involved are acceptable or not.  
The discussion so far provides some indication of how complex 
environmental conflicts can be. Nonetheless, when dealing with concrete cases, 
what is required is a thorough analysis of the situation in order to get to the root of 
the conflict. A good understanding of conflicts is necessary in order to develop 
strategies for dealing with them (United States Institute for Peace 2012, p. 4). 
Crucial to this processes is the determination of which issues are the most 
relevant to focus on. To this effect conflict analysis helps to redefine a conflict. 
This redefinition opens up alternative or appropriates ways of dealing with 
conflicts (cf. Burton 1990, p. 28). Taking into account the explanation of 
environmental conflicts provided in this section, the next section will consider 
specific types of conflict in order to ascertain the roles that the key concepts 
discussed in section 1.3 can play in environmental conflicts. 
1.6 Typology of environmental conflicts 
 
In terms of subjective interests, conflicts can occur in two different ways. First, 
they can be an issue of ‘competing interests’, or what Schmidtz (2002, p. 418) 
refers to as ‘conflict in use’, which is primarily about access to the same resources 
by different users20. Second, environmental conflicts can manifest in terms of 
‘conflicting interests’ or what Des Jardins (1997, p. 96) refers to as a ‘conflict of 
interests’ in which case one party prefers one thing whereas another party prefers 
something else. Each of the parties’ attention may be focused on the same 
                                                          
20 The following case cited by John Benson is a good example of a conflict of competing interests: ‘In north-
west England, a conflict [arose] over a proposal to impose a 10 mph speed limit on Windermere, a lake which 
lies within a National Park, a designated area of peace and tranquillity, but which is much used by power-boat 
enthusiasts and water skiers, whose activities contribute substantially to the economy of the area, and of 
course to their enjoyment, but detract from the peace and tranquillity of the lake’ (Benson 2000, p. 41). It is 
clear from the above case that the interests of speed-boat enthusiasts were in conflict with those who were 
interested in retreating to the park and the lake for some peace and quiet. 
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resource, but for different reasons. One party may prefer to use a particular 
resource whereas another party may prefer to preserve the same resource. The 
result is a situation where one party is in favour of a project that involves the use 
of a particular resource whereas another is against such a project. In this way, 
‘environmental conflicts are also incited by different stakes in the outcome of 
environmental and natural resource management decisions’ (Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck 1990, p. 7).  
The example in (c), as noted in the previous section, where some people 
place priority on maintaining biological diversity and environmental integrity for 
future generations while others place priority on harnessing nature’s resources to 
serve the needs of today’s society, also represent a different kind of conflict, 
namely, ‘conflicting priorities’. As Schmitz claims, ‘we misunderstand this kind of 
conflict if we see it simply as another case of conflicting values.’ This is because 
‘people’s immediate goals can be incompatible even when their values are 
relevantly similar’ (Schmidtz 2002, p. 418). In short, conflicting priorities do not 
necessarily entail ‘conflicting human values’. Conflict can emerge between people 
with relevantly similar or shared values when each of them sees different things 
as more pressing, e.g., harnessing a river to generate electricity as compared to 
maintaining biodiversity or river ecosystems. While conflicting priorities may 
involve conflicts of value in the sense of object value, they do not necessarily 
entail conflicting values in the sense of human values. 
Conflicting values represent a different type of conflict and relate more to 
the concerns noted in (a) and (b), and would most likely entail different 
orientations toward the environment. For instance, as Crowfoot and Wondolleck 
(1990, p. 1) note, some individuals perceive an intrinsic value in certain things, 
especially those that are wild and natural, while others do not.  
In view of the distinction between human values and object value, conflicts 
that are primarily over human values, should also be distinguished from ‘conflicts 
of value’ that involve the object value of different things (e.g. when a small town 
community is faced with a choice to consider a construction of a new shopping 
mall at the expense of a public park). However, one can assume that Crowfoot’s 
and Wondolleck’s claim in (a), to the effect that ‘environmental conflicts are rooted 
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in different values of natural resources and environmental quality’ provides for 
both of the two different types of value conflicts, namely, ‘conflicting values’ and 
‘conflicts of value’. In understanding the significance of impacts, however, the 
focus on conflicts of value should be understood in terms of object value.  
While the different types of conflict outlined in this section can be 
manifested in isolation or simply as aspects of the same conflict, they are all 
relevant to an adequate understanding of environmental conflicts. An adequate 
explanation of conflict is crucial not only to the understanding of conflicts, but also 
to the resolution of such conflicts21. In taking account of the many subjective 
perceptions, ideological and value stances, an additional problem might be that as 
human beings we may not be that good at knowing our ‘real’ motives. In short, it 
may not always be immediately clear, both to the individual and to others, as to 
the real reasons why someone might be in favour of, or why one might be 
opposed to something. What this implies (although it is not my main concern here) 
is that we may not only be capable of deceiving others, but ourselves as well. This 
is why third-party intervention and adequate conflict analysis is essential (United 
States Institute for Peace 2012, p. 4).  
Determining the nature of an environmental conflict is an important first 
step in determining how it can be resolved. To appreciate the nature of 
environmental conflicts, as I shall argue throughout this thesis, the distinctions 
among human values, object value and interests is very helpful. In the same vein, 
it is important to ensure that the emphasis placed on any of these three 
dimensions is not at the expense of others in order to avoid a tendency to reduce 
different aspects or types of conflict to a single explanatory framework, unless it is 
warranted by the nature of the conflict at issue. 
 
                                                          
21 As Burton (1990, p. 27) writes: ‘In the study of conflict, its resolution and prevention, in which there are so 
many subjective perceptions, and ideological and value stances, the main problem area is finding an 
adequate explanation of conflict from which to deduce remedies.’  
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Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this chapter has clarified and specified the sense in which the 
key concepts will be understood in the rest of the discussions in this thesis. The 
analysis has shown that some key distinctions are useful in terms of dealing with 
the ambiguities involved in the key concepts, namely, value and interests. I have 
adopted terms such as object value, human values, and objective and subjective 
interests in order to make the key concepts and the relevant distinctions clearer. 
Object value is understood as the quality of something which makes it desirable or 
an object of interest, whereas human values are understood in terms of desirable 
goals, ideals or principles that human beings, as individuals or groups are 
committed to, or at least wish to uphold. Objective interests have been understood 
as factors that are conducive to an entity’s wellbeing or to the attainment of 
certain goals or objectives, while subjective interests have been understood in 
terms of what a conscious being actually desires or wants.  
Furthermore, the distinctions set out in this chapter are helpful in terms of 
facilitating an adequate explanation of the nature of environmental conflicts. This 
has enhanced the understanding of environmental conflicts by facilitating a 
typological analysis and explanation of these conflicts. This then makes it possible 
for one to undertake an assessment of the distinctive roles that value and 
interests play in environmental conflicts and of how they can be resolved.  
The contrast between subjective interests and human values is central to 
the standard view on conflict resolution which will be discussed in chapter 3, 
whereas the contrast between object value and subjective interests is relevant to 
the EIA framework presented in chapter 4. The distinction between object value 
and human values will be utilised in chapter 5, to highlight the challenge posed by 
conflicts that involve different kinds of value, and to explain the limitations of 
approaches that conflate these two different kinds of value in an attempt to 
resolve environmental conflicts. The analysis of concepts as presented in this 
chapter therefore provides a basis for distinguishing and comparing the different 
approaches to conflict resolution that will be discussed in this thesis.  
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The next chapter will explore some concerns about intrinsic value, an issue 
which is not only important to a complete understanding of value but also to an 
appreciation of the nature of some environmental conflicts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ISSUES ABOUT INTRINSIC VALUE 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the notion of ‘intrinsic value’. This concept is relevant to 
some of the discussions in this thesis for two reasons. First, it is required for a 
complete mapping of the concept of value and our valuing practices. Second, 
some conception of intrinsic value is required in order to explain the nature of 
some conflicts as indicated in Crowfoot’s and Wondolleck’s explanation of 
environmental conflicts in section 1.5, noting that some individuals perceive 
intrinsic value in things that are wild and natural while others do not. In this 
chapter I explore these two issues on the assumption that the first will shed more 
light on the second. In brief, having a sense of what the concept of intrinsic value 
means is important in order to appreciate the role such value might play in 
environmental conflicts. 
This discussion takes the above observation by Crowfoot and Wondolleck 
(that some individuals perceive intrinsic value in things that are wild and natural 
while others do not) as a given. However, in view of the reasons noted above it is 
still worthwhile to explore and consider some of the relevant issues about intrinsic 
value. The concept of intrinsic value is central to environmental ethics where it has 
been applied by philosophers in an attempt to extend our moral obligations to 
nonhuman beings and the natural environment22. I shall return to this issue in 
section 2.1 when I examine the different senses of intrinsic value (see especially 
the first and second sense).  
It is important not to confuse the practical issues with the conceptual 
questions about intrinsic value. Furthermore, we should not confuse the 
conceptual questions about intrinsic value with the deep metaphysical and 
metaethical questions or assumptions about it, because doing so has been an 
                                                          
22
 Some philosophers (e.g., Norton 2003) have argued that environmental ethics should move beyond 
intrinsic value in order to attend to practical issues while others, such as Jamieson (2008), maintain that the 
notion represents deep questions about value which we cannot ignore. 
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obstacle to an appreciation of intrinsic value in some philosophical discussions. 
Explaining intrinsic value should not be derailed by some of these meta-
theoretical issues because they are not peculiar to it23.  
As indicated in section 1.1, the focus in this thesis is on the conceptual and 
practical issues about value and not on the metaphysical concerns. With this 
qualification in mind, I will now proceed to examine the concept of intrinsic value 
taking into account the fact that resolving conflict is a practical concern which 
however can be helped by a good conceptual framework (cf. Burton 1990, p. 
152). 
There are three issues involved in the controversies about intrinsic value: 
(i) what the notion of intrinsic value means; (ii) the range of things to which the 
concept of intrinsic value can be applied24; and (iii) the practical significance of 
intrinsic value, for example, in decision making and in our obligations to the 
bearers of intrinsic value. With regards to (ii), the point of contention is mainly 
whether or not intrinsic value is applicable to nonhuman beings or objects. The 
issues in (i) and (ii) are related in that how intrinsic value is conceived or 
understood (i) will have a bearing on (ii) in terms of the range of things to which 
intrinsic value so conceived may be applicable. How (i) and (ii) may relate to (iii) is 
open to debate (cf. Crisp 2006, p. 62). In some discussions, however, the above 
issues are conflated. This can be a source of confusion and misunderstandings. 
I concur with Michael Zimmerman that (i) is more fundamental than (ii) for 
we cannot say what may or may not have intrinsic value unless we understand 
what intrinsic value means. Hence, as Curt J. Ducasse notes with concern, it is 
surprising that in some criticisms of intrinsic value, no account of intrinsic value is 
supplied. This is unfortunate because ‘an explicit account of what is being meant 
by “intrinsic value” is indispensable if what is denied, affirmed, or queried is not to 
                                                          
23 With regard to instrumental values, for instance, MacKinnon (2012, p. 341) writes: ‘Those things that 
produce benefit are good or of positive value, and those that cause harm are bad or of negative value. But 
where does this goodness and badness come from? Is it there in the poison or in the growth? This a 
considerable difficult metaphysical and moral question … Does a thing have value in the same sense it has 
hair or weight?’  
24
 Zimmerman (2010, p. 2) expresses (i) and (ii) as follows: (i) ‘What is intrinsic value?’ and (ii) ‘What has 
intrinsic value?’ 
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remain wholly mysterious’ (Ducasse 1968, p. 410). Equally, the fact that many 
critics write as though intrinsic value can only have one meaning can also be 
misleading. As we shall see in section 2.1, intrinsic value can be understood in 
different senses.  
Intrinsic value is often defined as value that something has ‘in itself’, or ‘for 
its own sake’ (Zimmerman 2010, p. 1). This definition involves two distinct terms 
viz., value-in-itself and value for its own sake. I shall return to this particular issue 
when I look at the different senses in which intrinsic value can be understood. In 
what follows I consider key distinctions that are often used to explain intrinsic 
value.  
There are two distinctions that are often invoked in explaining intrinsic 
value. One of these is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. 
Another is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. Extrinsic value 
is defined as the value something has for the purpose of something else or for 
some entity apart from itself (Martell 2009, p. 28). As Wilfred Beckerman and 
Joanna Pasek have noted, the term ‘intrinsic value’ may also be used ‘to indicate 
merely one part of the twofold classification of values as being either intrinsic or 
instrumental’, which means ‘that objects of value are, respectively, either valued 
for their own sake or valued for the sake of the contribution that they make to 
some other objective’ (Beckerman and Pasek 2010, p. 83). It is common in the 
literature to distinguish intrinsic value from instrumental value perhaps because 
instrumental value is understood as a typical example of extrinsic value.  
Given the diversity and plurality of values, the distinction between instrumental 
and intrinsic value may be useful, but it does not seem to be as definitive, 
exhaustive, or as precise as one would want to have it. In short, there are values 
that do not fit snugly in terms of being either instrumental or intrinsic, i.e., being 
non-instrumental does not necessarily make a value intrinsic. Equally, non-
intrinsic does not necessarily mean instrumental (cf. Jamieson 2008, p. 71). It is 
because of this difficult that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is 
fundamental (cf. Korsgaard 1983, p. 170).  
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To determine what may or may not have intrinsic value, we first need to 
establish what intrinsic value means. In so doing we have to take into account the 
fact that intrinsic value has several meanings. The next section explores the 
different senses in which the notion of intrinsic value can be understood. Given 
the rich record of the discussions about intrinsic value (Zimmerman 2010, p. 2) 
one does not need to reinvent the wheel as it were. Hence, much of the emphasis 
and effort in this discussion is motivated by the need for clarity.  
2.1 The different senses of intrinsic value 
 
Philosophers such as Dale Jamieson and Katie McShane identify four different 
senses of intrinsic value whereas others, such as John O’Neill identify three, yet 
others such as Shelly Kagan and Ben Bradley refer only to two different senses of 
intrinsic value. In discussing the different senses of intrinsic value philosophers 
often use different terminology. While it will be inevitable to incorporate the views 
of other philosophers in order to clarify certain claims and terminologies, this 
analysis is largely based on the terms employed by Jamieson (2008) outlined as 
follows: ‘(1) intrinsic value as ultimate value; (2) intrinsic value as moral 
considerability; (3) intrinsic value as inherent value; (4) intrinsic value as 
independence from valuers’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 154).  
In the first sense (1) ‘what is of intrinsic value is of ultimate value’ whereas 
‘what is of instrumental value is only valuable because it is conducive to the 
realization of what is of intrinsic value’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 69). What this implies 
then is that what is of intrinsic value is (ultimately) more important than what is of 
instrumental value. In the context of some moral theories as Jamieson points out, 
one cannot ignore the fact that this sense of intrinsic value has had pride of place. 
For example, intrinsic value may be understood to refer to the ‘highest good’ or 
‘what is of absolute value’.  
Intrinsic value is the ‘gold standard’ of morality. Just as gold is what is of ultimate monetary 
value, so what is of intrinsic value is what is of ultimate moral value. In the case of both 
money and morality, other things obtain their value by their relations to what is of ultimate 
value (Jamieson 2008, p. 69). 
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However, outside of the context of some moral theories the above assumption 
needs qualification, especially if it is understood to imply that what is intrinsically 
valuable ‘must always be more important’ than what has instrumental value 
(Jamieson 2008, p. 153); or ‘that intrinsic values are the kind of values that should 
outweigh, trump, or even silence other values in cases of conflict’ (McShane 2007, 
p. 47). This conclusion, as some philosophers point out, is not always true 
because in some instances something of instrumental value can be more 
important than what is of intrinsic value. For example, assuming that pride (in the 
positive sense) is intrinsically valuable, one may have to swallow one’s pride and 
accept help in order to get out of some predicament. It is plausible to think that 
intrinsic value might pose different concerns from what is of instrumental value. 
But it does not necessarily mean that intrinsic value has a special role to play in 
the resolution of environmental conflicts.  
In the second sense (2) ‘intrinsic value is seen as the ticket that admits 
something to the moral community’ in that ‘having intrinsic value is both necessary 
and sufficient for being an object of primary moral concern’ or as having ‘moral 
standing’ or being ‘morally considerable’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 70). Consequently, 
as some philosophers would claim, ‘such value is a particular kind of moral value’ 
(Zimmerman 2010, p. 14). While there is no inconsistency in supposing that 
something that is morally considerable has intrinsic value, it does not follow that 
anything that has intrinsic value is or should be morally considerable (cf. O’Neill 
2003, p. 138). In fact, intrinsic value might have an important role to play in moral 
decision making because anything that has moral standing is intrinsically 
valuable. To claim that intrinsic value entails moral standing appears to put the 
cart before the horse, as it were. We may need to inquire as to whether it is more 
appropriate, in some instances, to say that someone has a rational obligation to 
something that possesses intrinsic value as opposed to saying that they have a 
moral obligation.  
Considering that rationality is a complex notion (cf. Maclntyre 1988), it is 
important to be clear about the context in which one is using this important term. 
The most common understanding of rationality is ‘instrumental rationality’ which is 
the pursuit of one’s interests and the need for consistency in one’s choices and 
actions. As a result, some authors insist that rationality must be seen from a 
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purely individualistic and self-interested economic point of view (cf. Rawls 1971, p. 
14, Wallace 2008, p. 7). This understanding of rationality is challenged on the 
grounds that it involves a “thin” theory of rationality. ‘Its value is not denied, but 
the need for a broad theory of rationality is suggested’ (Nicholson 1992: 51). In 
this regard, the argument is that a broad understanding of rationality must go 
beyond mere consistency or efficiency to consider the framework or ‘broad set of 
beliefs in which preference judgements are embedded’ (ibid.). For example as 
Boardman (2001: 103) points out: 
To the extent that environmental reasoning rests on assumptions about cooperation, 
community, trust and interpersonal communication, and the restraint of self-interest in the 
production and consumption of goods, the pursuit of self-interest appear to be limited or 
just wrong. 
The above concern points to the need for a “thick” description of rationality which, 
however, is beyond the purview of this discussion25. Nevertheless, it should be 
adequate for my purpose here to state that to see an action as rational is to see it 
as something we have reason to do (or to refrain from doing with regard to some 
environmental concerns).26 I may for example not value a tree for its own sake. 
Rather I can value it as having value in itself. The rational constraint then is that 
one cannot cut down a tree without a reason that might make it necessarily for 
one to cut it down. This need not necessarily entail that I have certain moral 
obligations to the tree. Making a distinction between moral and rational 
considerations does not entail a denial of the interconnections between moral and 
rational concerns. Rather, what this observation implies is that the general claim 
standard to some environmental ethical theories, that whatever has intrinsic value 
is thereby morally considerable, can be mistaken (cf. O’Neill 2003, p. 126).  
 
                                                          
25 According to Arne Naess for instance, ‘if an environmentally oriented policy decision is not linked to intrinsic 
values, its rationality is yet undermined’, or more specifically, ‘even what counts as a rational decision is 
challenged, because “rational” is always defined in relation to specific aims and goals’ (Naess 2010, p. 242).  
26
This understanding of rationality is open to two interpretations: ‘On the stronger usage, an action is rational 
if it is rationally required, and so omitting it would be irrational. The stronger usage allows that there can be 
cases where more than one action is rational – in which case it would be irrational to perform none of the 
actions. On the weaker usage, an action is rational if it has not been ruled out by reason – and not performing 
the actions is equally rational’ (Mason 2006, p. 10). 
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Distinguishing between morality and rationality is important because while 
the terms ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ may appear to be intimately connected (particularly 
in the context of philosophical ethics), the term rational can be used in discussions 
or in reference to decisions or actions that make no direct reference to moral 
questions. As Nicholson (1992, p. 51) points out, ‘[such] usage of “rational” has 
the merit of separating judgements of rationality from judgements of morality and 
therefore adds, not detract from our moral precision and effectiveness.’ This 
allows for the possibility that something can be rational but immoral27.  
Jamieson refers to the third sense of intrinsic value as ‘inherent value’ 
supposedly because it ‘depends entirely on what inheres in the thing itself’ 
(Jamieson 2008, p. 70). MacKinnon (2012, p. 342) makes a similar observation 
that ‘things have intrinsic value or worth (sometimes referred to as inherent value) 
when they have value or worth in themselves for some reason’. However, and as I 
want to maintain in this discussion, it is also reasonable to see why some authors 
insist on drawing a distinction between inherent value and intrinsic value (cf. 
Connelly and Smith 1999, p. 19).  
If one takes into account the view that instrumental value is not the only 
kind of extrinsic value, then inherent value is considered to be a kind of extrinsic 
value but in a non-instrumental way, or at least not in a purely instrumental 
fashion. Jamieson’s account above is a good representation of inherent value 
because it requires both the subject and object. For example, the sight of many 
things e.g., a flock of geese flying overhead is of inherent value in that we can 
appreciate it aesthetically and value it accordingly (Connelly and Smith 1999, p. 
19) in the same way that we may appreciate a beautiful sunset. We cannot talk 
about the aesthetic value of such phenomena without the subject who is capable 
of perceiving them in this particular respect. Consequently, distinguishing inherent 
value from intrinsic value merely requires one to abandon the claim that inherent 
value depends entirely on what inheres in the object. Unlike Jamieson’s or 
                                                          
27
 There is however a strong connection between rationality and morality in philosophical discussions. As 
Callicott (2010, p. 203) observes, ‘the weight of western philosophy inclines to the view that we are moral 
beings because we are rational beings. And while morality in principle might be a function of human reason 
(as say, mathematical calculation clearly is), to suppose that it is so in fact would be to put the cart before the 
horse. Hence we must have become ethical before we became rational. Even so, ethics proper, in Darwin’s 
[or Hume’s] account, remains firmly rooted in moral feelings or social sentiments.’ 
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MacKinnon’s perspective, this analysis is therefore in support of making the 
distinction between intrinsic and inherent value.  
Nevertheless, the underlying idea for the third sense of intrinsic value 
(which Jamieson and Mackinnon refer to as inherent value) is that it is value that 
‘an object has solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties’ (O’Neill 2003, p. 131). 
Some philosophers refer to intrinsic value in this sense as the value which an 
object has ‘in itself’ or as ‘value-in-itself’ (cf. Kagan 1998, p. 278). This sense of 
intrinsic value can also be explained as value that something has in virtue of its 
non-relational properties. ‘If the object’s value is had independently of all other 
objects, that value cannot depend at all upon any relational properties of the 
object; rather its intrinsic value must depend upon the intrinsic properties alone’ 
(ibid., p. 278; McShane 2007, p. 48). The terms intrinsic and objective properties 
are used interchangeably in some discussions and will be understood as such in 
this discussion.  
The fourth sense of intrinsic value involves the claim that intrinsic value is 
independent from valuers. According to Jamieson (2008, p. 71) the idea behind 
‘independence from valuers ‘is that there are certain things that are of value, even 
if no one were ever to value them.’ As O’Neill (2003, p. 132) similarly notes, in this 
sense intrinsic value is ‘value that an object possesses independently of the 
valuations of valuers.’ Depending on how the term ‘independently’ or 
‘independence from valuers’ is interpreted this sense of intrinsic value is subject to 
slightly different interpretations. In one interpretation (metaphysical) it leads to the 
view that intrinsic value can exist independently of valuers (cf. G. E. Moore 1903). 
In another (metaethical) it merely involves a claim intended to deny the 
subjectivist view that all value depends on the attitudes or preferences of valuers 
(O’Neill 2003, p. 132). Hence, O’Neill interprets this sense of intrinsic value as a 
synonym of ‘objective value’. 
In view of the four different senses of intrinsic value examined in the 
foregoing we can understand why conflating them can be a source of confusion 
(cf. O’Neill 2003; McShane 2007) or why some of the disagreements about 
intrinsic value could be based on misunderstandings. To deal with this particular 
concern this discussion will set aside the claim that intrinsic value is synonymous 
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with ultimate value as stated in (1), which in fact is closely connected to the moral 
sense of intrinsic value in (2) and the associated claim that intrinsic value is 
always more important than instrumental value for instance. Equally, the claim 
that intrinsic value can exist in a world where there are no valuers or that it exists 
in objects, which is one of the ways in which one can interpret the sense of 
intrinsic value in (4), shall be set aside as well. There are, however, other 
interpretations of the same sense (4) which I will rely on to establish the 
meaning(s) of intrinsic value I want to adopt in this thesis. 
The key issue to understanding the sense of intrinsic value in (4) is that it is 
value that an object has independently of valuers. To this extent there is more 
than one viable explanation. First, an object can have intrinsic value 
independently because such value is based entirely on its objective properties. 
This also entails the second explanation which is that such value is independent 
of the attitudes and preferences of valuers. Intrinsic value in this sense then is 
synonymous with ‘objective value’. Third, intrinsic value can be understood as 
value that an object has independently of its use or instrumental value to valuers.  
Later in the discussion we shall see that the first and second explanations 
are not exclusive to intrinsic value because they can apply to instrumental value 
as well. For example, the instrumental value of some things, e.g., water, minerals 
and vitamins, is based on their objective properties and not on the attitudes and 
preferences of valuers.  
The third explanation adds something crucial to an understanding of 
intrinsic value which then makes it possible to distinguish intrinsic values from 
other types of value such as instrumental value. Therefore, intrinsic value in this 
sense ‘might be used to indicate that the value something possesses is not only 
objective but is independent of its instrumental value to something else’ (Connelly 
and Smith 1999, p. 19).  
In view of the foregoing analysis I shall focus on intrinsic value simply 
defined as (a) value that something has ‘in itself’ and (b) ‘for its own sake’ thereby 
aligning the foregoing analysis to the definition of intrinsic value adopted in the 
introduction to this chapter. The sense of intrinsic value in (a) is based on the 
intrinsic or non-relational properties of something. This is the concept at work in 
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the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic value. The concept of intrinsic value in 
(b) is what is at work in contrasting intrinsic with instrumental value. In reference 
to the same contrast between intrinsic and instrumental value, McShane (2007, p. 
48) notes ‘that to value something intrinsically is to value it for its own sake, and 
thus for a thing to be intrinsically valuable is for it to be properly or appropriately 
valued for its own sake.’ Another set of terminology that is used in distinguishing 
between instrumental and intrinsic value is the contrast between ‘means’ and 
‘ends’. O’Neill (2003, p. 132) refers to ‘ends’ in the above contrast as ‘a synonym 
for non-instrumental value.’ In this sense, anything that is valued as an end is 
understood to be intrinsically valuable whereas something that is valued as a 
means has instrumental value. Whether something is valued as an end for its own 
sake or as an end in the sense of ultimate value is an open question. Hence, to 
value something for ‘its own sake’ does not automatically or necessarily imply that 
it is of ultimate value. 
In considering the two crucial senses of intrinsic value above (i.e., valuable 
‘in itself’ and valued for ‘its own sake or for itself’), it may also help as noted earlier 
to set aside the metaphysical concerns about intrinsic value on the understanding 
that such concerns are not peculiar to intrinsic value. Rather, they apply to other 
types of value as well, such as instrumental value.  
2.2 Some issues about the two distinct conceptions of intrinsic 
value 
 
The two concepts of intrinsic value in (a) and (b) are compatible in the sense that 
something can be valued for its own sake because of its intrinsic or non-relational 
properties. It is reasonable to suppose that something can be valued for its own 
sake because of its intrinsic properties or in general for being the sort of thing it is. 
As Harman (2000, p. 198) points out ‘not all explanations compete’; rather, some 
help to fill out others.  
Taking into account the possibility that the two different conceptions of 
intrinsic value can be understood in combination with each other, as Jamieson, 
O’Neill and Harman acknowledge, the question is how we can distinguish 
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between things that can have intrinsic value in both senses of the term and those 
that may not. The differences between living and non-living things as well as 
between conscious and non-conscious beings would play a significant role in 
addressing the above question.  
I would argue that a certain interpretation of something being valued for its 
own sake will dictate that only conscious beings can be valued for their own sakes 
(cf. Martell 2009, p.30). It is difficult to see why objects that can never possess 
consciousness should be valued for their own sakes, even though they can be 
valued in and of themselves. Hence, not all value that is based on the intrinsic or 
objective properties of something, for example the value of a tree, would entail 
that the thing should be valued intrinsically for its own sake. Being valued for its 
own sake seems to imply that it matters to the being what happens to it. It is also 
in this respect that valuing something for its own sake would be more directly 
relevant to moral considerations as opposed to intrinsic value in the sense of 
value-in-itself, which, however, is also relevant to certain rational considerations 
as noted in the previous section. 
The claim that objects, which lack consciousness, cannot be valued for 
their own sake, or at least that it may be difficult to understand why, does not 
imply that such objects can only have instrumental value. On the contrary, it is 
possible to value certain such objects in a non-instrumental fashion on the basis 
of their objective properties, or at least in part. However, this does not imply that 
all value that is based on the objective properties of the object amounts to intrinsic 
value. As Martell (2009, pp. 28-9). For example, food and certain tools have value 
that is based on their objective properties. The value of these things is derived 
from their objective properties but is value for something else. Hence, the fact that 
value is based on the objective properties of something does not necessary mean 
that it possesses intrinsic value. Furthermore, given that an object has value that 
is based on its objective properties; the next question is whether or not it would be 
rational or appropriate to value the object for its own sake. 
The distinction between ‘value-in-itself’ and something being valued ‘for its 
own sake’ is central to the understanding of intrinsic value in this thesis because it 
helps to lessen the controversies and misunderstandings about the notion. It also 
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makes it possible for practical purposes to distinguish between things to which we 
may have moral obligations and those to which we may have rational obligations. 
To what sort of entities these two senses are applicable depends on the 
significance of the distinctions between living and non-living things, as well as on 
the distinction between conscious beings and living things which lack 
consciousness or the potential for it. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to see how 
something which lacks consciousness can be valued for its own sake. In contrast, 
it should not be difficult to suppose that a living thing which lacks consciousness 
can be of intrinsic value in the sense of having ‘value-in-itself’. In some 
discussions however, there is more emphasis on intrinsic value that is based on 
consciousness (sentience/experience) which leads to the view that things which 
lack consciousness cannot be said to have intrinsic value.  
For example, Martell claims:  
It is hard to see a value in just being, living or growing. Value is the experience of these. 
Plants and rocks do not have the capacity to experience being or growing or gain 
wellbeing from them. But experience or wellbeing, which are of intrinsic value, can be felt 
by sentient beings – humans and animals – and it is in them that intrinsic value lies (ibid., 
p. 30). 
It is however surprising that those who follow this line of thinking are willing to 
distinguish between beings that can have experiences and those that cannot, but 
are willing to ignore the distinction between plants and rocks for instance, or 
generally between living and non-living things. In view of the two different senses 
of intrinsic value adopted in this discussion there is a flaw in this line of thinking 
which should not be difficult to expose. For instance, this is apparent in Martell’s 
additional claim ‘that there cannot be intrinsic value in an ecosystem’ because, ‘a 
system’s value and claim to respect rest in the value it has for its individual 
members’ (ibid., p. 35)28.  
Martell may be correct in claiming that ecosystems cannot have intrinsic 
value because the value they have is for individuals who make up the system. But 
it is difficult to see why sentience or the capacity to experience pain or suffering 
                                                          
28
 We also need to appreciate that the idea of a system is also applicable at the individual level. At this level it 
is not difficult to maintain that the value generated by individuals, as systems, is primarily for individuals 
themselves which then can be said to be intrinsic value for their own sakes or as value-in-itself. 
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should be the only criteria upon which individuals can be said to have intrinsic 
value in the context of an ecosystem. In fact, it is not clear on what basis 
sentience is a criterion for membership in an ecosystem. There is of course room 
for being concerned about pain and suffering in a socio-ecological context, 
especially from the human point of view, but such concern need not be the only 
consideration or the primary criteria for value. However, what Martell’s position 
seems to imply is that only individuals can be valued for their own sake. His 
concerns about why ecosystems should not be given intrinsic value are as follows:  
Giving value to systems has dangerous implications. It means we can value systems over 
individuals and individuals can be sacrificed for the sake of an impersonal structure. 
Making the ecosystem of intrinsic value creates a conflict between its interests and the 
interests of the individuals who make it up. Yet it is the latter who matter and the former 
which should serve them. If the system gains value in itself over and above individuals this 
can be very dangerous for them (Martell 2009, p. 35). 
The above concerns may be relevant. However, they do not tell the whole story. 
One may agree with Martell that the value in the ecosystem is not for the 
ecosystem but for individuals who make up the system and who stand to benefit 
from the ecosystem’s services. Hence, we cannot value the system for its own 
sake. The value of the ecosystem may be determined by the objective properties 
of the system as Martell admits, but it is value for individuals and not for the 
system29.  
However, a shift from considering the value of individual elements to 
considerations of collective entities such as species and ecosystems is a key 
feature of environmental thinking. From this perspective the focus is on defending 
habitats, ‘which is a collective name including both instrumentally necessary 
inorganic features of the species’ environment and other intrinsically and 
                                                          
29 Nevertheless, a system can have ‘systemic value’, i.e., ‘the value present in systems such as ecosystems 
and the entire evolutionary process that facilitates the existence of living creatures in all their diversity’ 
(Attfield 2000, p. 201). As Holmes Rolston III points out, ‘all value does not end in either human or non-human 
intrinsic value, to which everything else is contributory. Values are intrinsic, instrumental, and systemic, and 
all three are interwoven, no one with priority over the others in significance, although systemic value is 
foundational … [To say that systemic value is foundational means that] systemic value is the productive 
process, its products are intrinsic values woven into instrumental relationships’ (Rolston III 2010, p. 134).  
 
51 
 
instrumentally valuable organisms’ (Ferré 2010, p. 159). Species or systems may 
not have intrinsic value in the sense that individual organisms can be said to have 
it. Nonetheless, concerns about species or systems are inextricably linked to 
concerns about individual organisms and their environments.  
Sensitivity to the two different conceptions of intrinsic value is helpful in terms 
of making sense of the disagreements about whether nonhuman beings or objects 
can have intrinsic value or not, or in approaching such concerns ‘with the care and 
suspicion they deserve’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 75). In short, in dealing with questions 
about intrinsic value one should pay attention to both the nature of the object at 
issue and the relevant conception of intrinsic value. 
In considering Martell’s views as to why some things cannot be said to have 
intrinsic value, it is evident that those who hold this view seem to assume that 
there is only one kind of intrinsic value. In view of the two different senses of 
intrinsic value explored in this discussion this assumption is questionable. A 
particular sense of intrinsic value may be more relevant to certain considerations 
and another sense relevant to other considerations.  
In what follows I consider further substantive claims for or against attributing 
intrinsic value to nonhuman beings or objects in order to shed more light on the 
nature of these disagreements. The discussion will focus on the views of Eugene 
Hargrove (2003) and Bryan Norton (2003). A comparison of the two is interesting 
because even though they claim to hold the same point of view, there are still 
marked disagreements in their views concerning the intrinsic value of nonhuman 
beings or objects. These two perspectives are helpful in terms of appreciating the 
nature of the disagreements insofar as the intrinsic value of nonhuman beings is 
what is at issue.  
First, I will examine Hargrove’s views in section 2.3 as an example of the line 
of thinking that is consistent with the attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman 
beings. This will be followed by an examination of Norton’s view in section 2.4 as 
being representative of the line of thinking that rejects the attribution of intrinsic 
value to nonhuman beings or objects. Then I shall respond to some of Norton’s 
concerns and arguments against ascribing intrinsic value to nonhuman beings.  
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2.3 Eugene Hargrove on intrinsic value 
 
According to Hargrove (2003, p. 177) ‘at the most general level, four kinds of 
values are possible’: (1) Instrumental value for the benefit of nonhuman beings 
(nonanthropocentric); (2) instrumental value for the benefit of human beings 
(anthropocentric); (3) intrinsic value that applies to nonhuman beings 
(nonanthropocentric); and (4) intrinsic value that applies to human beings 
(anthropocentric) As Hargrove observes: 
In environmental matters nonanthropocentric instrumental values – concerning the 
instrumental relationships of benefit and harm between nonhuman plants and animals – 
are quite common and completely uncontroversial … One thing in nature either 
instrumentally benefits other things or it does not, regardless of what humans think about it 
and whether or not humans think about it and whether or not humans even know that 
these instrumental relationships exist ... Anthropocentric instrumental value judgements, if 
they are simply the same relationships applied to humans, are likewise common and 
uncontroversial. Fluoride is either instrumentally valuable to humans or not, whether we 
humans know it, believe it, or value it (ibid., p. 177). 
In Hargrove’s view, appreciating the above may be difficult if the distinction 
between instrumental and intrinsic value is associated, or taken to be 
synonymous, with the distinction between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric 
claims about value. Hence, Hargrove cites some of the terminological issues 
involved in discussing intrinsic value as contributing to the confusions or 
disagreements about it. Nonanthropocentric claims are ‘simply assumed to be the 
opposite of instrumental value, making anthropocentric for all practical purposes a 
synonym for the word instrumental’ (ibid., p. 175). However, attending to 
instrumental values need not necessarily entail that such considerations are 
restricted to ‘anthropocentric’ concerns, as it is commonly assumed, because 
certain things can be instrumentally valuable to things other than human beings.  
I shall consider the term ‘nonanthropocentric’ simply as the opposite of 
‘anthropocentrism’. Anthropocentrism involves a claim that all value (intrinsic and 
instrumental) is grounded in value for humans (Holbrook 2009, p. 53).30 
                                                          
30
 In contrast, value may be ‘anthropogenic’ but that does not necessarily mean that it should be 
anthropocentric. As Attfield (2003, p. 189) points out, ‘the anthropogenic theory of value simply involves the 
claim that all value and disvalue are dependent on human valuations.’ 
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Something has value if and only if human beings stand to benefit from it. 
Anthropocentrism then confines the scope of concern, e.g., moral concern, ‘to 
human interests, and regards nothing but human wellbeing’ (Attfield 2003, p. 188) 
or human consciousness (Norton 2003, p. 170) as being intrinsically valuable. In 
short, anthropocentric concerns are human-centred. In contrast, a 
nonanthropocentric view would involve a claim that various elements are 
instrumentally valuable to other entities in the environment apart from or in 
tandem with the interests of human beings. For example, we can understand why 
a river or an old growth forest can be said to be instrumentally valuable to entities 
or organisms that depend on these things for their continued existence. In fact, 
many conservation groups or individuals will find this to be a reasonable basis for 
objecting to any undue intrusions into certain areas of the environment by human 
beings.  
From Hargrove’s perspective the question may not be whether or not 
nonhuman beings have intrinsic value. Rather, it is more about the sense in which 
they can reasonably be said to have such value. I concur. There is, however, a 
challenge in terms of accommodating the different senses of intrinsic value in 
some philosophical discussions. As Hargrove concludes, ‘it is almost as if there is 
a competition between various conceptions of intrinsic value such that recognition 
of one kind of intrinsic value, anthropocentric intrinsic value, somehow damages 
the other, nonanthropocentric intrinsic value’ (ibid., p. 178).  
Hargrove’s explanation of anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric intrinsic 
value31 is compatible with the two different senses of intrinsic value I have 
adopted in this discussion. From a nonanthropocentric perspective some 
nonhuman beings (e.g., animals) can have intrinsic value in both senses of the 
term, i.e., value in itself and for their own sakes while others (e.g., plants) can only 
have intrinsic value in the sense of value ‘itself”.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
31 ‘…if all that is claimed is that nonhuman entities have sakes or goods of their own (independent of human 
interests) and that they are using nature instrumentally for the benefit of their own sakes, which are then 
defined as (intrinsically valuable) ends (to them)’ Hargrove (2003, pp. 177-8).  
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The next section considers Bryan Norton’s concerns about attributing 
intrinsic value to anything other than human beings. The views expressed by 
Norton are representative of the line of thinking that is opposed to attributing 
intrinsic value to nonhuman beings or objects.  
2.4 Bryan Norton’s argument against the intrinsic value of 
nonhumans 
 
To some, the notion of intrinsic value causes problems regardless of the sort of 
entities to which it is applied, human beings included. As Coker and Richards 
(1992, p. 17) claim, ‘the value we attach to ecological phenomena is of the same 
kind as the value that we attach to human beings, and the problem of explaining 
its nature is no greater in the one case than in the other’32 (cf. Hargrove 2003, p. 
182). This, however, does not seem to be Bryan Norton’s primary concern. His 
main concern is about the attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman beings or 
objects in the natural environment or to ‘nature’ in general. Instead of talking 
about the intrinsic value of nonhumans, in Norton’s view, there are reasons for 
being concerned about human behaviours that are detrimental to the natural 
environment. As he suggests, we can choose for rational or religious reasons ‘to 
live according to an ideal of maximum harmony with nature’ without attributing 
intrinsic value to natural objects or nonhuman beings (Norton 2003, p. 165). Such 
an ideal can then provide a basis for condemning human actions that are 
detrimental to the environment and to other species. 
In his view, ‘in a post-Darwinian world, one could give rational and scientific 
support for a world view that includes ideals of living in harmony with nature, but 
which involve no attributions of intrinsic value to nature’ or nonhuman beings 
(ibid.). As he claims, we need not recognise the intrinsic value of nonhuman 
objects; instead we can recognise the intrinsic value of our fellow humans and 
their preferences that nonhuman objects not be harmed. To illustrate this point, 
Norton (2003, p. 166) gives the following example:  
                                                          
32
 In considering a hierarchy of values, especially in the context of human values, one can still argue that the 
intrinsic value of a human being is more important than that of an animal or that the intrinsic value of an 
animal is more important than that of a plant. 
55 
 
I can accept that there is a fitting way to act in regard to my neighbour’s horse, without 
thereby accepting any commitment to accord intrinsic value to it. Nor am I thereby 
committed to anything either unintelligible or pointless. I need not recognize the intrinsic 
value of the horse; I can alternatively, recognize the intrinsic value of my neighbour and 
her preference that the horse not be harmed.  
In considering Norton’s views one can assume that he is working with a rather 
specific sense of intrinsic value, which in his view can only be attributed to human 
beings. This can also be seen from the fact that he has no problem attributing 
intrinsic value to human beings. The question, however, is whether or not intrinsic 
value that is attributed to human beings is, or should be, the same kind that is 
attributed to nonhuman beings or objects. If there is only one kind of intrinsic 
value, then the answer to this question would have to be in the affirmative for 
those who believe that nonhuman beings are also intrinsically valuable.  
To make sense of Norton’s claims against the attribution of intrinsic value 
to nonhuman beings or objects, we need to ascertain the sense in which he 
understands the notion of intrinsic value. In fact, one of the reasons why he is 
unable to attribute intrinsic value to nonhuman beings, as he claims in the 
example of the horse cited earlier, can be seen in the following: ‘Ideals regarding 
the treatment of my neighbour’s horse (viewed as a piece of private property) 
imply only that the horse has instrumental, not intrinsic value’ (ibid.). Of course, 
looking at a horse from this perspective does not seem to require that one 
attributes intrinsic value to it. But what Norton does not seem to take into account 
is the possibility that to some owners, a horse or a dog might be a companion as 
opposed to being a piece of property, in which sense owning the horse does not 
always imply that it can only be instrumentally valuable. It can either be valued 
inherently for its beauty and companionship or it can also be valued intrinsically 
for its own sake. Furthermore, contrary to Norton’s claims, there are reasons to be 
concerned about the horse on the basis of what is instrumentally valuable to it (in 
terms of its objective interests), as opposed to or independently of concerns about 
the owner and her preferences that the horse not be harmed. This is because 
what is instrumentally valuable to the horse is not determined by the owner’s 
preferences. Rather, what is good for the horse or a dog is what should inform the 
owner’s preferences. 
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Finally, a consideration of Norton’s conception of environmental conflicts 
can also help to explain why he has a problem with attributing intrinsic value to 
nonhuman beings or objects. In Norton’s view: 
The most common conflict, the one many environmentalists fear we face, exists when 
overly consumptive felt preferences cause serious overexploitation of nature thereby 
threaten the resource base necessary for continued human life. This conflict can be 
resolved by taking human ideals into consideration (Norton 2003, pp. 171-72). 
What is obvious from the above is that Norton’s concern is primarily about human 
life, if not the only concern. Everything else would seem to matter only insofar as it 
contributes to the continued existence of human life. However, Norton’s view 
above is not far from acknowledging that there can be conflict between our 
consumptive preferences and the integrity of nature or other living things in the 
natural environment. But even if he did acknowledge a conflict, the conflict would 
be between the intrinsic value of humans and the instrumental value of the natural 
environment. This may be informed by the view that ‘although we literally cannot 
kill the planet, we can make it better or worse for us’ (MacKinnon 2012, p. 341). 
Nonetheless, Norton’s point is that we cannot attribute the same kind of intrinsic 
value we attribute to human beings to nonhuman beings as well. This seems to be 
the underlying concern in Norton’s argument against attributing intrinsic value to 
nonhuman beings.  
Given that the concept of intrinsic value can be understood in two different 
senses, as explained in section 2.2, it is rather difficult to demonstrate completely 
that nonhuman beings cannot plausibly have intrinsic value in any them. In 
particular, Norton’s concerns do not seem to sufficiently indicate that attributing 
intrinsic value to nonhuman beings is unreasonable or irrational. If that is the 
case, then the question is not whether or not nonhuman beings can be said to 
have intrinsic value at all. Rather it is more about the sense in which such beings 
can reasonably be said to have intrinsic value. Therefore, the position in this 
thesis is that being open to the two different senses in which the notion of intrinsic 
value can be understood is important in dealing with disagreements about it. In 
particular, intrinsic value in the sense of something having ‘value-in-itself’, and 
something being ‘valued for its own sake’ should not be difficult to understand.  
57 
 
Instrumental value or use value is not the only kind of value conceivable, 
nor should it be the only kind that matters. Admittedly, instrumental value would 
seem much easier to appreciate or to relate to than intrinsic value because the 
benefits from the instrumental value of something are often tangible.33 However, 
‘some notion of intrinsic value is likely to loom as a significant landmark on any 
adequate map of our evaluative practices’ (Jamieson 2008, p. 75). As pointed out 
earlier in section 2.2 given that there are different kinds of instrumental value it is 
strange for anyone to maintain that there can only be one kind of intrinsic value, 
especially in view of the distinction that is often made between intrinsic and 
instrumental value. 
In addition, sensitivity to the distinction between human values and object 
value is also helpful in terms of appreciating the different senses in which the 
notion of intrinsic value can be understood. Given that the distinction between 
instrumental and intrinsic value is applicable to both human values and object 
value (cf. Rokeach 1967, 1973), considering whether one is looking at human 
values or object value has a significant bearing on which of the two senses of 
intrinsic value would be more appropriate. In fact, looking at intrinsic values in the 
context of human values is likely to raise different concerns compared to looking 
at intrinsic value in the context of object value. This issue will be explored further 
in chapter 5. 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it should suffice to note the following: 
First, there are two distinct concepts of intrinsic value, i.e., the value that 
something has in itself and value or valuing something for its own sake. This is 
important because we need to understand what intrinsic values mean in order to 
be in a position to say what may or may not have intrinsic value.  
Secondly, even if people agree on the meaning of intrinsic value, and the 
sort of things that may possess it, they may still disagree on its significance in 
decision making or in their actions. To this extent the conceptual and practical 
issues about intrinsic value would be independent of each other. However, 
disagreements about intrinsic value can contribute significantly to the nature of 
                                                          
33
 In contrast, as Des Jardins (1997, p. 130) suspects, ‘we seem to lack the language for expressing intrinsic 
value’ (cf. Feldman 1998, p. 339). 
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some environmental conflicts. Hence, taking note of these disagreements is 
pertinent to an understanding of some aspects of environmental conflicts. Overall, 
some notion of intrinsic value is required not only for understanding the nature of 
some environmental conflicts as explained in chapter 1, but also for a complete 
mapping of the concept of value itself and our valuing practices. Furthermore, 
sensitivity to the different senses in which intrinsic value can be understood is 
helpful in making sense of some of the concerns at stake.  
It is also pertinent to take into account the plausibility that the distinction 
between instrumental and intrinsic value is applicable to both object value and 
human values. 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has been dedicated almost entirely to a discussion of intrinsic value 
because, in the context of environmental philosophy, one would appreciate that 
this not a notion one would usually mention in passing. Over and above the 
controversies that have characterised the intrinsic value debate, one is also 
expected to take a stand on the significance of the entire debate itself. I have, 
however, resisted this temptation because of the overall aim and context of this 
thesis, namely, conflict resolution. In particular, the analysis presented in this 
chapter should be understood from a mediator’s or facilitator’s outlook (see 
section 3.1) where the aim is not necessarily to establish which side is correct or 
wrong. 
From the point of view of a mediator or facilitator, attempting to determine 
whether or not any party to a conflict should attribute intrinsic value to things that 
are wild and natural may introduce an additional burden or strain (perhaps 
unnecessary or undesirable) on the process of resolving conflicts. What this 
entails is that in good conflict analysis, one has to be open to all the relevant 
concerns raised, including those that may reflect issues about intrinsic values. It is 
not a mediator’s prerogative to decide whether or not an expressed concern is 
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trivial or is indeed the most important34. Doing so may just defeat the purpose of 
deliberation and in the process hamper their attempts to resolve conflicts. Instead, 
the purpose of deliberation is to strive for areas of agreement or synergy among 
the conflictual domains.  
On the assumption that concerns emanating from human values would 
pose different challenges in the resolution of environmental conflicts as compared 
to concerns based on object value, the next chapter examines the challenges 
posed by human values in the resolution of conflicts. I examine this issue by 
exploring some insights from the standard approach to conflict resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 As Robin Gregory (2002, p. 473) notes, although the distinction between ‘means and ends values is 
conceptually straightforward—ends are valued in and of themselves, whereas means are valued insofar as 
they contribute to the availability or amount of some other objective—developing clarity in practice only comes 
after engaging stakeholders in demanding discussions’ (emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STANDARD APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an appraisal of the standard view of conflict resolution. In 
brief, this view involves the claim that focusing on interests instead of human 
values makes the resolution of conflicts much more feasible. The problem, 
however, as I will argue, is that an exclusive focus on interests in the process of 
resolving environmental conflicts is inadequate in some important respects 
because there are other things to be considered such as the impacts at the root of 
the conflict. With the help of an example, I will illustrate how attending to impacts 
helps us to appreciate the nature of environmental conflicts and the limitations of 
the standard approach. Concerns about human values that will emerge in this 
chapter, and their significance to environmental conflicts and their resolution, will 
be addressed gradually in subsequent chapters. 
In view of the analysis of concepts presented in the previous chapter, it is 
worth noting that the understanding of both interests and values that characterises 
the standard approach to conflict resolution is specifically in relation to human 
beings. In short, the focus is on human interests and values. It is also in this 
specific sense that the contrast between interests and human values is central to 
the standard approach to conflict resolution. In view of the analysis of terms 
presented in the previous chapter, the term ‘interests’, under the standard 
approach, is understood primarily with regard to subjective interests, that is, 
interests in the sense of what the parties to a conflict actually want.  
The discussion in this chapter begins with a brief exploration of the concept 
of ‘conflict resolution’ in order to place it within the broader context of the field of 
conflict studies and practice. This is followed by an examination of the thinking 
behind the standard view on conflict resolution. Then an assessment of this 
approach to conflict resolution is undertaken against a detailed analysis of the 
nature of environmental conflicts. The purpose is to provide a basis on which to 
61 
 
explain why an exclusive focus on interests, as advocated by the standard view 
on conflict resolution, would be inadequate in the resolution of some 
environmental conflicts. To substantiate this claim, the chapter will also make use 
of an example. This is intended to highlight key features of environmental conflicts 
which may be overlooked if the standard approach to conflict resolution is adopted 
in dealing with certain environmental conflicts.  
3.1 Conflict resolution 
 
The field of conflict studies and the actual practice of conflict resolution are vast. 
In such an expansive field, it is common to find that the same terms are used in 
different ways or different terms are used to refer to the same things (cf. 
Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 27). Thus, choosing to use one term and not the 
other may require some sort of rationale. Nevertheless, concepts in this field are 
better understood when contextualised, or defined in relation to other related 
concepts. Conflict resolution can then be understood in relation to conflict 
management. ‘Conflict resolution involves the termination of conflicts by finding 
solutions to them’ whereas ‘conflict management includes the prevention, 
limitation, resolution or transformation of conflicts’ (United States Institute for 
Peace, USIP 2012, p. 3). Consequently, and by definition, conflict resolution is 
one of the key components of conflict management35.  
However, whether one is looking at conflict resolution or conflict 
management the techniques involved in dealing with conflicts are the same, viz. 
negotiations, mediation, facilitation, and problem-solving. Negotiation is a process 
whereby parties to a conflict seek to settle or resolve the conflict, whereas 
mediation involves third party intervention, but also includes negotiations 
(Ramsbotham et al 2005, p. 29). Facilitation also involves third party interventions: 
An independent third party facilitates constructive communication through moderating, 
implementing rules and non-directive communication styles. The notion of facilitation 
captures the positive side of conflict and tries to determine the possibility of synergy 
between conflictual domains (Mayer 2008, pp. 42, 43). 
                                                          
35
 Some authors such as Ramsbotham et al (2005, p. 27) use the term conflict resolution in a broader sense 
to include conflict management. 
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In this sense, facilitation is also linked to problem-solving. In problem-solving, 
parties to a conflict are invited to reconceptualise the conflict in an attempt to find 
constructive solutions or outcomes that are beneficial to all (Ramsbotham et al. 
2005, p. 30). The question of which of the above techniques may be more 
appropriate or predominant depends on the approach to conflict resolution that is 
adopted. For example, under the standard approach where the emphasis is on 
reaching consensus or resolutions that are mutually acceptable to all concerned 
parties (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, preface, p. xiii), negotiation and 
mediation are more central to the process of resolving conflicts. In contrast, under 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) approach, discussed in the next 
chapter, facilitation and problem-solving are more relevant. This difference is 
partly rooted in how ‘public involvement’ is perceived. As Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck (1990, p. 22) claim: 
In the traditional process [of decision making in government], public involvement is limited. 
It is, for the most part, public input to decisions, inputs that are multiple and often 
conflicting. Constructive criticism and offering of alternatives by citizens are certainly 
permissible; whether or not action is taken on these suggestions, however, is the decision 
of the relevant authorities in charge.  
The above notwithstanding, dealing with environmental conflicts under the EIA is 
primarily about finding workable solutions to the problems at hand as opposed to 
merely meeting the demands of the parties to a conflict. In fact, negotiations under 
the EIA approach could be difficult because of the open nature of the process. An 
EIA process often can bring in people with diverse views, interests and values, 
some of whom, unfortunately, may not be on talking terms, as the case may be 
with some conservation groups and oil corporations. Hence, unlike mediation, 
facilitation may not involve any negotiations. It may only require that every party is 
given an equal opportunity to communicate their views and concerns through 
small stakeholder meetings or through public hearings as explained in sub-section 
4.1.1.  
Against this background, and on the basis of the analysis of concepts 
presented in chapter 1, this chapter will examine the standard approach to conflict 
resolution. The point is to ascertain whether or not the standard approach offers 
or can facilitate an adequate understanding, or explanation of environmental 
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conflicts. If the standard approach does not facilitate an adequate understanding 
of environmental conflicts as indicated in section 1.4 and 1.5, then there is reason 
to suspect that it is not adequate in dealing with some environmental conflicts.  
I will begin by exploring the thinking behind the standard approach to 
conflict resolution. The idea is that doing so will allow us to evaluate the merits of 
this approach to conflict resolution in general, as well as in understanding its 
limitations in the context of environmental conflicts.  
3.2 The thinking behind the standard approach 
 
In order to appreciate the standard approach to conflict resolution, it is worthwhile 
to note that there are two options that may be available in attempting to resolve a 
conflict. One option is to focus on ‘ultimate goals’. The other option is to focus on 
‘immediate goals’. In view of the contrast between human values and interests 
that characterises the standard approach, ultimate goals relate to human values 
whereas immediate goals are captured in terms of subjective interests.  
In view of the above, one of the options is to interrogate ultimate goals 
(goal values) which may seem self-justifying, non-negotiable, or almost beyond 
discussion in the hope that they become open to inquiry, questioning and 
exploration. The idea behind this is that ‘a reduction of conflict can sometimes be 
sought by forcing the contending parties farther out on their means-ends chains’ 
(Van Dyke 1962, p. 572). The reason why ultimate goals (ends) may be difficult or 
impossible to reconcile is presumably because they are focused on or informed by 
incompatible human values. In chapter 5, the thesis will consider the particular 
kind of values that may pose this kind of difficulty.  
For example, the goal of preserving life, or not to take away any life, could 
be the ultimate goal or value at issue. A person who holds this ideal may not be 
willing to negotiate or even discuss it as an option that can be sacrificed in the first 
place. However, if people are persuaded to discuss such issues, the expectation 
is that there may be a ‘change of positions’ in terms of their overall stance, which 
in turn might make it possible for them to consider values or views which are 
opposed to their own. 
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The alternative option is that ‘when ultimate goals are in irrevocable 
conflict, the appropriate strategy for reducing conflict is presumably to draw 
attention away from them and to look for more immediate interests that, hopefully, 
may be shared’ (ibid.). The assumption or expectation, as Schmidtz (2002, p. 240) 
claims, is that negotiations should revolve around the actual problem as defined 
by the actual benefits to be realized from the settlement or resolution of a conflict. 
The motivation is that when there is the above shift from ultimate goals (values) to 
immediate interests ‘two reciprocal advantages may be gained: the role of 
emotion in considering the interest is likely to be reduced, and the role of objective 
inquiry is likely to be increased’ (Van Dyke 1962: 571). This is because it is much 
easier to establish what is instrumentally valuable than the case might be with 
establishing what is ultimately valuable to all concerned parties. Of the two 
options above, the standard approach to conflict resolution favours the second 
option of focusing exclusively on interests, as the next discussion explains. 
The standard view on conflict resolution strategies in the literature is that 
focusing on interests instead of values makes the resolution of conflicts tractable 
(Burton 1990, p. 40). As noted earlier, this strategy relies on a distinction between 
interests and human values that is clearly articulated and defended. As Burton 
(1990, p. 40) claims, the distinction between interests, which are negotiable, and 
values, which are not, is a recent one: ‘it is an insight gained primarily from 
facilitated conflict resolution processes.’ In some discussions, the same view is 
expressed slightly differently. For example, as Schmidtz (2002, p. 240) claims, 
‘the most basic principle of conflict resolution is that mediators should try to get 
people to focus on their interests, not on their positions.’ In comparing the two 
expressions of the standard view by Burton and Schmidtz above, it would appear 
that positions relate to values.  
The term ‘positions’, however, appears to be somewhat vague. Consider, 
for instance, the following account of the standard view which incorporates both 
Burton’s and Schmidtz’s perspectives above: 
One of the classical ideas in conflict resolution is to distinguish between the positions held 
by the parties and their underlying interests and needs. Interests are often easier to 
reconcile than positions, since there are usually several positions that might satisfy them. 
Matters may be more difficult if the conflict is over values (which are often non-negotiable) 
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or relationships, which may need to be changed to resolve the conflict, although the same 
principle of looking for a deeper level of compatible underlying motives applies 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 18). 
From the above explanation one can infer that the term positions can be linked to 
both interests and values. The difference, as Ramsbotham and others explain, 
seems to be that interests can be satisfied by several positions which presumably 
may not be the case with values. What this means is that positions are likely to be 
less rigid if they are informed by interests as compared to when they are informed 
by human values. This then provides a basis for differentiating between positions 
that are based on interests and those that are based on values. However, and for 
the sake of clarity in terminology, the focus in this thesis is on interests versus 
values as opposed to interests versus positions.   
The main issue in terms of appreciating the standard view on conflict 
resolution is to look at the perceived advantages of focusing on interests, and the 
difficulties associated with human values in the process of resolving conflicts. Of 
particular significance is the claim that human values are ‘often non-negotiable’ as 
compared to interests which are often negotiable (ibid.). In particular, compromise 
can be made on interests if the concerned parties stand to gain something in 
return as opposed to ‘values which are not for trading’ (Burton 1990, p. 39) or 
which may not be motivated by personal gain. Chapter 5 explains in detail why 
some human values may not be up for trading.  
Furthermore, ‘interests are transitory, altering with circumstances and are 
not as much part of the individual as values might be’ (ibid., pp. 39-40). In fact, as 
some scholars suggest, we can see a person or personhood as a constellation of 
values (Rokeach 1973). In this sense, compromising on values can be difficult 
because ‘values have inherent personal relevance’ and ‘occupy an important 
place within individuals’ social psychology’ (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, pp. 379, 384). 
As a result, values appear to be an inherent part of individuals in terms of who 
they are or what they stand for in a way that interests might not be. In short, to 
compromise on values may be seen as being tantamount to compromising on 
who someone is or what someone stands for.   
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Overall, some values represent ‘enduring goals or beliefs’ (Rokeach 1973, 
p. 5) and may relate to commitments that individuals would want to maintain even 
in the face of adversity or persuasion. Furthermore, people may want to protect 
certain values even if their own conduct appears to contradict such values36. For 
instance, people who oppose activities that contribute to global warming would 
still drive to a corner store (Gregory 2002, p. 466), or they may oppose an 
expansion of a coal powered plant even though they use and benefit from the 
electricity generated from the same power plant. In contrast, interests are likely to 
be much more directly implicated in behaviour because they relate to what a 
person wants or to the things they want to pursue.  
Against this background it should not be difficult to appreciate why focusing 
on interests can make the resolution of conflicts much more tractable than the 
case might be if the focus is on conflicting human values. As understandable as 
the argument behind the standard view on conflict resolution might be, it should 
not be taken as a substitute for a thorough analysis of environmental conflicts. 
While an exclusive focus on interests can make the resolution of some conflicts 
tractable it is inadequate in some important respects. This is the position in this 
thesis and it is informed by the exploration of the nature and typology of 
environmental conflicts presented in the first chapter.  
In brief, approaches to conflict resolution that are based on the standard 
view can be characterised as follows: ‘They acknowledge the value differences 
underlying many conflicts, yet try to resolve the resulting disputes by cooperatively 
seeking a common ground between different interests at stake and then building 
upon this common ground’ (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, p. xiii).  
To explore the limitations of the standard approach the next section will 
examine an example that has been widely discussed by various sources in the 
environmental ethics literature. The case in point involved the removal of feral 
goats in order to save endangered species of plants on San Clemente. The 
discussion that follows on this case is based exclusively on the account provided 
by Dale Jamieson (2008). 
                                                          
36
 This happens perhaps because even though values are central to issues of personhood, they are less 
directly implicated in behavior (cf. Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, p. 361). 
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3.3 The San Clemente Island case 
 
San Clemente Island is located off the coast of southern California. Setting part of 
the history aside, the Island is occupied by the United States Navy, which took 
custody of it in 1934. After taking over San Clemente Island for military purposes, 
the U.S. Navy got caught up in some environmental problems which are relevant 
to the claims in this discussion. Jamieson explains the San Clemente case as 
follows: 
In 1977 seven species (those which are native and exist naturally nowhere) were listed as 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act. Four plant species, which were first listed 
under the Act, provide shelter to two species of bird and one species of lizard. The listing 
obliged the Navy to develop a recovery plan, and their attention turned immediately to the 
feral goats that had inhabited the island since the seventeenth century. The goats had 
severely degraded the ecosystems and it was clear that they were a major threat to the 
existence of these species. By 1979 the Navy had recovered 16, 500 goats from the 
island, but about 3, 000 remained in steep, rugged, canyons. The Navy then proposed a 
shooting program to be conducted from helicopters, but was blocked in court by the Fund 
for Animals. A series of negotiations led to the fund using helicopters and nets to capture 
some of the goats, taking them off the island, and finding homes for them across the 
country. However, the conflict continued, and in 1990 the last goat on the island was shot. 
While accurate numbers are hard to come by, one estimate is that about 27, 000 goats 
were shot and about 4,000 were airlifted to safety (Jamieson 2008, p. 172). 
To appreciate the difference between the standard approach and the perspective 
to environmental conflicts adopted in this thesis, a comparative assessment of 
different ways of looking at environmental conflicts in relation to the above 
example is worthwhile. In particular, this assessment compares the focus on 
interests with the focus on impacts.  
It is important to recall the sense in which the term ‘interests’ has been 
understood in order to interpret the San Clemente Island case appropriately. As 
explained in chapter 1, the focus on interests in this discussion is in terms of what 
people actually want as opposed to what may be assumed to be in their best 
interests. If the focus is on interests in the sense of what people actually want, 
then the issue at hand involves a ‘conflict of interests’ between the Navy and the 
Fund for Animals. In following the standard approach, one should be satisfied with 
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what Jamieson has described as the initial reaction to how the impasse between 
the Navy and the Fund for Animals was handled: ‘An initial reaction that many 
have is that the airlift organized by the Fund for Animals was a good compromise; 
Goats were recovered, as the Navy wanted, but they escaped harm, as the Fund 
wanted’37 (Jamieson 2008, p. 173). But there is more to this case than what the 
exclusive focus on interests may provide. 
Looking at impacts paints a different picture, and at least highlights the root 
cause of the conflict at issue. The environmental conflict at the core of the San 
Clemente case is between the value of feral goats and the value of endangered 
species of plants. The conflict emerged when it was noted that the goats, in terms 
of impacts, had severely degraded the ecosystem, and it became clear that their 
existence on the island was a major threat to the survival of the plants in question. 
In short, the presence of the goats on the Island and the survival of the 
endangered plants seemed incompatible. Second, there is the issue of the impact 
of the actions by the Navy on the feral goats. This too is a genuine concern, and 
this is what the Fund for Animals was primarily concerned about. But focusing on 
the interests of the parties to the conflict makes it seem convenient to look at it as 
merely a conflict between the Navy and the Fund for Animals. However, the 
character of environmental conflicts often changes when we shift our focus from 
interests to impacts. This is because the focus on interests may overshadow the 
root causes of the conflict as defined by the impacts at stake. Focusing on what 
the parties to the conflict want may result in a failure to understand the cause of 
the conflict and the nature of the conflict at issue. 
Attending to impacts makes it possible to understand the object value at 
stake as opposed to merely looking at what the parties to a conflict want. For 
example, the object value at stake in the San Clemente case was biodiversity 
which was threatened by the fact that goats where destroying the plants in 
question. In particular, the value of the plants was at stake, especially in view of 
the fact that they were classified as endangered, besides their role in the 
ecological context of the area. Clearly there was a conflict between the goats and 
the endangered species of plants. But if biodiversity is the object value at stake, 
                                                          
37
 My emphasis. 
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then the idea of choosing between the goats and plants is a tough one, taking into 
account that they are both part of biodiversity. As Jamieson (2008 p. 172) writes: 
This case seems to present us clearly with questions about the value of sentient but 
common animals versus the value of highly endangered but insentient plants. Someone 
who endorses biocentrism or believes that biodiversity should never be reduced, even 
slightly, might think that morality demands killing the goats. Someone who takes sentience 
or animal rights more seriously would find this conclusion almost impossible to swallow. 
Both sides face a series of further questions, including these: How many sentient animals 
is a single plant worth? How much environmental degradation must we sustain before a 
single goat can be killed? 
Of course the initial idea was to move the goats off the island. At least, that would 
seem to have been more practical than moving the plants. It is only when logistical 
difficulties emerged that the Navy decided they could get rid of the remaining 
goats by simply shooting them.  
I concur with Jamieson’s interpretation of the San Clemente case. 
However, in following up on this account, it will suffice to point out the need to 
distinguish between human values and object value in looking at the perspective 
Jamieson presents us with. There are two aspects one should note in Jamieson’s 
account above, namely:  
(a) The case presents us with questions about the value of common animals 
versus the value of endangered plants; and  
(b) Someone who endorses biocentrism or believes that biodiversity should be 
protected ‘might think that morality demands killing the goats’ whereas ‘someone 
who takes sentience or animal rights more seriously’ may find this conclusion to 
be unacceptable.  
Sentience refers to concerns about the capacity to suffer whereas biocentrism is 
concerned with respect for all forms of life. The understanding in this discussion is 
that the second aspect (b) is largely determined by human values given that the 
concern is about what someone endorses. In contrast, the first aspect (a) is 
primarily a biological issue that should be understood in an ecological context38. In 
short, while some of the concerns generated on the basis of human values may 
                                                          
38
 See Rolston III (1988, p. 197). 
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correspond to the object value at stake (as the case may be with the San 
Clemente example), sometimes what we endorse or believe may not be an 
accurate reflection of what is at stake. 
From the perspective adopted in this thesis I can see and argue that (a) 
relates to the object value of the animals and plants while (b) touches on the 
involvement of human values. Focusing directly on object value, especially in 
terms of environmental impacts, does not base our understanding of conflicts on 
what the parties to a conflict happen to endorse or stand for (their human values). 
However, Jamieson’s point in (b) can also show that we do often bring our human 
values to bear on environmental conflicts even though, at the root, the conflict is 
primarily about the object value of the environmental elements at stake. It is also 
worth noting that, in some instances, concerns generated on the basis of human 
values can latch on to or safeguard the object value of the environmental 
elements at issue. For example, a community may preserve a certain area of the 
natural environment on religious grounds or on the basis that it is a dwelling place 
for the ancestral spirits. Such areas may, upon inspection, turn out to be of 
significant ecological value even though this ecological significance was not the 
primary reason for their preservation. 
Furthermore, the San Clemente case is useful in understanding the 
precedence of impacts and object value over interests in the context of 
environmental conflicts. Before the Fund for Animals came on the scene, the Navy 
was already trying to address a conflict of value (object value) between the goats 
and the endangered species of plants. It is only when the Navy decided to start 
shooting the animals that a conflict of interests arose between the Navy and the 
Fund for Animals. Hence, there is often more to environmental conflicts than just 
the interests of the parties to a conflict.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to assess the standard approach to conflict resolution in the 
context of environmental conflicts. The standard approach suggests that we focus 
on interests, as opposed to focusing on conflicting human values, in order to easy 
the resolution of conflicts. It cannot be denied that interests have a role to play in 
environmental conflicts and in the resolution of such conflicts. Nonetheless, the 
argument in this thesis is that the role that interests play in environmental conflict 
resolution is limited because there are other factors to be considered, namely, the 
impacts at the root of the conflict.  
Distinguishing between the standard approach and the approach adopted 
in this thesis highlights how the shift from focusing on interests, which 
characterise the standard approach, to consideration of impacts changes the 
character or our understanding of environmental conflicts. As explained earlier in 
section 1.4, environmental impacts involve the consequences of certain activities 
or products on environmental aspects of particular value or sensitivity. To this 
effect, and as will be explained in the next chapter, value is to be understood 
primarily in terms of object value as opposed to human values. Hence, an 
exclusive focus on interests is not the only alternative in an attempt to avoid the 
difficulties associated with human values in the process of resolving conflicts. In 
dealing with environmental conflicts we cannot just focus on what the parties to 
the conflict want. The need for assessing the environmental factors at stake 
presents a fundamental issue to be considered.  
Chapter 5 will further explore the difficulties involved in dealing with 
conflicts involving human values. The next chapter examines the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) framework, an approach to environmental decision 
making, and conflict resolution which takes into account object value primarily 
because of its focus on environmental impacts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter I argued that an exclusive focus on interests, as 
advocated for under the standard approach, is inadequate in some important 
respects insofar as the resolution of different types of environmental conflicts is 
what is at stake. I have also argued that object value, in relation to impacts, 
should be central in the resolution of environmental conflicts. The standard 
approach to conflict resolution is concerned with human values and interests. 
While human values and interests are relevant to the analysis of conflicts, they are 
not at the root of major environmental conflicts. Instead what are at the root of 
these environmental conflicts are the impacts of certain human undertakings. It is 
therefore in the consideration of impacts that the concept of object value is useful 
in terms of understanding the value implications of decisions that emerge from the 
resolution of environmental conflicts. 
Taking into account the fact that the standard approach to conflict 
resolution does not deal directly with object value, but makes reference only to 
human values, this chapter examines the significance of object value in terms of 
environmental decision-making and conflict resolution in particular. In looking at 
environmental decision-making and conflict resolution, the focus in this chapter is 
on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) which will be discussed with the help 
of two examples. The chapter will also explore how the EIA framework differs from 
the standard approach discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the role 
that value and interests play in the resolution of environmental conflicts.  
An EIA is an environmental decision-making tool. Environmental conflict 
resolution is something that accompanies the process by implication. Hence, the 
agenda of EIAs is much broader than the specific task of resolving conflict. In 
particular, the purpose of an EIA is to ensure that environmental concerns are 
integrated into economic or developmental projects (Environmental Council of 
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Zambia, ECZ 2010, p. 4). Consequently, the primary concern in attempting to 
resolve conflicts under the EIA process is not merely to meet the demands of the 
parties to a conflict. Rather, it is more about finding a solution to the problems at 
the root of the conflict. While the process tries to accommodate different views, as 
well as to seek common ground, the resulting decisions need not and do not often 
depend entirely on consensus among the stakeholders. I will clarify this claim in 
subsequent sections.  
The discussion will begin with an examination of the nature of the EIA 
framework. This will be followed by an exploration of how conflicts are dealt with 
under the EIA process, an issue which will be addressed with the help of an 
example.  
4.1 The nature of the EIA process 
 
There are two aspects that are essential to an appreciation of the nature of the 
EIA process and framework, namely, ‘technical analyses’ and ‘stakeholder 
participation’. Technical analysis is provided by professionals on the basis of 
studies they have conducted, or generally on the basis of the information available 
on a particular issue or problem. Stakeholder participation allows for the 
participation of the public and community members in the affected areas. In short, 
an EIA has two key aspects, namely, ‘technical analysis’ and ‘stakeholder 
participation’ both of which feed into the deliberations that characterise the final 
stages of the process thereby contributing to decision making. 
EIA is a relatively recent phenomenon introduced in the environmental 
public policy arena in the 1970s.Ithas been increasingly turned to as a method for 
incorporating environmental and social concerns into project designs and 
implementation. According to James Connelly and Graham Smith, an EIA can 
generally and concisely be understood as follows: 
The aim of the EIA process is to present, in as bias-free a manner as possible, a 
systematic analysis of the significant impacts of a proposed development as an aid to 
decision makers. Consultation with statutory agencies (such as government departments 
or pollution control agencies) and non-statutory groups (such as voluntary conservation 
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organisations) is seen as central to the process of information gathering, as is a period of 
consultation with agencies and the public after the environmental impact statement is 
published. Such consultations should mean that the best sources of information are 
accessed and can often lead to project redesign and mitigation of impacts. These 
comments, along with the environmental impact statement, feed into the decision-making 
process for authorisation, where they are balanced against other material considerations 
(Connelly and Smith 1999, p. 145). 
In what follows I tease out some of the issues noted in the above overview of the 
EIA process.  
4.1.1 Technical analysis and stakeholder participation 
 
As a technical process, an EIA is a systematic investigation of conditions within 
the environment followed by an assessment of the impacts a proposed project will 
have on the environment in its totality in terms of physical, biological, chemical, 
social, and economic considerations (Environmental Council of Zambia, ECZ 
2006, pp. 3, 7). The EIA process involves a number of activities, some of which 
are undertaken by consultants hired by the developer, in liaison with the 
implementing government department or agency, for example the Zambia 
Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA, formerly ECZ) in the Zambian 
context. These activities are intended to facilitate the identification and evaluation 
of potential impacts, mitigation measures, and the options available to assist in 
deciding whether or not to approve a proposed project. Hence, it is vital that an 
EIA is conducted at an early stage so that the information is conveyed at a time 
when it can materially affect the outcome in terms of decision-making (Warthen 
1988, p. 6), to ensure that the decision is informed by, or takes cognisance of all 
the relevant concerns and perspectives. It is also a requirement from the start that 
those conducting the EIA study take into account all the pertinent legal issues that 
may be relevant to a proposed project to ensure that the decision taken is within 
the confines of law. 
Insofar as stakeholder or public participation is concerned, the EIA process 
is not only consultative but also informative. It is consultative in that it involves 
soliciting concerns about a proposed development from all the stakeholders. It is a 
requirement that a record of these consultative meetings is provided, detailing the 
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concerns voiced by the participants and how the developer intends to address 
those concerns. The process is informative because it involves dissemination of 
information about the environmental impact statement report of the potential 
impacts of a proposed project. 
One of the reasons for including public participation in the EIA process is 
explained by the recognition that ‘growing public concern for the environment 
spells out the need for involving the public in decision-making’ (ECZ 2006, p. 4) 
and public responsibility is summarised as follows: 
The responsibilities of the public and IAPs (Interested and Affected Parties) are to provide 
information about the local environment, community goals and aspirations in relation to the 
proposed development, contributing to the social, cultural and economic evaluation of the 
project and assisting in decision-making as well as the project management process 
(ECZ 2006, p. 4). 
In providing for public or stakeholder participation, the EIA framework makes a 
distinction between interested and affected parties (IAPs). An interested party can 
be any individual or institution that has a stake in the issues involved in virtue of 
their mandate or professional obligations. In addition, merely taking an interest in 
the matter at hand can qualify any member of the public as an interested party.  In 
contrast, affected parties are those who are directly affected by a proposed 
project, for example, people or communities living in the area where a proposed 
project is to be implemented. Of course, there is no reason why one cannot be an 
affected and interested party at the same time.  
Public hearings, besides being the source of additional information, are 
crucial in that they afford decision-makers an opportunity to assess whether 
people, or the affected communities in particular, are in favour of the proposed 
project or not. The significance of public hearings is explained as follows: 
It is important to state that the findings of public hearings have considerable influence on 
the review process. In some cases certain aspects of the project proposal have had to be 
altered, additional mitigation proposals and commitments were made and final decisions 
on projects delayed until substantive issues were addressed (ECZ 2006, p. 13). 
In line with the above elaboration, public hearings and the review process can 
provide safeguards in relation to some concerns about the EIA process, for 
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example, the determination of what might constitute ‘significant impacts’. Given 
that it is the developer who has to produce the environmental impact statement 
(EIS) there is likelihood to over-emphasise the potential benefits of the project and 
to down-play the significance of the negative environmental effects (Connelly and 
Smith 1999, p. 146). For this reason, the contribution of public hearings to the 
review process is essential in terms of enhancing the efficacy, reliability and 
fairness of EIAs. In particular, public hearings are also useful in attracting the 
attention of all interested parties, ensuring that people in influential positions do 
not highjack the process. The relevance of public hearings to this discussion is 
spelt out in terms of the benefits of public hearings in the EIA process, among 
which the following are the most relevant: 
o Providing an avenue for public information and interaction between the proponent and all 
interested groups; 
o allowing people to articulate their views about a given project and make inputs which 
eventually enhance the quality of the project’s environmental assessment;  
o leading to social acceptability of projects and promotion of harmonious relationships 
between the proponent and affected communities;  
o unearthing issues that may be hidden from the reviewing authority; and  
o resolving conflicts during public meetings since every party is given the opportunity to 
express concerns before an independent panel (ECZ 2006, p. 13). 
While all the above issues are indirectly relevant, this discussion is focused more 
on issues raised by the last point. In terms of conflict resolution, public hearings 
form an essential part of the EIA process. Many conflicts are resolved in this 
manner or at the decision-making stages. Even if a conflict is not resolved during 
a public hearing, the hearing may still afford decision-makers an opportunity to 
appreciate what is really at stake so that such issues can be properly considered 
during the decision making stage. In some instances, the decisions that emerge 
from the EIA process may not be based on consensus or mutual agreement 
among stakeholders. For this reason, if a conflict is protracted, the case may even 
end up in courts of law for litigation. However, the fact that some cases might end 
up in courts of law should not be interpreted as a weakness on the part of the EIA 
process. Rather it is an accountability requirement for the purpose of good 
environmental governance.  
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In view of the fact that there is input from various stakeholders into the EIA 
process, the next section explores how the issues raised in the process are 
handled. 
4.1.2 EIA as a deliberation process 
 
In considering the significance of public hearings and input from various 
stakeholders in the review process, the EIA can be understood as a process of 
deliberation. As a result the process is able to take into account various interests. 
The decision-makers are not just faced with an environmental impact statement to 
consider. Rather, the main task is about the ‘need to balance a range of 
qualitatively different economic, social, and environmental factors’, as a result of 
which an EIA places considerable ‘emphasis on the role of sound political 
judgement’ (Connelly and Smith 1999, p. 144). For this reason deliberation under 
the EIA process is in some sense a political process and not just a technical 
process. In understanding the EIA as a process of deliberation, one should take 
into account the distinction between ‘deliberation’ and a mere ‘balancing of 
interests’: 
 
The idea behind deliberation is that the process of negotiation and discussion can be 
educational. Because people must argue their views on the merits and from a public or 
intersubjective point of view in order to persuade each other, they may refine or even 
change their positions to make them plausible representations of the public interest or the 
general good. Disagreements are likely to turn, therefore, on scientific, technical, and legal 
considerations, about which both sides may then seek more evidence or better 
information. In the context of deliberation, in other words, positions are not construed as 
exogenous variables but are endogenous to the decision-making process. Participants, 
therefore, may redefine a problem or consider alternatives that permit an unexpected 
resolution
39 (Sagoff 1988, p. 41). 
 
In deliberation, as the above claim suggests, the concerns expressed by 
stakeholders are not treated as ‘givens’ or ‘arbitrary’ preferences coming from 
outside (exogenous) the process. Rather they are considered to be part of, and as 
being (endogenous) generated by the process, in order to enhance the outcome 
                                                          
39
 In my view, the possibility of getting people to accept a resolution they did not expect represents an ideal by 
which the success of deliberation efforts can be measured. 
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of the process. As a result, ‘one of the advantages of this approach is that it can 
involve debate, exchange of information and argument, by which initial 
preferences of the various parties may become modified and their arguments 
scrutinised’ (Benson 2000, p. 47). Hence, deliberations have a significant bearing 
on the decision making process under the EIA framework. The decision making 
stage of the EIA process in the Zambian context, for instance, is summarised as 
follows: 
o Upon receipt of the environmental impact statement (EIS) from the developer, the Zambia 
Environment Management Agency ZEMA reviews the project; 
o ZEMA either approves or rejects the project; 
o If ZEMA approves the EIS, the developer may implement the project; 
o If ZEMA rejects the project the developer can appeal to the Minister for the relevant 
government ministry in charge of environmental affairs within ten working days of receipt 
of the decision letter from ZEMA. The Minister, on behalf of government, must respond to 
the appeal within fourteen working days; and 
o If not satisfied with the Minister’s decision, the developer may appeal to the High Court 
(ECZ 2006, p. 12). 
The next section presents an example in order to address some substantive 
issues about the character of conflict resolution, or decision making in general, 
under the EIA framework. I shall refer to the example at issue as the Legacy case. 
This case went through the EIA process and attracted attention from different 
sectors of society both locally in Zambia and internationally.  
4.2 The Legacy case 
 
The Legacy case involves a proposal that was initiated in 2006 with a view to 
develop hotel infrastructure and related amenities within the Mosi-oa-Tunya 
National Park. The park is situated in Livingstone, a town in the Southern 
Province of Zambia, named after the 19th century British missionary and explorer 
David Livingstone – and is considered as the tourism capital of the country. In 
terms of physical location, the park is situated on the Zambian side of the Zambezi 
River, and covers an estimated area of about 6000 hectares. The park has unique 
importance because being within the vicinity of the Victoria Falls makes it part of a 
World Heritage Site, following a declaration in 1989 by the United Nations 
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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Consequently, this is 
an area where the country has national and international obligations to carefully 
control new tourism developments, especially in terms of infrastructure for the 
tourism industry.  
This notwithstanding, there have been a number of developments in the 
park, apparently as a result of the emphasis government has placed on tourism as 
an important sector for economic growth and national development. These 
developments by other developers were already established before the Legacy 
proposal came on the scene. Among others, the developments include two hotels 
owned by Sun International, namely the Royal Livingstone and Zambezi Sun. As 
a press statement from Legacy Holdings indicates, all these facilities are within 
the national park in an area which has been designated as a tourist zone by the 
Zambia Wildlife Management Agency (ZAWA). If this is the situation, then the 
question is why did the Legacy proposal provoke what has been described by 
some conservationists as the ‘the biggest environmental campaign ever run in 
Zambia’? To answer this question, some details on the case will help to shed light 
on the matter. 
Initially, Legacy Holdings Zambia Limited had tendered for, and acquired a 
two hectares area advertised by ZAWA on a five year lease. The case then took a 
twist when it later emerged that in fact Legacy had applied for more land and had 
been awarded an additional 218 hectares. This meant that the Legacy project was 
now looking at a total area of 220 hectares of the national park along the Zambezi 
River upstream of the Victoria Falls.  
According to a press statement issued at the time by Legacy and as 
explained in the EIA report, the ‘Mosi-oa-Tunya Hotel and Country Club Estate 
Project’ was to be anchored, among other things, on the following components: 
(a) two hotels, namely the ‘Mosi-oa-Tunya Hotel and International Conference 
Centre’ with approximately 280 rooms and Queen Victoria Hotel’ with 200 rooms; 
(b) an 18 hole golf course, 450 luxury villas and support facilities collectively 
referred to as the ‘Queen Victoria Country Club and Golf Estate.’ In providing a 
rationale for the proposed developments, Legacy felt that the aim of their initiative 
was to ‘position Zambia, Livingstone and Victoria Falls as a leading tourist 
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destination and critical mass for eco-tourism’, particularly in comparison to the 
neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe.  
It was also Legacy’s intention to commission the project in 2008 before the 
2010 FIFA world Cup hosted by South Africa. Among other benefits, the project 
was expected to create 2000 jobs during construction and 1000 permanent jobs 
thereafter. In the same press statement, it was indicated that Legacy looked 
forward to working closely with the government, the people of Zambia and all 
stakeholders in order to realize what seemed to them as an exciting project (The 
Post, Friday April 21, 2006). Truly the project was exciting but in very different 
ways for different people. While some were anxious about it, others were 
incensed by it.  
4.2.1 Public response to the Legacy case 
 
Civil society and conservation groups in particular were against the project 
proposal by Legacy, apart from concerns about the manner in which Legacy had 
acquired additional land. These concerns raised suspicions about procedural 
issues and the integrity of the deal. However, concern about how Legacy acquired 
the additional land is not what is of primary interest to this discussion. 
As noted in chapter 1, dealing with conflict situations can be tense given 
that there are often so many subjective perceptions and value stances. In fact, 
some cases are also characterised by protests by the communities, conservation 
groups or other civic organisations. But in many cases, just as the situation was 
with the Legacy case, there are supporters on both sides for and against the 
project.  
(http://victoriafallsheritage.blogspost.com/2006/11/wildlife-and-environmental.html) 
After considering the environmental impact statement submitted by Legacy 
on the project, and comments from stakeholders and the general public during the 
review process, ZEMA concluded that the proposed project would have far 
reaching negative environmental impacts if it were implemented in full. In 
particular, they noted that it would have caused permanent damage to a wildlife 
habitat and animal corridor, especially for hundreds of elephants that cross the 
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Zambezi River from Zimbabwe into Zambia every year. This ruling confirmed the 
concerns that were expressed by conservation groups such as the Wildlife and 
Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia (WECSZ). Among other issues 
WECSZ cites the ZAWA’s Mosi-oa-Tunya General Management Plan (GMP) of 
May 1999 which under sub-section 3.5.1 on natural resources clearly states that 
the priorities for the management of the national park will include ‘protecting and 
conserving the Zambezi River and its riverine vegetation.’ Consequently, ‘any 
development – local, national, international – which threatens the integrity of the 
riverine ecosystem should be opposed in the strongest terms.’ In this vein, 
WECSZ notes that the General Management Plan was clearly opposed to the 
developments proposed by Legacy. Following up on the impression given by the 
claims noted from a participant earlier in this section, the next section explores 
different ways of looking at the Legacy case. 
4.2.2 Some relevant perspectives on the Legacy case 
 
There are different ways of looking at the Legacy case insofar as the 
understanding and resolution of environmental conflicts is what is at stake. The 
different perspectives can be explained in terms of the different typology of 
environmental conflicts outlined in chapter 1. ‘Conflict in use’ involves competing 
interests where people want access to the same resource. They may want to use 
the same resource in the same or different ways. In contrast, ‘conflicting interests’ 
entail a situation where some people are in favour, while others are against a 
project that involves using a particular resource. Those who are against the 
project may in fact want the resource at stake to be preserved.  
‘Conflicting priorities’ arise when people’s immediate goals are 
incompatible even though their personal or social values are relevantly similar. In 
contrast, ‘conflicting values’ entail different and incompatible orientations with 
regard to the environment and other relevant aspects. Finally, ‘conflicts of value’ 
involve the object value of different things, which are incompatible in that getting 
one or more of one is somehow detrimental to the existence or quality of the 
other. For example, more timber production in certain areas means less or 
degraded forests.  
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While these conflicts can be understood in isolation as different types of 
environmental conflicts, they can also manifest as different aspects of one 
episode of environmental conflict, especially when multiple stakeholders are 
involved. Under the EIA framework, however, it would be possible to look at 
environmental conflicts either in terms of interests and priorities or in terms of 
object value on the basis of impacts.  
By considering interests, the Legacy case can be viewed, as another 
commentator portrayed it, in the following story:  
After raising their concerns at a contentious public hearing … they [conservation groups] 
used internet blogs to keep supporters updated and to spread the word internationally. It 
worked. Safari tour operators in Britain threatened to boycott Legacy. The US 
Environmental Protection Agency wrote to the Zambian government to voice its concerns. 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) let it be 
known that the project would put in jeopardy the World Heritage site status that the falls 
and park currently enjoy; and, 
In December, the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) handed down a compromise 
decision. Noting that the Legacy proposal would have ‘far reaching environmental 
consequences’, the ECZ said the golf course would have to go. Legacy could keep its two 
hotels, but would be prohibited from putting up animal fencing or building their hotels 
higher than the treetops. ‘It was a huge victory ... It’s the biggest environmental campaign 
ever run in Zambia.’  
(http://victoriafallsheritage.blogspost.com/2006/11/wildlife-and-environmental.html) 
The manner in which the Legacy case is portrayed in the above citation 
represents a view where a conflict situation is seen as a conflict of interests. The 
conflict is primarily understood to be between Legacy and the conservation 
groups. Legacy preferred one thing and those opposed to the project preferred 
something else. In fact, this view could be reinforced by the fact that Legacy is 
reported to have threatened to take away the proposed USD 260 million 
investments if it was not allowed to implement the project in full and in the 
designated area. The decision by the environmental management agency may be 
seen as a compromise between the two competing positions. This is in view of the 
fact that Legacy was only allowed to construct two hotels while the golf course 
and villas were not permitted. However, as things turned out, the compromise was 
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not acceptable to Legacy. Of course, this is expected in a process like the EIA 
where decisions are not primarily based on consensus or mutual agreement 
among stakeholders. 
There is yet another way of looking at the Legacy case. This can be 
explained by again drawing on some of the pertinent issues raised in a press 
statement by the Chairman of Legacy Group. The press statement raises the 
relevant issues at stake, in addition to expressing some of Legacy’s specific 
concerns on the matter. It reads in part as follows: 
As happens in similar situations elsewhere, there are many locals and competitors, both in 
Livingstone and Zimbabwe, who have their own agenda and/or conflicting interests, who 
use the environment as a tool to protect their own self-interest. These include competing 
hotel groups on both sides of the river, local expatriates developing their own golf estate, 
or who have a grudge against the government … The real issue is – will the environment 
on the Zambian side of the falls be worse off or better with this development?
40
 The 
authorities need to decide this outside of all other peripheral issues. 
(http://victoriafallsheritage.blogspost.com/2006/11/wildlife-and-environmental.html) 
The above account by Legacy begins with an interests’ perspective on the 
conflict. It is only when the key question is posed (as emphasised in the above 
citation) that a different way of looking at the conflict, or at the Legacy proposal in 
this particular case, opens up. The question touches on the need to look more 
directly at the impacts of the project. The consideration of relevant impacts is what 
defines a conflict of value (e.g., environmental versus economic value). As Legacy 
claims in the above citation, the real issue was whether or not the environment 
was going to be worse or better off if the project was approved. Of course, as 
noted earlier in section 4.1, there is a concern about whether a developer can 
state potential impacts in a manner that is not biased. However, it is for concerns 
such as this one that public hearings and the review process have been provided. 
Furthermore, attending to impacts makes it possible to clearly review a 
proposed project in terms of both environmental and social considerations. In this 
regard, the supposed economic benefits of the project, in terms of tourism 
development and job creation were weighed against the actual and possible 
                                                          
40
 My emphasis. 
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environmental impacts of the project. It is on this basis that the environmental 
agency decided not to approve the Legacy project in full. The next section 
explores why attending to impacts is crucial to environmental decision-making and 
conflict resolution in particular. 
4.3 The significance of impacts in environmental conflict 
resolution 
 
The need to appreciate the significance of impacts in environmental conflict 
resolution is primarily based on the realization that the concerns expressed in a 
situation of conflict may be motivated by issues other than the impacts of the 
project in question. For example, besides the concern noted in the previous 
section, there is also a common suspicion that the concerns raised by parties to 
an environmental conflict may well be self-serving. This is because what may 
appear to be genuine environmental concerns may turn out to be just disguised 
ways of supporting an individual’s or groups’ own self-interests. Of course, each 
party is free within reason to promote their interests. But from the point of view of 
the decision-makers this cannot be at the expense of the root cause of the conflict 
and what is actually at stake. Hence, the best way to proceed, for instance as one 
EIA report illustrates, is as follows: 
Where we identified clear environmental concerns for any project activity and saw 
potential effects, the team designated the environmental concern as a valued 
environmental component upon which the EIA study was focused. The valued 
environmental components were determined, in part by perceived public concerns related 
to physical, biological, socio-economic or aesthetic values and by scientific and 
professional knowledge (Environmental and Social Affairs Unit, Zambia 
Electricity Supply Cooperation, ZESCO 2010, p. 29). 
In the above citation, the term used to refer to impacts is ‘potential effects’. The 
advantage of looking at impacts stems from the understanding that they can be 
assessed more transparently than the case might be with interests or human 
values. This is because impacts can be objectively ascertained or assessed and 
measured, assuming it is practically possible to obtain the relevant data or 
information. In chapters 1 and 3, I explained why impacts are at the root of 
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environmental conflicts based on the understanding that environmental conflicts 
emerge when one of the parties has concerns about the environmental impacts of 
the other party’s activities or project. This chapter argues that attending to impacts 
facilitates considerations about object value in the resolution of environmental 
conflicts. This is important because what are fundamentally at the root of many 
environmental conflicts are the incompatibilities among the object values of certain 
environmental resources.  
To assess the significance of impacts in terms of decision making, this 
discussion will consider some scenarios that may shed some light on the 
significance of different factors, such as interests or object value, in the decision 
making process. 
The EIA framework does not seem to spell out specifically how conflicts are 
resolved. The only thing that is clear, as noted earlier in section 4.1, is that ‘every 
party is given the opportunity to express concerns before an independent panel.’ 
This does not tell us exactly how conflicts are resolved under the EIA process. 
Just giving all the parties an opportunity to express their concerns does not by 
itself resolve a conflict. This is important to note especially if one takes into 
account how the participant described the situation during the public hearing for 
the Legacy case where he expressed anxiety about whether the meeting was 
going to be fruitful or not. The particular concern was that ‘cadres had been 
brought on both sides and every time the speaker spoke for or against the project, 
there were huge cheers.’  
Setting aside the practical and emotional challenges of dealing with a 
crowd, the real issue is to appreciate the manner in which the EIA process deals 
with environmental conflicts. The EIA involves a decision making approach to 
environmental conflict resolution. For this reason, deliberation among 
stakeholders and decision-makers is central to the process. In fact, given the 
open nature of the process, facilitation seems to be the most convenient 
technique as compared to, say mediation or negotiations. Facilitation involves 
giving all parties an opportunity to express their concerns before an independent 
panel. An independent panel, as the third party, also assists in terms of 
‘constructive communication through moderating, implementing rules and non-
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directive communication styles’ (Mayer 2008, pp. 42, 43). In view of the fact that, 
often, there are multiple stakeholders (interested and affected parties) in the EIA 
process, mediation or negotiations, whereby parties to a conflict directly seek to 
settle a conflict by talking to each other do not seem to be the primary methods of 
the EIA approach to conflict resolution (see section 3.1). While public input to 
decisions is provided for, the actual decision making rests with the relevant 
authorities (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, p. 22).  
The crucial issue for the EIA process is to determine whether a proposed 
project should be approved or not. In a public policy context, this issue has 
underlying value considerations rather than being merely about the interests of 
any particular party to a conflict. If the project is not approved, then the question of 
balancing interests does not even arise. If the project is approved, then balancing 
the interests of concerned parties becomes a significant part of the process. What 
this often entails is that a project is approved subject to certain conditions which 
the developer has to fulfil so as to take care of the concerns raised by other 
interested parties. Nevertheless, and as the concept itself (environmental impact 
assessment) suggests, the consideration of impacts is what is at the core of the 
EIA framework.  
To appreciate the EIA approach to environmental conflict resolution and 
the significance attached to the assessment of impacts the following scenarios 
should help. First, let us assume a scenario where there are no objections from 
the public against a proposed project. In particular, communities in the area 
affected by the proposed project are unanimously in favour of the proposed 
project. Does this mean that the decision-makers have no choice except to 
approve the proposed project? From the decision making point of view of the EIA 
framework, the answer is ‘not necessarily’. This is because the decision-makers 
still have to consider the technical information and professional comments or 
views about the project. On the basis of this information, a decision can be made 
not to approve the project in question for the appropriate reasons if that is where 
the evidence is pointing.  
There is no conflict of interests in the above scenario to talk about insofar 
as the public or the particular community involved is concerned. An awareness of 
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the above scenario is useful in terms of appreciating decisions that can emerge 
from the EIA process.  
For a second scenario, we may ask, how do the decision-makers handle 
cases where one group is in favour of a proposed project, and another group is 
against the same project? As noted from the first scenario, from a decision making 
point of view, what matters primarily is not the fact that one party is in favour of the 
project and the other is not. Instead, the reasons provided for taking such 
positions are the critical factors to be looked at. The need to provide justifications 
for the position taken in terms of relevant reasons or evidence is therefore crucial. 
Attending to object value, as the EIA process does, offers real insights into what is 
actually at stake and adds something substantial to the process of resolving 
environmental conflicts as opposed to an exclusive focus on interests that 
characterises the standard approach. An exclusive focus on interests does not 
seem compelling, at least in the context of environmental conflict resolution, 
especially if one takes into account the different types or aspects of environmental 
conflicts such as conflicts of value or conflicting human values.  
In order to further illustrate the significance of object value as well as to 
highlight the limitations and dangers of an exclusive focus on interest, the next 
section will examine another example that went through the EIA process. The 
case involves a proposal to commission an open pit mine in the Lower Zambezi 
National Park. The park is about 4000 square-kilometres and is situated about 
100 kilometres to the east of Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. 
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4.4 Mining in the Lower Zambezi National Park 
 
“You want to mine where?”41 One commentator exclaimed. 
In 2011, the Zambian government made a controversial decision to grant a 25-
year mining license to Zambezi Resources Limited, a subsidiary of an Australian 
mining company. In September 2012, after Zambezi Resources submitted its 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ZEMA rejected the proposed large scale 
open-pit mining activities on the following grounds: 
The proposed site is not suitable for the nature of the project because it is located in the 
middle of a national park and thus intends to compromise the ecological value of the park 
as well as the ecosystem.  
As the commentator wondered: 
How could the government even consider mining in a national park, which then was under 
consideration for World Heritage status? … You do not need an environmental impact 
assessment to inform you that it is wrong to mine in the middle of a national park. 
(http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2014/01/23/zambia-approves-a-
massive-private-copper-mine-in-the-heart-of-lower-zambezi-national-park/) 
However, and to the dismay of some environmental groups and individual citizens, 
ZEMA’s decision was overturned in January 2014, by the Minister of Lands, 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, following an appeal from 
Zambezi Resources. This development prompted the environmental groups to 
seek a court injunction (as provided for under the EIA framework and regulations) 
and it was granted. Before I comment further it is only fair to hear both sides of the 
story by looking at the views in favour of the proposed mining project as well.  
The main thrust of the arguments by those in favour of the proposed mining 
project was that ‘mining activities have far greater impact on the economy than 
tourism.’ From this perspective the Lower Zambezi case seems to present us with 
                                                          
41 (http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2014/01/23/zambia-approves-a-massive-private-copper-mine-in-
the-heart-of-lower-zambezi-national-park/) 
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an issue of mining versus tourism in the context of economic benefits. Apart from 
the core issue noted above, there were other issues that may be worth noting and 
clarifying. For example, one commentator poses the following questions: 
 
… Why are animals and plants or the natural beauty of the park more important than the 
lives of people? How do you reduce poverty without increasing economic activity through 
projects like this? … I will never understand how people can essentially argue for more 
poverty in the name of the environment. 
 
(http://www.zambian-economist.com/2014/02/reframing-lower-zambezi-mining-
copper.html) 
 
The first question: ‘Why are animals and plants or the natural beauty of the park 
more important than the lives of people?’ raises an issue which will also come up 
in the next chapter. I do not think that those who were opposed to the mining 
project are in any direct way saying that animals, plants or the natural beauty of 
the park are more important than people. However, the issue is about how to 
understand decisions where people have to choose between different options and 
what such decisions may imply.  
 
Just like the views against the mining project alluded to earlier in this 
section, there are statements in the above argument in favour of the project that 
reflect the personal feelings of the author. While such views are relevant as a 
reflection of how deeply different people may feel about the project, this 
discussion will set aside this aspect of the issue.  
Another thing to bear in mind is that getting accurate information in 
situations of conflict is challenging because ‘there may be a significant amount of 
distorted, irrelevant or false information’ (United States Institute of Peace 2012, p. 
4). For example, in some reports it is stated that the mining project will affect 25 
per cent of the national park while some claimed that the mine will only take up 6 
per cent. Consequently, this discussion has also set aside concerns about figures 
in relation to gains or loss in revenue presented by both camps on the issue of 
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mining versus tourism. The next section will explore government’s response to the 
events as they unfolded.  
4.5 Government’s response 
 
The Lower Zambezi case is interesting in that it created a rift in the response from 
government whereby the positions taken by two senior Ministers were 
diametrically opposed to each other. For example, the Minister for Tourism and 
Arts is reported to have issued a statement to a parliamentary committee which 
was opposed to the decision to allow mining in the national park for the following 
reasons, among others: 
Plans to declare the Lower Zambezi as a World Heritage site may not materialise if the 
mining activities are allowed to proceed and this might lead to an unprecedented 
campaign against Zambia’s tourism, which is a key sector in diversifying the economy.  
(http://lusakavoice.com/2014/02/14/masebo-kalaba-differ-over-lower-zambezi-
national-park-mining/) 
 
One would expect the interests of the Minister for Arts and Tourism and the 
Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection to be 
compatible. This is because the concerns raised by the former are not only 
favourable for tourism, but also for environmental protection which is one of the 
primary objectives for the latter. Under normal circumstances therefore one would 
expect this conflict to be between either of the two ministries above and the 
Ministry of Mines for instance.  
 
The Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection is 
on record to have maintained as follows:  
 
I think government has made a position and unless there is very huge tangible evidence 
that will go against government’s interests [sic!]. In fact, the matter is that whatever the 
government does, it does it for the greater good of the people and we will not be 
irresponsible really to begin doing things that will be outside the people’s interests.  
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(http://www.miningnewszambia.com/approved-construction-of-kangaluwi-mine-in-
national-park-raises-dust-2/, The Post, Thursday January 30, 2014).  
 
In view of the above statement, first one would wonder where the minister 
expected the very huge tangible evidence to come from if what was in the EIA 
report, the basis upon which the experts at ZEMA decided not to approve the 
project could not convince him. Furthermore, if the minister’s position on the 
matter was based on interests then it is unlikely that any additional evidence 
would make a difference. There is an effort in the above statement to appeal to 
what may be in the best interests of the people of Zambia. However, as I will 
argue in chapter 6 appealing to what we may consider to be in people’s best 
interests can be misleading when dealing with communities or groups with 
different aspirations especially in situations of conflict.  
 
It is also in this respect that an exclusive focus on interests, as the standard 
approach advocates, is not adequate in dealing with some environmental 
conflicts. One cannot fully explain the nature of the conflict concerning the 
proposed mining in the Lower Zambezi National Park by simply appealing to the 
fact that the interests of two Ministers are in conflict. It is also inadequate to simply 
maintain that the interests of government and the mining company on the one 
hand and the interests of some environmental groups and safari/tour operators on 
the other are opposed to each other. Rather, the conflict stem from the fact that 
the requirements of maintaining a national park and the activity of mining are 
incompatible. As ZEMA stated, mining at the scale proposed could compromise 
the ecological value of the park the ecosystem. The manner in which these two 
sectors interact with the natural environment means that they cannot take place in 
the same area. In short, it is unlikely that you can have both in the same area 
without one being negatively affected by the other.  
 
While the Minister has powers under the current legislation to reverse 
decisions made by ZEMA, one would be primarily interested in the reasons that 
may be given for doing so. It is common for government officials to claim that 
government can act on advice or ignore it. Whatever the merits of this claim might 
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be, overturning a decision made by a legitimate government agency is a different 
matter and therefore requires some justification. 
 
Apart from what was reported in the media there is not much information 
that one can use in considering the Minister’s decision. In fact, given that the term 
interests can be understood in two different senses as explained in chapter 1, we 
should wonder in what sense government can be said to have interests. Taking 
into account the fact that government is not a person or a conscious being in the 
literal sense then it cannot be said to have interests in the first sense of wanting 
something. As a result, what the Minister claims to be government’s interests may 
be a reflection of the interests of some individual members in government.  
In view of the foregoing, the statement by the chief government 
spokesperson intended to clarify the contradiction between the two Ministers 
noted above does not help much. It reads: 
 
Government expects a fair balance between the benefits of mining and the protection of 
wildlife conservation, the policies and laws will be respected and adhered to and the 
investment will create employment opportunities for ordinary Zambians. 
 
(http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2014/02/16/government-clarifies-its-position-on-
lower-zambezi-national-park-mine/) 
 
The idea of balancing wildlife conservation and mining in the same location does 
not sound plausible. In fact, the argument against the mining project may as well 
be correct in claiming that you do not even need an EIA to tell you that it is wrong 
to mine in the middle of a national park or to dig up a legally protected 
conservation area. The logic in this view is that a conservation area is not only 
legally protected from ordinary people and local communities but from government 
itself and business interests as well, especially if such interests are incompatible 
with the status of the area in question. Consequently, government’s position on 
the matter and the government spokesperson’s claim that ‘laws will be respected 
and adhered to’ makes it difficult for one to understand what is going on, 
especially behind the scenes. 
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In exploring the EIA framework this chapter has considered two cases, 
namely, the Legacy case in section 4.2 and plans to commission an open pit 
copper mine in the Lower Zambezi National park presented in section 4.4. I have 
also used these two examples to assess the significance of object value in 
environmental decision-making. It is clear in both examples that the decisions 
made by ZEMA make direct reference to impacts/object value, e.g., ecological 
value. Some of the concerns and arguments discussed in both examples reflect 
the interests of stakeholders themselves. 
 
While it is not possible in this discussion to present all the concerns that 
were raised in either of these cases, what is obvious is the fact that there are 
concerns that reflect human values. Hence, when I argue that the EIA framework 
does not deal directly with conflicting human values I do not imply that there are 
no human values involved in the process or that it should not deal with human 
values. Rather, my point is that the EIA framework is not equipped to deal with 
conflicting human values head-on (e.g., where oil corporations and some 
conservation groups are involved, see also section 2.1).  
 
As the following observations will indicate, the above challenge is 
substantive. The most explicit reference to value under the EIA framework comes 
under the criteria for assessing the impacts of a project. As it is stated, the criteria 
for determining the significance of possible impacts from a project is based on 
what value society places on the resources and the different impacts affecting the 
resources (ECZ 2006, p. 7). This understanding of value in terms of impacts may 
not tell us or satisfy a philosopher’s curiosity about what value is ̶ although it 
seems to be a simple and useful guideline for practical purposes. With regard to 
assessments the notion of impact points mainly to object value, and whatever 
value there is in this context, it is something that is determined, at least partly, by 
the characteristics of the resource in question ̶ for example, the value of 
unpolluted air or water. This then makes it possible to assess the value 
implications of decisions to prohibit or sanction certain projects. 
 
Some authors such as Lawrence (2000, p. 621) have, however, argued 
that the role of value in the EIA process has not been fully explored. In attempting 
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to explore this concern further the EIA literature may be more informative than the 
EIA framework itself. But as Tim Richardson claims, ‘the question of value has 
become very difficult for EA [environmental assessment] theorists (Richardson 
2004, p. 341)42. As I argued in chapter 1, the distinction between human values 
and object value is useful in dealing with this difficulty because ‘one of the issues 
that the EA community must sort out is how it deals with the presence of multiple 
and often conflicting values, and ways of valuing’ (ibid., p 348).43 In the absence 
of the distinction between human values and object value, the question of how the 
EIA process can deal with value questions would be shrouded in controversy. For 
example this is the case with the debate on whether EA should embrace values, 
‘and attempt to mediate value conflicts’ (cf. Daniels and Walker 1996), or rather, 
whether decisions over values should be completely removed from the process 
(cf. Elling 2004) and be left to politicians who have the mandate to make difficult 
judgements about trade-offs or irreconcilable differences (Richardson 2004, p. 
349).44 I agree with Richardson’s observation that rather than merely 
concentrating on procedure, ‘the EA/SEA community should be debating where 
and how value conflicts and differences are being or should be resolved’ (ibid. p. 
348).45 Understanding the EIA in the context of strategic environmental 
assessments (SEA) or in a policy context in general also provides avenues for 
considering conflicting human values that may not be adequately dealt with at the 
project or EIA stage. I shall return to this issue in chapter 6. 
 
Whether values should be removed from the EIA process or not as the EA 
debate suggests is not the real issue. The issue is whether the EIA framework is 
capable of dealing with value conflicts or not, and if so what kinds of value 
conflicts and in what ways. For example, I have argued in this chapter that while 
                                                          
42
 Richardson (2004) uses the terms EIA and EA interchangeably. 
43
 Richardson then suggests that the point is ‘to move beyond acceptance of multiple values, to the 
realization that value judgments need to be made in the face of multiple and often conflicting ways of valuing.’ 
However, as many would acknowledge making such value judgments is difficult (cf. Des Jardins 1997, p. 96) 
and may not aid the process of conflict resolution as the standard approach also cautions. 
44
 The fact that the minister (under the Zambian EIA legislation for example) has powers to reverse a decision 
made by the environmental agency ZEMA may seem to reflect this impression. However, the same legislation 
also stipulates that any aggrieved part can seek redress from the courts of Law. This means that questions 
about values and irreconcilable differences are not left to politicians alone. 
45
 As Richardson (2004, p. 351) acknowledges, the EA debate ‘alerts us to the inescapable presence of 
values in the activity of scoping, filtering, and assessing impacts of development’ however, it does not 
‘satisfactorily show us how to deal with them.’  
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the EIA framework can deal with conflicts involving object value it does not seem 
equipped to deal with some conflicts involving human values.  
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the significance of object value in 
environmental decision-making and conflict resolution. An assessment of the EIA 
framework and the two examples that we have looked at have shown that object 
value understood in terms of impacts has a pivotal role to play in decision making 
as well as in the resolution of environmental conflicts. It is evident from both 
examples that the environmental agency relied mainly on information about the 
environmental impacts of the projects at issue in order to justify its decisions.  
Attending to the interests of stakeholders is primarily intended to ensure 
their participation in the EIA process as opposed to determining the outcome. The 
fact that the EIA process is able to take into account object value and interests in 
the process of decision making and environmental conflict resolution is noted. 
However, the EIA framework does not offer adequate guidance in terms of how it 
deals with conflicting human values. This observation is important given that 
human values can play a significant role in some conflicts even though they may 
not be at the root of environmental conflicts. For this reason, the next chapter will 
examine an approach that claims to deal with conflicting human values in an 
explicit and adequate manner. It shall also ascertain how human values tend to be 
introduced in environmental conflicts, as well as the particular kind of values that 
may pose a difficulty in the process of resolving conflicts. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEALING WITH MULTIPLE VALUE DIMENSIONS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated the significance of attending to object value in 
the process of environmental decision-making that characterises the EIA 
framework. I have argued that taking object value into account is central to an 
appreciation of the value implications of decisions arising from environmental 
conflict resolution. The EIA does not, however, deal directly with human values. 
As a result it does not offer adequate guidance in dealing with conflicting human 
values. This chapter will therefore examine the structured decision making (SDM) 
approach to environmental risk decisions based on Robin Gregory’s account. 
Gregory’s (2002) suggests using ‘structured processes’ to address the 
challenge posed by multiple value dimensions for improving the quality of 
stakeholder input to environmental decision-making and conflict resolution, in an 
attempt to deal with difficult value trade-offs. While he describes his approach as a 
SDM approach, the ideas involved are drawn from different sources and 
disciplines, e.g., decision sciences and behavioural psychology, which are too 
numerous to be examined in this discussion. Hence, I have opted to focus 
specifically on the claims that are relevant to the discussion in this thesis.  
In particular, I will address my concern that Gregory, in his SDM approach 
to conflicts involving multiple value dimensions, conflates human values and 
object value. This is a major drawback in his attempt because allowing for a 
distinction between human values and object value is fundamental to an 
appreciation of multiple value dimensions.  
Another important aspect in looking at value dimensions is the distinction 
between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of value as explained in 
section 5.4. This distinction is also applicable to both human values and object 
value. However, the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative is much 
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more evident in the context of human values where values that are inclined to the 
qualitative dimension differ significantly from those that are inclined to the 
quantitative dimension. 
By focusing on the combination of technical analysis and stakeholder 
participation as the foundation for successful community participation in 
environmental risk decision making (Gregory 2002, p. 462), Gregory’s SDM 
approach shares some characteristics with the EIA approach discussed in the 
previous chapter. However, the SDM approach is not as traditional to the 
government decision making context as the EIA might be.  
As opposed to being a traditional process, the SDM approach therefore 
falls within the category of ‘alternative processes’ to environmental decision-
making or conflict resolution. Alternative processes can be distinguished from 
traditional processes. Alternative processes are often designed to address the 
shortcomings in traditional decision-making approaches in government. For 
instance, as a US government memorandum on environmental conflict resolution 
notes, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) helps make the government more 
results-oriented, citizen-centred and provides for effective public participation in 
government decisions, encourages respect for affected parties and nurtures good 
relationships for the future.’ While Gregory is cautious about the extent to which 
stakeholders can influence public decisions, his focus is on how the processes 
can be improved so as to reduce the levels of dissatisfaction among stakeholders. 
The next section examines Gregory’s main concerns. First, an overview of his 
concerns is presented and then the particular claims relevant to this discussion 
are examined in detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
5.1 Gregory’s main concern 
 
Gregory’s main concern is about the failure of most environmental initiatives to 
fully incorporate conflicting values and value trade-offs in environmental risk 
decision making. Hence, his focus is on incorporating conflicting values into the 
decision making processes. He argues that we need to address people’s 
concerns head-on in order to develop new management methods that can deal 
with the challenging task of incorporating value conflicts and trade-offs into 
controversial risk-management decisions (Gregory 2002, p. 467). In response to 
growing awareness of the need to involve the public in environmental 
management and decision making, Gregory acknowledges that ‘information about 
the values of citizens is increasingly asked for as input to evaluating a broad 
range of environmental- and health-risk management decisions’ (ibid., p. 464). In 
considering the significance of public participation, however, he argues that often 
‘the weighing or balancing of conflicting values, which is the essence of clarifying 
trade-offs, is ignored or partial’ (ibid.). This happens because participants are not 
assisted to think through their own values or to deal effectively with value conflicts 
within their concerns or in relation to those of others. Consequently, value trade-
offs that emerge during the course of nearly all policy consultations on 
environmental risk-decisions are not effectively dealt with in most environmental 
initiatives. 
Gregory’s main worry is that if stakeholder input to the decision making 
process is inadequate then decision-makers can make decisions which do not 
effectively deal with conflict thereby leaving some of the stakeholders highly 
unsatisfied with the outcome. This, in his view, has negatively affected the 
success of most environmental initiatives in that ‘they fail to encourage the more 
deliberative [and] constructive type of decision making response’ (Gregory 2002, 
p. 484).  
There are two substantive issues in Gregory’s concerns: (1) the inability of 
some initiatives to deal with conflicting values and value trade-offs; and (2) what it 
is that makes certain value conflicts and value trade-offs difficult to resolve or to 
deal with. The second point is crucial because the reasons given might help to 
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understand why some initiatives may not be able to deal with these kinds of value 
conflicts and value trade-offs. 
On the first point (1), the reason why many initiatives may not be able to 
address the concerns Gregory raises is twofold: Not only do they refuse or fail to 
recognise the complexity of the value dimensions involved, they are also unable 
to provide the techniques required for addressing value conflicts and trade-offs 
among stakeholders. Consequently, they fail to ‘help community stakeholders to 
make sense of their own, and others’ conflicting values’ (Gregory 2002, p. 462). 
The issue Gregory raises about the need to recognise the complexity of the value 
dimensions that may be involved in some value conflicts or trade-offs is important. 
This discussion will now examine Gregory’s explanation of why value conflicts and 
trade-offs can be difficult to deal with as noted in (2), then I shall, in reference to 
(1), assess his attempts to address the challenge posed by value conflicts 
involving multiple dimensions of value. 
5.1.1 Gregory’s explanation of why some trade-offs are difficult 
 
Trade-offs occur whenever getting more of one thing of value requires giving up something 
else that also is desirable: more jobs resulting in less environmental protection, a higher 
quality output also requiring more time, or more habitat for a rare animal species leading to 
fewer opportunities for recreationists (Gregory 2002, p. 462). 
In addressing the question of why some value trade-offs are difficult, Gregory 
offers a number of reasons. First, ‘addressing value trade-offs explicitly is 
cognitively demanding’ (ibid., p. 465) especially in terms of weighing the costs and 
benefits, or simply in terms of assessing what will be gained and lost as a result of 
the trade-off in question. For example, how do we compare the loss of biodiversity 
with the wealth created by development (Benson 2000, p. 41)? Trade-offs 
involving goods that are not only diverse, but also public are complex to deal with. 
Public goods include resources which are of common benefit to the public or 
communities, such as unspoiled natural countryside or parks within inhabited 
areas, the earth’s atmosphere and oceans (Gregory 2002, p. 56). Second, some 
trade-offs are difficult to deal with ‘because they bring up emotional, moral, or 
ethical issues that are fundamentally hard for individuals to think about and do not 
easily lend themselves to resolution’ (ibid., p. 465). For example, this may include 
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asking someone about their willingness to increase a present benefit at the risk of 
their own or other’s future health or to forgo an economic development intended to 
benefit the poor in order to protect a habitat for an endangered species of 
animals.  
Other reasons include such issues as people being uncomfortable because 
they feel they lack the information they need to make an informed decision; or 
they feel that it is not their responsibility to make the decision because they think 
that elected officials, for instance, should assume that responsibility; or they feel 
that ‘a norm that is protected or regarded as sacred (e.g., the health of children) is 
perceived as being violated’ (Gregory 2002, p.465). In view of these constraints, 
Gregory’s concern then is that ‘at such times, individuals may refuse to answer 
the trade-off question that is being asked or they may provide a meaningless 
response that gives little insight into their underlying values (ibid., p. 466). Overall, 
the foregoing concerns collectively translate into the following six decision making 
challenges to each of which Gregory suggests some useful techniques as outlined 
in the table below:  
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Table 2: Selected decision making techniques for encouraging the consideration 
of trade-offs.  
Decision making challenge             Useful techniques                                               
  
Multiple value dimensions                                                means/ends networks 
(value hierarchies) 
 constructed attributes/measures 
  
Uncertainty of consequences46  value of information assessment 
 identification of thresholds 
 expert judgement processes 
  
Unfamiliarity of evaluation contexts                 setting priorities (e.g., swing weighting) 
 simplifying the decision (e.g., even 
swamps) 
 evaluability: increasing ease of 
comparisons 
  
Affect and process concerns                              broaden legitimate range of concerns 
 use process-based and constructed 
scales 
 mental models and open-ended 
elicitations 
  
Learning                                                               multiple (sequence) decisions 
 multiple methods 
 monitoring and adaptive strategies 
 
Source: Gregory (2002, p. 472).  
 
                                                          
46
 My emphasis. 
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While all the issues outlined above are relevant for an appreciation of Gregory’s 
project, the focus in this thesis is on the two top rows of the above table. Given 
that chapter 1 has already addressed concerns about ‘uncertainty of the 
consequences’ of some environmental activities in terms of impacts, this chapter 
will focus only on the challenge posed by ‘multiple value dimensions’ in relation to 
the resolution of value conflicts and trade-offs.  
As Gregory points out ‘fundamentally, trade-offs are difficult because it is 
hard for people to make choices over options that may result in outcomes 
affecting multiple dimensions of value’47 and ‘not only are there many different 
dimensions of value, but their variation is often fundamental’ (Gregory 2002, p. 
467). He writes: 
In these and many other risk contexts, the definition of some key dimensions also can be 
subject to substantial ambiguity: people may care intensely about protecting biodiversity or 
reducing respiratory illness among children without precisely understanding what these 
concerns imply. Even if definitions are clear to one individual or stakeholder group, the 
existence of multiple value perspectives means that others may disagree (ibid.). 
Gregory’s depiction of the problem above, insofar as looking at multiple 
dimensions of value is what is at stake, is true. However, there is need for a clear 
understanding of the concept of value in order to be clear about what the concern 
expressed above indicates.  
In order to improve the quality of expressed concerns there is a need to 
communicate concerns about value in a manner ‘that is transparent, logical, and 
free of arbitrariness’ (Gregory 2002, p. 473, cf. Slovic 1995). This thesis has 
adopted the distinction between human values and object value in order to have a 
precise understanding of what the concept of value can mean with regard to 
different concerns. This is useful in terms of assessing the concerns expressed by 
stakeholders. Furthermore, if the distinction between human values and object 
value is borne in mind, we would be in a better position to appreciate what is at 
                                                          
47
 Trade-offs are easier to deal with if they fall within the same category of value (i.e., either within the domain 
of human values or object value) than the case is with trade-offs involving multiple dimensions of value. For 
example, trade-offs between objects do not seem to pose serious difficulties. If that was not the case, then 
‘barter trade’ (the exchange of goods, services and so on, for other goods or services of a different kind, 
without using money as a common measure) would be difficult if not impossible.  
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stake and what the disagreements may be about. It therefore adds something 
substantial to Gregory’s attempts to address the challenge posed by multiple 
value dimensions. 
The next section will evaluate the effectiveness of his suggestions in order 
to explain why they do not seem to address the decision making challenge posed 
by multiple value dimensions, particularly in relation to environmental conflict 
resolution.  
5.1.2 Gregory’s solution to the challenge posed by multiple 
dimensions of value 
 
I sympathise with Gregory’s position on the difficulties that people may face in 
identifying and dealing with values because it would appear ‘that people rarely 
proceed on the basis of a well-considered and consciously entertained 
comprehensive conception of their values’ (Van Dyke 1962, p. 569). This is why it 
is important, as he suggests that people are helped to clarify their concerns in 
order to reveal the underlying values and to make explicit the trade-offs that their 
concerns may imply. Setting aside the value elicitation problem, the key issue in 
terms of assessing Gregory’s views is how he proposes to deal with the value 
conflicts that are likely to emerge from the expressed concerns.  
The thinking behind Gregory’s view is that providing appropriate techniques 
for addressing difficult value trade-offs is essential to dealing with value conflicts. 
As he correctly claims, difficult value trade-offs involve multiple value dimensions. 
Gregory then suggests two different techniques of dealing with the challenge 
posed by multiple value dimensions, namely, ‘means-ends analysis’ and 
‘constructed measures’. From this it follows that if these two techniques can 
address the problem of multiple value dimensions then they will help in terms of 
addressing difficult value trade-offs, thereby contributing to the resolution of the 
value conflicts that underlie the difficult value trade-offs. This implies that if the two 
techniques fail to surmount the challenge posed by multiple value dimensions, 
then they are not as helpful as Gregory wants us to believe. To deal with this 
issue, this discussion will first briefly outline the two methods, viz., ‘means-ends 
analysis’ and ‘constructed measures’. This is followed by an assessment and 
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explanation of why these two solutions are not successful in surmounting the 
challenge posed by multiple dimensions of value.  
According to Gregory (2002, p. 473) the analysis of means and ends is 
essentially a value elicitation technique intended to help stakeholders to think 
through their values in order to communicate this information more effectively to 
decision makers. Constructed measures can be used to assist stakeholders to 
make trade-offs involving multiple value dimensions in relation to environmental 
decisions. A common example of a constructed measure is money, e.g., dollars. 
Money is often used to compare the value of different commodities or the 
performance of different sectors of business in terms of profits or their contribution 
to the economy. Another example of a constructed measure is the grades that are 
given to students on the basis of which for example, a faculty can come up with 
the best student across different disciplines and course combinations. In short, the 
idea behind constructed measures is to have a common measure which has 
common interpretation across different spheres. 
In view of the above, it would appear that Gregory’s main solution to the 
challenge of multiple value dimensions is the idea of constructed measures. 
Although there may be no problem with the use of constructed measures per se, I 
will argue later that there are serious constraints in terms of the extent to which 
constructed measures can be applied. The next two sections will provide an 
assessment of each of the two methods suggested by Gregory. Section 5.2 will 
look at the issue of means-ends analysis, while section 5.3 will assess the 
effectiveness of constructed measures. 
5.2 An assessment of means-ends analysis 
 
When explaining the challenge people face in making choices affecting multiple 
value dimensions as noted in section 5.1.1, Gregory claims that the decision 
context is difficult not only because there are many value dimensions involved. 
Rather, it is also because the variation in value dimensions is often fundamental, 
i.e., we cannot ignore the differences in the character of the values involved 
because such differences matter. As explained in section 5.1.1, for example, 
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these may involve things such as protecting biodiversity, human health, or 
considerations about financial costs and so on.  
The focus on means and ends values ties Gregory’s views to the distinction 
between instrumental and intrinsic values. However, this is just one of the aspects 
in considering multiple value dimensions. Once it is realised that reference to 
means and ends is applicable in the context of either human values or object 
value, then the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ values is not as 
straightforward as Gregory claims. This is because each of these two terms can 
be understood in two different senses, an issue which, as Katie McShane (2007, 
p.15) claims, has also caused tremendous confusion in discussions about intrinsic 
value.  
Chapter 2 has already explored concerns about intrinsic value. For the 
purpose of this assessment, an exploration of the two different senses in which 
means and ends can be understood is provided given that Gregory does not take 
this issue into account. I will argue that the distinction between human values and 
object value which Gregory also does not recognise is relevant to an appreciation 
of the two different senses of means and ends. McShane offers a detailed 
analysis of the two different senses of means and ends48.  
The first sense of means is causal and the second one is representational 
or symbolic. This is clear in the example McShane cites from Elizabeth Anderson, 
namely, that ‘something like a memento would count as a means in the second 
sense but not in the first’, and the reason is that ‘a memento has value not 
because of what it does – not because it is used to achieve any goal or aim – but 
because of what it signifies or represents’ (McShane 2007, p. 51). In a similar 
fashion, a ring or a bouquet of flowers can be a means of showing love. They do 
not necessarily cause people to fall in love. Thus, while means in the first sense 
                                                          
48 She writes: ‘The first sense of means and ends comes from everyday speech, where we use the term end 
to denote a goal or an aim, and we use the term means to denote that which one uses to achieve a goal or an 
aim. […] In the second sense, end is used to describe something that has value in its own right (nonderivative 
value), and means is used to describe something that has value in virtue of a relation it has to some end 
(derivative value)’ (McShane 2007, p. 51). 
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can be associated with instrumental value, means in the second sense might be 
non-instrumental. 
With regard to the distinction between human values and object value, the 
second sense of means (i.e., representational or symbolic) applies in the context 
of human values only, whereas the first sense of means (i.e., causal) may apply in 
relation to both human values and object value. It is in the causal sense that many 
objects have their instrumental value as a means to something else, e.g., the 
value of water, a piece of wood, etc. The second sense of means fits well in the 
context of human values. It is only in the context of human values that certain 
objects can be understood to represent or symbolise something else, e.g., a 
bouquet of flowers, a ring and so on. In short, the distinction between human 
values and object value allows one to appreciate the two different senses of 
means and ends. 
In the absence of the above recognition, the analysis of means-ends 
networks is not very helpful in clarifying the concerns of different stakeholders in 
view of the challenge posed by multiple value dimensions. The concerns 
expressed by stakeholders can be better understood if there is recognition of the 
different kinds of value at stake, taking into account the distinction between 
human values and object value. Just appealing to means and ends in the sense 
that Gregory does is not revealing enough in terms of dealing with multiple value 
dimensions. Reference to means and ends can only be helpful in dealing with 
multiple value dimensions if there is a keen awareness of whether the issues at 
stake relate to either human values or to object value, or to the interface between 
the two and if the different senses of ‘means’ and ‘ends’ are borne in mind. The 
next section assesses the effectiveness of ‘constructed measures’ which is 
another solution Gregory provides to the challenge posed by multiple value 
dimensions. 
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5.3 Constructed measures and multiple value dimensions 
 
The primary purpose of constructed measures, from Gregory’s point of view, is to 
facilitate trade-offs involving multiple dimensions of value. If Gregory is using 
constructed measures as a common measure across different kinds of value, then 
he is at the same time indirectly challenging the idea that certain value 
dimensions are ‘incommensurable’. For example, this might be evident in the 
following substantive claims:  
Constructed scales thus provide a possible mechanism for addressing one of the key 
issues giving rise to taboo trade-offs, which is the perceived incommensurability between 
value dimensions of environmental risk-policy issues under consideration. They also 
provide a mechanism whereby a wide range of ethical and moral and aesthetic concerns 
can be made legitimate, in the sense that they can be compared directly to concerns such 
as costs or jobs. Individuals then have the option of ranking these different components as 
more or less important to the overall decision: one person may assign a high weight to 
jobs and a low weight to cultural or aesthetic concerns, for example, whereas another 
person may do the opposite (Gregory 2002, p. 476). 
The notion of ‘incommensurability’ is linked to a lack of a common measure 
(Kekes 1993, p. 21). If incommensurability is understood in this basic sense then it 
cannot in itself account for ‘taboo trade-offs’ as Gregory claims, because the idea 
of taboo trade-offs means something more than just the lack of a common 
measure. In fact, as Gregory also acknowledges, ‘taboo trade-offs arise because 
of the request to express one thing of value in terms of a fundamentally different 
metric which is not seen as simply bizarre or illegitimate but as threatening to the 
organization of society’ (Gregory 2002, p. 466). Hence, what might give rise to 
taboo trade-offs, for instance, is a tendency to think that moral concerns can be 
compared and possibly be traded off against other sorts of concerns such as 
costs or profits, or jobs and so on. The point, however, is that there is more to 
taboo trade-offs other than the perceived incommensurability of value dimensions. 
I will explore the notion of taboo trade-offs in detail in section 5.5. 
In what follows I assess constructed measures against the challenge of 
incommensurability in the context of multiple value dimensions. Given that 
constructed measures, from Gregory’s point of view, are intended to address the 
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issue of incommensurability, an exploration of incommensurability will be 
worthwhile in order to provide a framework for the assessment of constructed 
measures. 
5.4 Incommensurability of value dimensions 
 
Because the idea of commensurability is linked to comparability, the terms 
‘incommensurability’ and ‘incomparability’ are often used interchangeably or 
alongside each other in some discussions in the literature (cf. Nien-hê Hsieh 
2007). However, treating incommensurability and incomparability as though they 
are synonymous may lead to misunderstandings if not properly qualified. Many 
authors acknowledge (e.g. Chang 1997, Griffin 1986 and others) that 
incommensurability is not the same as incomparability. However, there is a way of 
understanding incommensurability that strongly links it to incomparability and thus 
goes beyond the idea of a lack of a common measure as I explain in subsequent 
sections. This would also help to explain Gregory’s perspective. 
According to Ruth Chang two things are incomparable ‘if no positive 
comparative judgement of their values is true’, that is, we can say neither that one 
is better nor that it is equal to the other (Chang 1997; cf. Nien-hê Hsieh 2007, p. 
3). Paradoxically, this explanation does not completely show that things are 
incomparable because if two things are really incomparable then one cannot even 
be in a position to say that neither is better than nor equal to the other. To claim 
this means that one is able to compare the two, at least in some way. 
Nevertheless, what seems to underlie the above claim is the idea that two things 
are incomparable if there is no basis for ranking or comparing them in terms of a 
common measure (Kekes 1993, p. 21). To this extent incomparability and 
incommensurability are interconnected. However, this need not entail that they 
are synonymous. This is because incomparability can arise from two different 
reasons. The first is a lack of a common measure (incommensurability). The 
second involves a concern or an attitude that certain comparisons are undesirable 
or inappropriate even if possible. It is in the second sense that the notion of 
incomparability will be primarily understood in this discussion. That is to say two 
things are incomparable if comparing them is seen to be unacceptable or 
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inappropriate. Although some authors, for instance Lukes (1997) and Raz (1986) 
have opted to explain incomparability in terms of incommensurability, it is better to 
treat incomparability in the second sense as a distinct issue given that it goes 
beyond what is involved in the first sense where incomparability arises merely 
from a lack of a common measure.  
To appreciate the two points above one can for instance consider the 
following claim: ‘Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be 
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgements 
about how these goods are best characterized’ (Sunstein 1997, p. 238). There are 
two distinct issues in this claim, namely, (a) incommensurability occurs when the 
relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric and (b) without doing 
violence to our considered judgements about how these goods are best 
characterised. To this effect (a) relates to the first aspect of incomparability (when 
there is a lack of a common measure, i.e., incommensurability) whereas (b) 
relates to the second aspect of incomparability (when certain comparisons are 
deemed to be undesirable or inappropriate even if it was possible to make such 
comparisons). As Sunstein further explains: 
The notion of a single metric should be understood quite literally. By this I mean a 
standard of valuation that (1) operates at a workable level of specificity and detail, (2) 
effaces qualitative distinctions among the goods that it measures, and (3) allows 
comparisons along the same dimension (ibid.). 
The claim that a metric ‘effaces qualitative distinctions’ raises an important issue 
in terms of appreciating concerns about the incommensurability of value 
dimensions. In fact, this is the main obstacle to the application of a metric to 
different value dimensions given that value dimensions can be either quantitative 
or qualitative (cf. Chang 1997, pp. 16-17). It would appear that metrics are mainly 
applicable to the quantitative dimensions of value such as mass or profit. In 
contrast, metrics would seem not to be appropriate for some qualitative 
dimensions of value such as respect, love, trust, or worth. Consequently, 
comparing different kinds of value may prove to be problematic because some 
values are inclined to the qualitative dimension and may be insensitive to quantity 
(cf. Baron and Spranca 1997). For example, whether something is good or bad, 
right or wrong, may not directly depend on how many times it happens. If this is 
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correct, then the qualitative dimension of value is at the core of the problem of 
incommensurability. 
The concern in (b) about doing violence to our considered judgements 
about how certain goods are best characterised is not merely that we cannot align 
goods on a single metric. Rather, it is that we should not align certain types of 
goods with any other goods on a single metric because doing so entails 
comparing things that are not supposed to be compared, for instance money and 
family ties or companionship. Such comparisons would be deemed to be contrary 
to our considered judgements, i.e., ‘our reflective assessments of how certain 
relationships and events should be understood, evaluated, and experienced’ 
(Sunstein 1997, p. 238). Secondly, as Nien-hê Hsieh (2007, p. 12) acknowledges 
in reference to Anderson (1997), ‘the roles that goods play in deliberation can be 
so different that attempts to compare them head to head are incoherent’ or ‘there 
is no good reason to compare their overall values with regard to some common 
measure.’ To this extent, incomparability is a more appropriate term than 
incommensurability (Nien-hê Hsieh 2007, p. 13).  
What is at issue from the point of view of this analysis, for example with 
regard to a choice between money and companionship (Raz 1986, p. 350) is not 
incommensurability per se. Rather, it is incomparability in the second sense of the 
term, which means that it is unacceptable, for instance, to compare the value of 
one’s companion or spouse to the value of money (especially if money was not 
the basis of that relationship). The understanding is that perhaps the most valued 
human relationships and commitments are not based on money. In short, money 
cannot be applied as a metric to the value of companionship, not because people 
cannot consider the monetary gains or expenses of being in a relationship, but 
because it is unacceptable to consider the value of a companion in terms of 
money since that entails comparing the value of an individual to the value of 
money. 
Monetary value is a metric, and quantity is the criterion for metrics. As 
Sunstein correctly claims, there are no qualitative distinctions in metrics and 
notions that allow for this sort of distinction, for example, ‘more important’ or ‘more 
honourable’ do not qualify as metrics. For this reason, ‘many possible standards – 
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excellence, well-being, affective allegiance – count as criteria, but not as metrics’ 
(Sunstein 1997, p. 238) because they are inclined to the qualitative dimension. 
Thus, even if some of Gregory’s constructed measures did qualify as metrics, 
some dimensions of value, for example, love, respect and wonder, including some 
environmental values are not susceptible to metrics (ibid.). Therefore, constructed 
measures do not seem to fully address the challenge posed by multiple value 
dimensions or the problem of incomparability (understood by some in terms of 
incommensurability) between value dimensions.  
Consequently, instead of imposing constructed measures where they 
should not apply one would be better advised to just ‘see how goods can be plural 
and how they can differ in kind or quality’ and not just in quantity (Anderson 1993, 
p. xiii). In fact, as Sunstein also claims, ‘probably we cannot make sense of our 
experiences without reference to qualitatively diverse goods’ (Sunstein 1997, p. 
237) because our evaluative practices are already attuned to the fact that we 
cannot value everything in the same manner. In fact, not only do objects of value 
possess different features, we also often value different features in different 
objects.  
Furthermore, the call to constructed measures is not as compelling as one 
would want to believe given that incommensurability does not always entail 
incomparability. Gregory’s quest to compare different kinds of value can be 
undertaken provided it is also borne in mind that ‘the comparability of goods need 
not entail value commensurability’ (Nien-hê Hsieh 2007, p. 14). It may be possible 
to compare some incommensurable goods in certain considerations when 
weighing our options or choices, e.g., between creating wealth and preserving a 
wildlife habitat to protect biodiversity. But in comparing incommensurable goods 
one need not claim to have addressed the challenge of incommensurability. 
In dealing with incommensurable value dimensions, especially in the context of 
this thesis, it is also important to recall that incommensurability (or incomparability) 
is not what is at the root of many value conflicts. Rather, it is ‘incompatibility’ that 
is at the root of value conflicts and the trade-offs or sacrifices that may result from 
this. Values are incompatible ‘if they cannot be realized together because the 
realization of one of them either entirely or partially precludes the realization of the 
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other’ (Kekes 1993, p. 21). Some of the factors that contribute to such 
incompatibilities would include situational pressures which may be either temporal 
or spatial. Pressures are temporal when two things cannot take place at the same 
time, or they can be spatial when two things cannot co-exist or happen in the 
same place. The fact that values are incommensurable or incomparable does not 
necessarily mean that they are incompatible. For example, the fact that 
companionship and money are incommensurable or incomparable does not 
necessarily mean that they are incompatible. For this reason there is more 
emphasis, in this discussion, on incompatibility as opposed to incommensurability 
or incomparability. 
However, conflicts can be complex when they involve incommensurable 
values. Nevertheless, the issue of whether a trade-off is seen as acceptable or as 
taboo does not arise from the mere fact that the values involved are 
incommensurable. Trade-offs can be seen as taboo if they involve goods that are 
deemed to be incomparable in the sense that comparing them is seen to be 
inappropriate or simply unacceptable.49  
Overall, taboo trade-offs arise because of the norms that govern certain 
choices. In short, it is the norms that people subscribe to which will guide them 
about whether a certain trade-off is appropriate or not. If this is the sense in which 
Gregory understands incommensurability, then there is a basis for associating 
taboo trade-offs with incommensurability (although as I explained earlier, we can 
avoid some misunderstandings if incommensurability and incomparability are 
treated as distinct concepts). But this very understanding of incommensurability 
also precludes the use of constructed measures as a solution to the problem of 
incommensurability or multiple value dimensions as Gregory would want to have 
it. In dealing with multiple value dimensions we do not only encounter 
incommensurability with regard to a lack of a common measure, we encounter 
incomparability as well, i.e., a refusal to compare certain things or a refusal to 
accept such comparisons. Hence, if understood in terms of incomparability, 
incommensurability can pose a challenge and may lead to taboo trade-offs.  
                                                          
49
 In the absence of this perception or norm certain relationships, attachments, and attitudes would not be 
tenable (Sunstein 1997, p. 242, Raz 1986). 
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What Gregory refers to as constructed measures ̶ e.g., ‘the creation of an 
index that describe the range of possible impacts’ for issues such as forest or 
ecosystem health (Gregory 2002, p. 475) ̶ do not qualify as metrics but simply as 
indicators. An indicator is a measurable property of the environment ‘defined in a 
time, space and policy context’ (SADC 2001, p. 3). While indicators are 
measurable or quantifiable they don’t qualify as a common measure because 
indicators are developed for a specific variable or value dimension. For example it 
is possible to develop indicators for issues such as biodiversity, forest health or 
deforestation. But these same indicators cannot be applied to other issues such 
as water quality, sanitation or child nutrition. If Gregory’s constructed measures do 
not qualify as common measures or metrics then it is difficult to see how they can 
address the problem of incommensurability. In contrast money, as a common 
measure, can be used to communicate information about costs and investments 
into all of the above issues and their contribution to the economy. However, we 
cannot use money to determine their relative importance because that would 
come up against the issue of incommensurability.  
Constructed measures do not offer an adequate solution to the challenge 
of multiple dimensions of value, or the problem of taboo trade-offs, as Gregory 
claims. Furthermore, the very notion of a ‘trade-off’ may be part of the problem in 
that it may not be an adequate reflection of what is going on when people make 
decisions that seem to reflect choices. For example, choosing between 
alternatives may not be ‘the same as a judgement about their comparative worth’ 
(Lukes 1997, p. 186). If someone chooses to tell a lie instead of telling the truth, it 
does not necessarily mean that the person thinks that telling lies is more important 
than telling the truth. As Lukes claims: 
The mere fact of taking, or having to take, a decision between options does not show that 
that decision is based on a judgement as to the relative worth of the options, even if the 
decision is part of a systematic pattern of such decisions and is not arbitrary (ibid.). 
In contrast to the above claim, the notion of trade-offs seems to rely on the 
assumption that the options are either equivalent or that the option that is chosen 
is more important than the one that is not chosen. In fact, this is the trap Gregory 
finds himself in by suggesting that individuals can compare and rank moral 
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concerns in relation to other concerns such as costs or jobs, and be in a position 
to decide which of these concerns is more or less important. This is a line of 
thinking that leads directly to taboo trade-offs as opposed to addressing or 
avoiding the problem altogether. The reason is that it may be inappropriate to 
trade-off concerns about the health of people with profits for instance. This 
challenge is prevalent in industries such as mining where the health of employees 
or local communities is at stake.  
People can make choices which do not carry the implication that the 
chosen option is more important than the one that is not chosen. This is what 
facilitates the idea behind the standard approach which is to look for immediate 
interests that hopefully can be shared in an attempt to ease the resolution of 
conflicts. From this perspective it is easy, especially for conflict resolution 
purposes, to take into account the options individuals have chosen without going 
into the difficult or controversial issue of determining which of the options is or 
should be more important. The point, however, is that where comparison is 
possible then choice is plausible. From this perspective, incommensurability need 
not be an obstacle to choice. In fact, it is not only that ‘commensurability is not 
required for choice’ (Sunstein 1997, p. 241; Nien-hê Hsieh 2007, p. 19), rather 
incommensurability can also aid certain choices. As some authors (e.g., Raz 
1997) have indicated there may be no reasonable basis for choosing (as opposed 
to merely picking) between things that are exactly the same either in quantity or in 
quality.  
In considering the extent to which Gregory is willing to apply constructed 
measures to different value dimensions, it is also important to note, as he 
acknowledges that ‘the point is not to reach agreement in value structures, but 
rather to present the full range of relevant values and demonstrate the diversity of 
concerns that any broadly supported policy alternative will need to address’ 
(Gregory 2002, p. 476). In this respect, it is difficult to come up with a consistent 
hierarchy or ranking of values among different people, which in turn makes it 
difficult to resolve value conflicts as the standard approach indicates (see chapter 
3). 
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5.5 Notable concerns about the concept of trade-offs 
 
To appreciate the key concerns about some trade-offs it is essential to take into 
account the fact that the circumstances in which choices or decisions are made 
can be complex. As a result the notion of ‘trade-off’ may not constitute an 
adequate explanation or reflection of what actually goes on when people make 
decisions that involve incommensurable values. In short, the notion of trade-off 
may not be an adequate explanation50 of what choices entail in certain 
circumstances as Gregory for instance wants to maintain.  
In exploring the above concern, Lukes compares the notion of trade-off to 
the notion of ‘sacrifice’, which I believe sheds some light on the key concerns 
about the idea of trade-offs. Comparing the idea of a trade-off with that of sacrifice 
draws a sharp and interesting contrast in that the two notions have different 
implications. As Lukes claims, a trade-off has the connotation of exchanging 
valued objects at an equivalent price while the idea of sacrifice has the 
connotation of obligation. He writes: 
Trade-off suggests that we compute the value of the alternative goods on whatever scale 
is at hand, whether cardinal or ordinal, precise or rough and ready. Sacrifice suggests 
precisely that we abstain from doing so: Devotion to the one exacts an uncalculated loss 
of the other (Lukes 1997, p. 188). 
The above comparison can help one to reflect on what is actually going on when 
people make what seem to be choices between incommensurable values. This is 
because it might be more appropriate to understand some choices in terms of 
sacrifice as opposed to a trade-off.51 For example, a parent may decide to spend 
                                                          
50 As Steven Lukes claims: ‘We speak of weighing goods, of balancing considerations, and, very often, of 
trade-offs that must be made when values clash: that is, when a choice must be made between valued 
alternatives that instantiate different and incompatible values. Indeed all thought about these questions that is 
based on or influenced by economic thinking typically takes the (never analysed) idea of a trade-off for 
granted as an adequate characterization of what such evaluative choice between valued alternatives consist 
in’ (Lukes 1997, p. 187). 
 
51
 In the context of human values, trade-offs may be difficult or demanding so that some might prefer the term 
sacrifice as opposed to the concept of a trade-off. For example, those who have sacrificed their lives for 
freedom or justice are called heroes, which would not be the case if they sacrificed their lives for money, in 
which case greed may seem to be the correct description of their actions. 
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more on medical resources for a child in hospital while leaving those at home with 
no food or other essentials. This will strike most of us as a sacrifice as opposed to 
a trade-off. Of course, there is a trade-off between food and medical resources, 
but it does not at the same time imply that there is a trade-off between the value 
or well-being of the children at home and the health of the child in hospital. Trade-
offs entail that we compare alternatives. It is these comparisons that people would 
refuse to make in some instances. For instance, it would be morally problematic to 
compare the health of children to the number of jobs that a factory which is 
detrimental to their health will provide. To use another example, a mining 
company can decide whether or not to invest more in safety and health issues. 
But it may be unacceptable, at least to some people, to directly compare the costs 
that may result from such a decision to the value of the lives of miners or 
communities affected.  
If the concern is that such comparisons are undesirable, then this might 
suggest that ‘the values that the attitude of incommensurability protects are 
sacred values’ (Lukes 1997, p. 188.). This understanding of incommensurability 
goes beyond the basic sense of a lack of a common measure, to include 
incomparability. These normative aspects are relevant to the concerns about 
trade-offs this section will consider.  
The notion of sacred values is helpful in terms of explaining the problem of 
taboo trade-offs which Gregory also seems to be concerned about. The presumed 
existence of these values raises an ethical question of whether it is correct or fair 
to seek to elicit certain difficult trade-offs from people if this would mean that they 
undermine their established norms and principles52 (Gregory 2002, p. 466). In this 
sense, the concern about taboo trade-offs is no small matter.  
In exploring the notion of ‘taboo trade-offs’, Peter McGraw and Philip 
Tetlock make an important observation. The two authors emphasise the 
                                                          
52 ‘The logic of choice often may not be consequential: What is in this for me? Rather, the logic of choice 
often may be that of role constraint obligation: What kind of person do I claim to be in my relation to particular 
others, and what types of decision would be compatible with this image of who I am?’ (McGraw and Tetlock 
2005, p. 2). 
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importance of distinguishing between routine trade-offs (the sort of trade-offs we 
make on a daily basis, for instance, between quality and price) from taboo trade-
offs. In agreeing with Fiske and Tetlock’s (1997) view of ‘taboo trade-offs’, 
McGraw and Tetlock state that ‘such trade-offs entail comparisons of the relative 
importance of secular values (e.g., money, time, and convenience) with sacred 
values that are supposed to be infinitely significant’ (McGraw and Tetlock 2005, p. 
4). In view of the above, it should not be difficult to appreciate people’s concerns 
about these kinds of trade-offs.  
In consideration of McGraw and Tetlock’s views, resistance to trade-offs 
across the different kinds of values cannot be explained fully by simply appealing 
to value incommensurability, as Gregory seems to suggest. Rather, of more 
concern is the claim that such trade-offs may violate ‘deeply held intuitions about 
the integrity, even sanctity, of the individual-to-individual or individual-to-society 
relationships and the values that animate those relationships’ (ibid.). As explained 
in section 5.4, incomparability is what is at the root of the above concern as 
opposed to mere incommensurability (understood with regard to lack of a common 
measure). In particular, trade-offs involving different kinds of value can be difficult 
or controversial if some values are assumed to be more important than others, as 
the case may be with ‘sacred values’ in relation to ‘secular values’.  
Another way to understand the idea of sacred values is in terms of 
‘protected values’. The main claim behind the notion of ‘protected values’ is that 
they ‘resist trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values’ (Baron and 
Spranca 1997, p. 1). The reason is that ‘protected values derive from rules that 
prohibit certain actions, rather than values for potential outcomes of actions’ 
(Baron and Spranca 1997, p. 4). To this effect, protected values are explained in 
contrast to compensatory values which are based on consequences or potential 
outcomes of actions53.  
                                                          
53 As Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca observe: ‘Of course, people do have rules based on consequences, 
but almost all of these rules trade off with other considerations, so that they do not lead to this problem [of 
taboo trade-offs]. Moreover, people who hold protected values for some things also hold compensatory 
values for other things, and these compensatory values trade off in the usual ways’ (Baron and Spranca 
1997, p. 8). 
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While protected values are based on ‘deontological rules’ (rules that are 
based on the relevant principles of duty), compensatory values are based on 
prudential or ‘consequentialist’ considerations in terms of what someone stands to 
gain from certain actions. In agreement with McGraw and Tetlock, Baron and 
Spranca also maintain that the important implication in dealing with protected 
values is to avoid ‘trade-offs of the usual sort’ (ibid.). The point is that subjecting 
protected values to the same kind of trade-offs involved in dealing with 
compensatory values is likely to be met with resistance, at least from some people 
or certain sections of society.  
More importantly, protected values can be difficult to trade-off because they 
are ‘a function of both the value and the person’ and they are different from 
compensatory values because protected values ‘are treated like commitments’ 
(Baron and Spranca 1997, p. 9) or obligations. Another way to appreciate the 
distinction between protected and compensatory values is to consider the 
difference between values that determine who we are and those that determine 
want (Sagoff 1988), where values that determine ‘who we are’ are likely to be 
protected or held sacred as compared to values that define what we want. 
It is evident from the foregoing that human values, understood in terms of 
sacred or protected values, are a major factor behind taboo trade-offs. In short, 
only certain human values would pose the challenge of taboo trade-offs. As the 
standard approach to conflict resolution suggests, it is these kinds of values 
(sacred or protected) that may pose serious difficulties in terms of conflict 
resolution if the value systems among stakeholders are different. However and 
unlike what the standard approach would want us to believe, the foregoing 
analysis has also shown that not all human values can be difficult to deal with as 
secular/compensatory values can be traded off.  
The next section will provide an overall assessment of Gregory’s claims in 
order to ascertain insights that are relevant to this thesis.  
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5.6 An assessment of Gregory’s claims 
 
In assessing Gregory’s claims this thesis also wishes to draw on some of his 
insights into the challenge posed by multiple value dimensions, which he does not 
seem to follow through. He acknowledges that ‘fundamentally, trade-offs are 
difficult because it is hard for people to make choices, over options that may result 
in outcomes affecting multiple dimensions of value’ (Gregory 2002, p. 467). 
However, Gregory does not offer the solution which his own analysis seems to 
demand, which is that it is helpful to deal with different kinds of value in a distinct 
manner in order to navigate the challenge posed by multiple value dimensions or 
taboo trade-offs. For instance, this insight is apparent when Gregory makes the 
following observation about trade-offs involving multiple value dimensions: 
There are many reasons for such trade-offs, relating not only to people’s choices and 
beliefs but also to limits on resources, including time, that are available for producing 
technologies and products or for engaging in activities. Unless these reasons are carefully 
expressed and disentangled, policy makers can be left with frustrated stakeholders and 
long lists of issues and concerns that provide little guidance for how to develop, prioritise, 
or communicate appropriate risk-management responses (ibid., p. 462). 
In the context of this discussion, there are two issues that need to be 
‘disentangled’ in addressing questions about trade-offs: (1) Is a particular trade-off 
about ‘people’s choices’ and ‘beliefs’, or (2) is it something that is inevitable 
because of the ‘limits on resources’? If trade-offs are primarily about people’s 
choices and beliefs, then the significance of human values cannot be ignored. If a 
trade-off is a direct consequence of the limits on resources, then attending to the 
object value of the resources in question would be appropriate or more 
informative about what is at stake. Nevertheless, Gregory’s approach fails to treat 
the above issues in an adequate manner because of a lack of a clear distinction 
between human values and object value.  
Gregory refers to values ‘as an expression of concerns or interests about 
what matters to individuals, in terms of both their preferences for different goods 
or activities and the underlying moral or ethical beliefs that give rise to these 
choices’ (Gregory 2002, p. 462). This conception of ‘values’ refers primarily to 
human values. This is because the primary focus is about ‘what matters to 
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individuals in terms of their preferences, beliefs and choices’. In contrast, most of 
the examples Gregory gives of trade-offs are primarily about object value, as is 
the case, for instance, with his definition of trade-offs cited at the beginning of this 
chapter, such as more jobs resulting in less environmental protection or a higher 
output also requiring more time.54 In this sense, it is difficult to appreciate 
Gregory’s conception of, as well as his concerns about, multiple value dimensions 
in the absence of a clear recognition of the distinction between human values and 
object value. 
Conclusion 
 
In concluding, Gregory’s view to the effect that differences in the values of 
stakeholders need not be a drawback to the decision making process is plausible. 
This is because there are other things upon which people may agree or which 
may seem compelling. They can be based on other considerations, such as object 
value as this thesis suggests, or on the immediate interests of stakeholders, as 
the standard view of conflict resolution suggests.  
Gregory’s intention to improve stakeholder input and to aid the decision 
making process by incorporating their values in a structured fashion is 
commendable. However, a major limitation to this attempt stem from the fact that 
he is working with a limited conception of value. Hence, while Gregory is aware of 
the challenge posed by multiple value dimensions in relation to value conflicts and 
trade-offs, the solutions he offers fails to surmount the problem. Addressing the 
challenge posed by multiple value dimensions with regard to conflict resolution 
requires an appreciation of human values and object value as different 
dimensions of value. This then makes it possible to disentangle the different 
concerns among stakeholders.  
 
                                                          
54
 To this extent Gregory does not seem to have tackled his own concern about most environmental 
initiatives, i.e., ‘… in a few cases that trade-offs are addressed, it is usually not in terms of clarifying the 
fundamental values but rather in terms of setting out priorities for action (e.g., restoring wetlands as opposed 
to municipal drinking water), which are unlikely to provide an accurate window into the underlying value 
structures’ (Gregory 2002, p. 465). 
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In view of the discussions in this chapter, it is better not to conflate human 
values and object value. Additionally, dealing with conflicts involving human 
values and object value requires a broader perspective than the one-to-one kind 
of trade-offs that Gregory seems to suggest. The next chapter will explain how an 
alternative way of looking at value conflicts and the interconnections between 
human values and object value can avoid problems such as taboo trade-offs. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERESTS AND VALUE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The aim in this chapter is twofold: (1) To provide a critical assessment of the role 
that interests and value play in the resolution of environmental conflicts; (2) 
explore alternative ways of understanding and dealing with conflicts involving 
multiple value dimensions. Aim number (1) is intended to reconsider what I have 
discussed in chapter 3 and 4 whereas (2) is intended to address the issues I 
raised in chapter 5. In particular, (2) will be looked at by comparing holistic 
perspectives (e.g., systems thinking) with the tendency to consider individual 
values against each other. A holistic perspective makes it possible to examine 
how the interconnections among human values and object value can help in 
environmental decision-making and conflict resolution. The purpose is to explain 
why and how human values can be taken into consideration even though they 
may not be at the root of an environmental conflict.  
In view of the above, we have to recall how the different senses in which 
interests and value can be understood, align with the three different approaches 
discussed in the preceding chapters, namely, the Standard Approach, the EIA 
framework, and the SDM approach. The concepts involved in the three 
approaches are based on two key distinctions, namely, the distinction between 
object value and human values and the distinction between objective and 
subjective interests. 
The standard approach to conflict resolution relies on the contrast between 
human values and subjective interests. The standard approach then is primarily 
concerned with subjective interests, in the sense of what the parties to a conflict 
actually want. This is because the approach clearly distinguishes between 
interests and needs, where needs in the context of this discussion have been 
understood to be a kind of objective interests. In short, the distinction between 
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interests and needs that characterises the standard approach corresponds to the 
distinction between subjective interests and objective interests. 
Given that interests in both senses of the term (subjective and objective) 
are relevant to the EIA framework, there are two issues that are relevant in 
assessing the EIA approach. These involve the contrast between object value and 
subjective interests on the one hand, and between human values and objective 
interests on the other (see section 1.3). However, the EIA framework does not 
deal directly with human values but focuses instead on object value understood 
on the basis of impacts. Hence, the contrast between object value and subjective 
interests is much more evident in the EIA approach than the contrast between 
human values and objective interests.  
An appreciation of the focus on object value is therefore helpful in terms of 
considering the differences between the standard approach and the EIA 
framework. The standard approach does not deal with the issue of object value, 
but only makes reference to human values. On this basis then the distinction 
between object value and human values is crucial in terms of comparing both the 
standard approach and the EIA framework with the SDM approach. Unlike, the 
standard approach or the EIA framework, the SDM approach does not deal 
directly with interests (objective or subjective) but raises an important question 
about the extent to which the standard approach and the EIA framework address 
concerns about conflicting values, especially in terms of human values. In fact, a 
failure to attend directly to conflicting human values, as noted under the SDM 
approach, is a criticism of both the standard approach and the EIA approach. 
The EIA framework is not explicit in dealing with human values. In contrast, 
the standard approach recognises that conflicts involving human values may be 
difficult to resolve and advocates that we focus instead on interests that hopefully 
may be shared by the parties to a conflict. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
object value and human values is central to the analysis of the similarities and 
differences among the three approaches thereby constituting a key basis not only 
for how they can be assessed, but also for how one can reconcile the insights 
gained from each one of them.  
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The SDM approach, however, seems to conflate object value and human 
values despite giving the impression that it recognises multiple dimensions of 
value. The position in this thesis, therefore, is that adopting a strategy that deals 
with human values and object value in a distinct fashion is helpful for the 
resolution of environmental conflicts. The reason is primarily because the difficulty 
associated with human values with regard to conflict resolution, as recognised by 
the standard approach, does not apply to object value.  
In view of the discussions in the preceding chapters, this chapter will 
explore two things: first, the shortcomings of an exclusive focus on interests in the 
context of environmental conflict resolution; and second, the disadvantages with a 
tendency to conflate object value and human values in an attempt to resolve value 
conflicts. To this effect, consideration will be given to the following: (a) The scope 
and challenges for an exclusive focus on human interests (both subjective and 
objective); and (b) alternative ways of looking at the interconnections between 
human values and object value, as opposed to conflating them. Overall, the task 
is to determine an adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be 
resolved. 
6.1 The scope and challenges of human self-interest 
 
People generally value the natural environment for reasons relating to their 
present and long-term interests (Light 2002; Norton 2003; cf. Jamieson 2008, 
p.156). Hence, concerns about environmental matters are often based on ‘human 
self-interest.’ I use the term self-interest to include both objective and subjective 
interests. In examining the standard approach in chapter 3 the focus was on 
subjective interests while the EIA framework in chapter 4 caters for both 
subjective and objective interests. In exploring the scope and challenges for 
human self-interest, this chapter will also take into account subjective and 
objective interests as well. My intention is not to reject this basis for environmental 
concerns entirely. Rather, it is simply to point out that it is not adequate for some 
of the concerns about environmental issues that at least some people might 
express. Other reasons, such as concerns about the existence of other living 
things can also supply strong convictions for some environmental concerns, ‘since 
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life on earth, and not just human life, is at stake’ (Attfield 2003, p. 114). In fact, 
these other concerns are more pertinent especially where human self-interest is 
not directly relevant.  
For example, how do we justify the preservation of certain elements in the 
natural environment whose contribution to our wellbeing is either negligible or 
unknown, or perhaps non-existent? Prudential arguments based solely on human 
self-interest do not seem to work convincingly. Often a common argument is to 
claim that such elements, for example a particular species, should be preserved 
because there might be some future benefits of which we are currently unaware.  
There is a problem with this prudential argument, as Jamieson argues, because ‘it 
is an argument from ignorance’55 (Jamieson 2008, p. 157).  
In view of the above challenge, to argue for the protection of a species on 
the basis of the interests of its members or the interests of other species which 
interact with it would be more appropriate than focusing on prudential 
considerations that may be unfounded. In short, preservation or protection of 
species, especially those that are endangered, need not make reference to any 
(unknown) present or future human benefits. What this means is that there are 
environmental concerns that cannot be subsumed under human self-interest. As a 
result, human self-interest alone is insufficient to underpin some of our 
environmental concerns. Being open to concerns other than human self-interest 
adds to the case for prudent environment management and is likely to support 
stronger policies (Attfield 2003, p. 114). In short, there are some environmental 
concerns that cannot be subsumed under human self-interest whether in relation 
to current or to future generations. So when these concerns are voiced out in 
situations of conflict they should be given due attention as well to ensure that 
environmental conflicts are dealt with adequately.  
Furthermore, in order to appreciate the challenges of an exclusive focus on 
human self-interest, we have to bear in mind that the notion of interest is not as 
                                                          
55 He writes: ‘It assigns a positive value to preserving a particular species on the grounds that we do not know 
that there will not be positive benefits from preserving it. Think about what is being said: if we don’t know that 
something is not the case, then we can assume that there is some chance that it is. This inference is 
fallacious. All that follows from ignorance is ignorance. To say more than this, we have to know something’ 
(Jamieson 2008, p. 157). 
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simple as this focus seems to assume. The claim that all of our environmental 
concerns simply boil down to human self-interest seems to assume that what is in 
our best interest could be an adequate basis for all of our concerns about the 
environment. But this assumption does not seem to work well once it is realised 
that the interests of different people (both objective and subjective) can, in 
practice, be in conflict with each other. Of course, working on the basis of shared 
interests can present some opportunities for resolving conflict. However, things 
change somewhat as soon as it is recognised that people actually do have 
different interests either as groups or as individuals, and that these interests may 
come up against each other.  
For example, interests in the appreciation and preservation of wilderness 
areas often come up against developmental interests both of which can 
reasonably be assumed to be in everyone’s interests. For instance, the 
construction of shopping malls has tended to threaten whatever wilderness areas 
or parks might have remained in cities or towns. If it is not possible to satisfy the 
different interests at stake by some compromise, the question then is on what 
basis such conflicts should be resolved. 
Certainly, it will not help to appeal to interests when the interests in 
question are opposed to each other56. First, to claim that not ‘all interests are 
equal or that some interests deserve special consideration’ is not advisable from a 
facilitation or mediation point of view where the emphasis is on finding common 
ground upon which the parties to a conflict can be engaged in further 
deliberations. Second, value judgements do not seem to offer a viable or easy 
solution if it is correct to assume that values are relative to individuals or groups. 
The main claim behind relativism is that human values have no eternal or 
universal appeal because they are relative to persons and groups. In considering 
the relativist challenge one should also take into account the fact that human 
values can be considered from two standpoints, as explained in chapter 1, viz., 
                                                          
56 One suggestion in response to this challenge, as attributed to Mark Sagoff by Des Jardins (1997, p. 96) is 
as follows: ‘We need to make a political and ethical judgment that some preferences are more worthy of being 
satisfied than others. Not all interests are equal, and some deserve special consideration. Unfortunately, as 
Sagoff acknowledges, articulating and defending such value judgments is notoriously difficult. The relativist 
challenge remains in the background: Who are you to say that what you want is more valuable than what I 
want?’  
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the personal and the social/impersonal. If personal values are understood in terms 
of preferences then the relativist challenge is obvious.  
While social values may be shared by members of the same group, they 
can vary from one group to another. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility that different groups or individuals across different groups can at least 
share some values. While individuals or groups may share some values, we 
should also consider that different groups may be motivated by different interests 
or priorities. ‘Quite often, environmental interests are pitted against entrenched 
and influential corporate and government interests’ (Des Jardins 1997, p. 198). 
This is often the case with conflicts involving environmental groups and 
transnational corporations (TNCs). At the global level both the TNCs and 
environmental groups can surmount, or at least lessen, the cultural relativist 
challenge because of their organizational reach across different regions. 
However, what seems to be the problem is that the interests of these parties can 
be so opposed to each other as to rule out viable negotiations or cooperative 
relationships. In short, value relativism is not the only challenge we have to deal 
with. Rather, the interests of different stakeholders can equally pose a significant 
problem. 
What this also means is that even appeals to objective interests would be 
blocked by the disagreement. While it is possible to identify objective interests, 
people may still disagree on how, when, or whether such interests should be 
pursued. Of course, we cannot rule out the fact that human values have a 
significant bearing on these disagreements (see section 1.5). Nevertheless, it 
would appear that both the focus on interests and on human values seem to raise 
the same difficulty in terms of dealing with conflicts where the interests at stake 
are opposed to each other. In view of the above, focusing on interests can only 
make conflict resolution tractable as the standard approach assumes when the 
parties to a conflict have some shared interests that can be satisfied in a mutually 
agreeable way.  
If resorting to human values in an attempt to deal with conflicting interests 
will just complicate issues as the standard approach cautions, considering how 
object value can inform or legitimise decisions that emerge from the resolution of 
128 
 
conflicts is a viable alternative. Object value is also indirectly useful in assessing 
the interests of stakeholders in order to understand how they relate to the impacts 
associated with the project at the centre of the conflict. The next section explores 
how attending to object value can help decision-makers to assess disagreements 
among stakeholders with regard to environmental decision-making and conflict 
resolution. 
6.2 Object value and environmental conflict resolution 
 
One of the advantages of attending to object value, in the context of 
environmental conflict resolution, is that it gives a real sense of what is actually at 
stake, unlike focusing on human interests or values. At the core of attending to 
object value is the need to understand the various impacts at stake and the value 
implications of such impacts. Attending to object value makes the process of 
environmental decision-making and conflict resolution much more transparent 
than is the case with entrenched or vested interests which can easily be 
concealed.  
For instance, impacts under the EIA framework are best understood in 
terms of object value. It is easier to subject impacts to independent verification 
through the review process as explained in chapter 4 than the case may be with 
interests. Often, vested interests can make parties to a conflict over-emphasise 
the perceived benefits and play down the costs associated with their preferred 
course of action. Given that a proposed project is usually what is at the centre of 
an environmental conflict, decision-makers want to understand the impacts of the 
project in order for them to make an informed decision. Attending to object value 
provides an impartial way to explain why a certain course of action was chosen 
and not another. In this way, object value is central in terms of dealing with many 
of the concerns that arise in environmental conflict situations.  
In considering the interaction between object values in the environment 
and human values, one cannot ignore the fact that the possibility of conflict looms 
large. Conflict is inevitable where human values, for example, profit can only be 
realised at the expense of the object value of certain elements in the environment. 
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Harmony obtains when human values and the object value of certain elements in 
the environment are compatible, for instance, as the case might be with the 
human values that inform certain practices under ecotourism, as compared to 
timber production or logging. Understanding the dynamics of interaction between 
object value and human values has a significant bearing in terms of how 
environmental conflicts can be resolved.  
Dealing with value conflicts, especially in the context of environmental 
conflicts, requires that the issues are understood in a broad context. For this 
purpose, Frederick Ferré’s account of what he refers to as a ‘guiding vision’, in 
terms of ‘dealing with the tough questions’ or generally in terms of resolving 
problems ‘when genuine obligations to the environment or to humanity conflict’ 
(Ferré 2010, p. 158) is a good starting point. As he claims:   
Such a vision must reveal a single, continuous worldscape in which human culture is 
situated fully within nature. It must offer conceptual clarity on what constitutes value, 
intrinsic and instrumental. It must show how genuine values of both sorts in nature can 
extend beyond (and sometimes conflict with) human values (ibid., p. 158). 
There are a number of issues in Ferré account above, some of which I have 
already alluded to in the preceding discussions on value. First, the need for 
conceptual clarity goes beyond the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. The distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value is applicable in 
relation to either human values or object value (cf. Rokeach 1967). Hence, it is 
important to be clear about whether one is considering it in the context of human 
values or object value. Ferré’s account above also implies a distinction between 
‘human values’ and ‘values in nature’. This discussion understands values in 
nature as object values. The important thing then is to understand how human 
values can in some instances conflict and how they can in some ways be in 
harmony with object values in nature.  
In dealing with conflicts between object values in the natural environment 
and human values, we have to bear in mind that harmony and conflict can be 
endemic to interactions between different systems, for instance, between 
economic and ecological systems. (The next section will explore the concept of 
systems thinking). Harmony obtains when interaction between different systems 
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supports co-existence. This means that systems do not undermine other systems 
with which they interact. In fact, by undermining other systems a system may also 
end up undermining itself. For example, harmony between human societies and 
the natural environment requires the maintenance and promotion of ecologically 
viable and socially desirable conditions (cf. Ulrich 2009, p. 133).  
In considering the issue of harmony between object values in the natural 
environment and human values, one cannot ignore the fact that human beings 
also need to use the natural environment. In fact, human beings and the natural 
environment are inseparable, ‘not simply because we are natural beings but 
rather because we are always already actively involved in the natural 
environment’ (Bookchin 2010, p. 263). This thesis, however, is not only concerned 
about how use of the environment by some people affects others, but also about 
how use of the environment by human beings affects other living things or the 
long term health of the entire biosphere (cf. Norton 2003, p. 172). Concerns about 
harmony cannot be restricted to the welfare of human beings only because we 
share many ‘needs’ with other living things, for example, the need for non-toxic air 
and water, and other elements that are essential to the sustenance of life on 
earth. As a result, the object value of certain elements in the natural environment 
to other living things cannot be subsumed entirely under concerns for our own 
wellbeing.  
With this background, the next section will explore alternative ways of 
dealing with conflicts involving multiple value dimensions. This discussion will 
argue that the difficulty in resolving some value conflicts and the problem 
associated with some trade-offs often results from a tendency to consider single 
values against each other thereby giving the impression that the only option is to 
choose between them.57  
 
 
                                                          
57
 This approach often assumes win-lose solutions as opposed to win-win solutions. 
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6.3 Alternative ways of dealing with value conflicts 
 
This section examines a holistic perspective on value conflicts. I am using the 
term ‘holistic’ primarily to underscore the need to appreciate how different issues 
may be interconnected in ways that reveal significant relationships in an 
ecological, social, economic and other relevant aspects. For this reason I shall not 
digress into discussing any contentious issues that may be associated with the 
term ‘holism’58. 
My main concern as I argue is that adopting a holistic perspective on value 
conflicts as opposed to considering individual values against each other is a better 
alternative. As noted in the preceding section, looking at value conflicts from a 
holistic perspective creates more scope in terms of how such conflicts can be 
resolved. From a holistic perspective, what is vital in terms of resolving value 
conflicts is not to look at conflicting values in isolation59. For this reason, as 
Anthony Weston suggests, ‘we should prefer a conception of values which ties 
them to their contexts and insists not on their separability but on their relatedness 
and interdependence’ (Weston 2003, p. 312). This approach is informed by the 
understanding that values ‘define themselves in dynamic interactions and 
dependencies on each other’ (Mayer 2008, p. 81). In terms of human values, for 
example, love is interlinked with other values such as care or respect.  
A holistic perspective makes it possible to appreciate not only how values 
can conflict, but also how they can be interconnected. To this extent there are 
some insights from ‘systems thinking’ that we can draw on in dealing with value 
conflicts from a holistic perspective. Generally, a system is defined by the 
structure and patterns of interaction among its various components, or in short, 
                                                          
58
 The term ‘holism’ is used in environmental ethics debates to consider individualist positions that put 
emphasis on the welfare or moral significance of individuals (such as animals) against holistic approaches 
that focus on ‘wholes’ understood for example as ecosystems or the entire biosphere (see Keller 2010, p. 17, 
Palmer 2003, p. 23-5,). In other discussions, it (holism) is also used to refute ‘dualist’ positions, for example 
those that insist on the separability of human beings from animals or from nature (Jamieson 2008, p. 2-3, cf. 
Barry). 
59 In terms of conflict resolution the point, as Kekes (1993, p. 24) points out then is that … ‘the resolution of 
any particular conflict involves not merely deciding what ought to be done about the situation at hand but also 
considering how resolving the conflict by opting for one value, or for the balancing of one value against 
another in some compromise, would affect the whole system of values of which conflicting values are merely 
a part.’ 
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the ‘organising relations’ (Capra 2009, p. 125). Hence, in attending to a system 
the focus is on properties or aspects of the whole system which cannot be 
attributed to any of its individual parts. There are two insights from systems 
thinking that are relevant to this discussion: (a) an understanding of conflicts as 
emerging from the interaction between different systems and within; (b) an 
appreciation of the need to shift our ‘attention back and forth between systems 
levels’ (ibid.) in an attempt to resolve conflicts.  
The insight in (a) deepens our understanding of environmental conflicts as 
emerging from interactions among different systems (e.g., economic and 
ecological systems). In section 1.4, I explained environmental conflicts primarily in 
terms of disagreements arising from the concerns of the parties involved, i.e., 
where at least one party has concerns about the environmental impacts of the 
other party’s projects. In following a systems perspective, in an attempt to resolve 
conflicts, decision-makers can be assisted by considering the interactions among 
the systems involved as opposed to merely looking at the disagreements arising 
from the expressed concerns.  
Point (b) is relevant in terms of considering how scenarios at different 
levels can lead to a transfer of insights gained from one level to another level. As 
Fritjof Capra writes: 
Throughout the living world, we find systems nesting within other systems, and by applying 
the same concepts to different systems levels – e.g. the concept of stress to an organism, 
a city, or an economy – we can often gain important insights. On the other hand, we also 
have to recognize that, in general, different systems levels represent levels of differing 
complexity (Capra 2009, p. 125). 
While Capra’s example focuses on stress, the focus in this discussion is on how to 
understand value conflicts at different system levels or in terms of the interaction 
between different systems. I want to argue therefore that how value conflicts are 
dealt with at the level of individuals can offer some insights and lessons in terms 
of how to approach value conflicts at higher levels, such as the community or the 
state. To this effect, an exploration of value conflicts from a systems perspective 
at the level of individuals is worthwhile.  
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Misha Hebel claims that the fact ‘that each individual has a set of values 
appears undisputed and these can be seen to be the components of a value 
system’ (Hebel 1998, p. 395). In her view, value systems or domains for an 
individual, for example, ‘might include one for work, another for home or family, 
and another for environmental matters’ (ibid., p. 396).  
Tension and conflict between values is inevitable, or at least likely, as an 
individual interacts with the different value domains or systems. In attempting to 
address such tensions or conflicts, it is important, from a systems perspective, not 
to just consider individual values against each other. Rather, it is helpful to 
appreciate the dynamic interactions and interdependencies among the value 
domains involved.  
For example, there may be tension between one’s work and family life. 
From a systems perspective, the solution is not always or necessarily to choose 
between work and family. Such a move would violate some of the obvious 
connections between the two domains. For instance, work is important for one to 
support one’s family, while family wellbeing is also crucial to the performance and 
reliability of employees. The value systems at work and at home may not be the 
same. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a system level functioning involving both 
of these domains and the interaction or interdependence between the two, it is 
vital to ensure that one value system or domain is not sustained at the expense of 
the other.  
The same way of understanding value conflicts at the level of individuals 
can be applied at a different level, provided one is alert to the fact that different 
levels present differing levels of complexity (as noted earlier with reference to 
Capra). However, the point still remains that the insights gained from examining 
how value conflicts can be handled at the level of individuals at least offers a 
model for a systems perspective on much higher levels involving the social, 
economic, and ecological spheres of community life or the state. A systems 
perspective can be adopted in terms of looking at value conflicts involving the 
social, economic, and ecological spheres as interactional systems. What matters 
is a broad understanding of the linkages and feedback-loops among these 
systems.  
134 
 
For example, the negative environmental impacts of agriculture cannot be 
ignored. However, by improving food security, agriculture can also have a positive 
bearing on environmental protection given that food-secure households are 
unlikely to engage in coping strategies that are detrimental to the environment. 
Damming rivers for electricity is another economic activity that has tangible 
negative environmental impacts especially on biodiversity in the area that is 
dammed. But access to clean energy from such dams also has a positive bearing 
on environmental issues in terms of reducing pollution from unclean sources of 
energy.  
In comparison to the individual or community levels, dealing with certain 
issues at the national level may pose some challenges given that there are more 
variables over which reliable information will be required. However, what may not 
be achievable at lower system levels can be achieved at higher system levels. For 
example, let us consider the case of the proposed mine in the Lower Zambezi 
National Park discussed in sections 4. If understood at the level of the area in 
question, that is the national park, the idea of balancing, as some commentators 
have pointed out is contradictory, if mining and wildlife conservation cannot take 
place in the same area. In particular, mining is likely to ‘compromise the ecological 
value of the park as well as the ecosystem’ as ZEMA stated in its decision to 
reject the proposed mine.  
It is only at the national level that government can claim to balance the 
benefits from mining and the protection of wildlife conservation provided they take 
place in different areas. From a conservation point of view a game park has to be 
seen in its totality as a system. Hence, you cannot introduce alien activities like 
mining in the middle of a game park for a period of 25 years without disturbing the 
system. In addition to destroying old growth vegetation and landscapes, it is likely 
that the territory for some animals and birds would be negatively interfered with in 
some way. 
In the argument in favour of mining, the proponent points out that there are 
countries in the world that do not have game parks and that such countries are 
not any worse off. While this observation is outside the scope of Zambia’s 
economic system, one can also argue that there are countries without mines 
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which are doing far better economically than countries with mines. However, the 
relevant issue at the national level would be to consider how many national parks 
there are in comparison to the number of mines and other areas where there are 
mineral deposits which are not being mined yet. In this respect, if the Lower 
Zambezi National Park was the only area with copper or other mineral deposits 
then the scenario would be different. But obviously that is not the case. According 
to experts, Zambia has been the largest copper producer in Africa for some time 
(Zambia Daily Mail Friday, March 14, 2014). If this is the case then we should ask 
why it should start mining in a national park as well. What benefits will the country 
gain from mining a national park which it has not gained so far from being the 
largest copper producer in Africa? The issue does not seem to be about value. 
Rather, it is about interests and government’s interests in particular, as the 
Minister who overturned ZEMA’s decision stated.  
In view of the above perspective, it is now widely recognised by 
environmental experts that EIAs should be undertaken within the broader context 
of strategic environmental assessments (SEA) so that certain issues are brought 
to the attention of decision makers at the earliest possible time. The realisation 
behind the SEA approach is that the significance of certain impacts (e.g., 
cumulative, regional and non-project impacts) ‘may be better assessed initially at 
the policy, plan or programme level, rather than at the project level’ (Wood and 
Dejeddour 1992, p. 3).  
At national level and in the context of policies and plans, the mining and 
tourism sectors are part of the same economic system and can co-exist as such. 
However, at the regional level and in terms of the geography of a national park it 
is unlikely that the two systems can co-exist given that mining tends to be 
destructive at the source. It is at this level that one would be able to appreciate 
whether opening a mine in a national park would be the best thing to do. A park 
such as the Lower Zambezi National Park is essentially a system of catchment 
areas, flora and wildlife. Hence, it is something that needs to be looked at 
holistically. On a systems perspective the judgement by ZEMA that the mining 
project would ‘compromise the ecological value of the park as well as the 
ecosystem’ was well informed.  
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In addition, if one is following a systems perspective at this level then a 
question that arose in the argument in favour of the mine would either be 
irrelevant or inappropriate, namely, ‘why are animals and plants or natural beauty 
of the park more important than people?’ A trade-off that this question wants to 
highlight is either false or non-existent. On the contrary, some of the key 
arguments against the mine were based on the fact that people are already 
benefiting from tourism activities in the park especially through revenue paid to 
government. In fact, the main difference between the two sides is that those who 
are in favour of mining seem to be motivated by short-term interests whereas 
those who want to protect the park for sustainable tourism have adopted a long-
term perspective. And in terms of government policy, tourism has been identified 
as a key sector with regard to diversifying the country’s economy from its 
dependency on copper mining. Overall, the issue here is not about whether the 
park or animals are more important than people. Rather, it is about whether or not 
you can have mining and wild life conservation in the same area. From what the 
experts know about open pit mining and wild life habitats this issue can be 
decided factually without introducing any spurious factors like the above question 
does. 
With regard to human values, however, the fact that there are more 
stakeholders or individuals involved also means that there are more value 
systems to deal with, given that it appears indisputable that each individual has a 
value system. For this reason it is prudent, whenever possible, for different 
dimensions of value, i.e., human values and object value to be addressed in a 
distinct fashion. This means that decision-makers can deal with object value in 
considering the interactions between the ecological, economic and social systems 
at the community or national level as opposed to dealing directly with human 
values. If the focus is on object value, for example, then value conflicts and trade-
offs can also be guided by scientific or technological considerations. The 
advantage in this case is that trade-offs involving object values can be made 
without forcing people to compromise on their values.  
Nonetheless, and as explained in the previous chapter, often the 
expressed concerns in an environmental conflict will involve human values and 
object value. However, instead of conflating the two different dimensions of value, 
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it is better to try and understand the linkages between human values and object 
values. In addition to revealing the character of values, appreciating the 
interconnections and interdependencies between these two value dimensions is 
also crucial in terms of assessments, choice, as well as in providing justifications 
(Weston 2003, p. 313) as to why a certain course of action should be chosen. 
To further appreciate the role that object value can play in dealing with 
value conflicts we have to consider how object values and human values can 
interrelate, for example, object value can inform human values as suggested by 
the following claim: 
To the extent that environmentalists can show that values are formed and informed by 
contact with nature, nature takes on value as a teacher of human values. Nature need no 
longer be seen as a mere satisfier of fixed and often consumptive values – it also 
becomes an important source of inspiration in value formation (Norton 2003, p. 165). 
In looking at ‘the value of nature in forming, rather than satisfying human 
preferences’ Norton has in mind the value of experiencing ‘natural objects and 
undisturbed places’ (ibid., p 165). The above claim brings out two important 
issues. First, the object value of certain objects can be the basis for some human 
values. Second, we can think of other kinds of values in the natural environment 
besides the instrumental values that feed consumptive values. For instance, some 
objects in the natural environment may inspire wealth creation whereas others 
may inspire awe, thereby resulting in an appreciation of different types of value. In 
both of these ways it is clear that object value and human values are linked. 
In addition, it is possible that human values can be attuned to 
environmental concerns. Mark Sagoff, for instance, writes:  
[Aldo] Leopold argued that land use and environmental policy ought to respond to the love, 
admiration, and respect many of us feel for the natural world. Love, admiration, and 
respect are human values, of course, but they do not necessarily involve human welfare. 
Rather, these values (although they arise in human beings) may be directed to the well-
being and integrity of the rest of nature (Sagoff 1988, p. 148). 
There may be controversies or disagreements about what the ‘well-being’ or 
‘integrity’ of the rest of nature might entail or for that matter even what ‘nature’ is. 
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The fact of the matter, however, remains that at least some people adore or care 
about certain things in the natural environment. 
In another discussion Sagoff (1988) suggests that we may value in nature 
aspects that we find valuable in our own lives e.g. freedom, nobility and so on. For 
instance, some people may object to damming a river because flowing naturally is 
akin to or symbolises freedom. This view need not be a source of controversy 
given that it does not seem to imply that that is the only plausible way in which 
people can value nature. The important thing to realise, however, is that by so 
doing we would still be considering nature within the framework of human values 
as opposed to the object value of the elements in nature60.  
Distinguishing between human values and object value with regard to our 
understanding of ‘environmental values’ is important in terms of dealing with 
environmental concerns and problems. The object value of environmental objects 
is determined by how the object functions or how it affects other things in the 
environment. This is the kind of value at issue when reference is made to the 
ecological value of organisms, wetlands, forests and so on.  
The significance and relevance of human values with regard to 
environmental issues depends on how they interlink with the object value of 
certain elements in the environment. The interdependencies between human 
values and object value cannot be ignored. Ideally, therefore, one would hope for 
a framework that incorporates both human values and object value. Nevertheless, 
and for the purpose of resolving environmental conflicts, we need to be clear 
about what constitutes human values and object value. Only then can we be able 
to appreciate how these two different kinds of value can be interdependent, or 
how they may at times conflict with each other. As explained at the beginning of 
this section, interdependencies among values have a significant bearing on how 
conflicts should be resolved. 
 
                                                          
60
 We should also note as Robert Elliot points out: ‘Val Routley has eloquently reminded us that people who 
value wilderness do not do so merely because they like to soak up pretty scenery. They see more and value 
much more than this. What they do see, and what they value, is very much a function of the degree to which 
they understand the ecological mechanisms which maintain the landscape and which determine that it 
appears the way it does’ (Elliot 2003, p. 387; cf. Rolston 1988). 
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Conclusion 
 
In concluding this chapter, it should be noted that both interests and value have a 
role to play in environmental conflicts depending, of course, on the type of conflict 
at issue. Consequently, any attempt to focus only on any one of these issues to 
resolve an environmental conflict stands in need of justification. An exclusive 
focus on interests might work in some instances. However, in view of the 
concerns that have been raised in this discussion and from other sources in the 
literature, it cannot be recommended as a comprehensive approach to all kinds of 
environmental conflicts. An exclusive focus on interests, especially on subjective 
interests, is not the only option, nor is it adequate in some cases of environmental 
conflict resolution. This is because objective interests, object value, human values 
and the interconnections among these issues all have a crucial role to play in 
environmental conflict resolution or in environmental decision-making in general.  
As both the standard approach to conflict resolution and the structured 
decision making approach recognise, it cannot be denied that human values have 
a role to play in conflicts. However, as the standard approach explains, attending 
to human values can pose some serious difficulties in attempts to resolve 
conflicts. My argument therefore is that object value, as opposed to an exclusive 
focus on interests, also provides a viable basis for resolving environmental 
conflicts. In fact, the prospect of appreciating the significance of human values to 
environmental concerns can be greatly assisted by appeals to the object value of 
elements in the environment, or at least to the dynamic interactions or 
interdependencies between the two. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to contribute to an enhanced understanding of environmental 
conflicts and to establish an adequate basis upon which they can be resolved. To 
accomplish this task the thesis has ascertained the role that value and interests 
play in environmental conflicts and in their resolution. In the process the thesis 
has examined three different approaches with regard to environmental conflict 
resolution, viz., the standard approach, the EIA framework, and the SDM 
approach.  
Being a philosophical discussion, the thesis has relied heavily on the 
analysis of the key concepts informing the three different approaches, namely, 
value and interests in order to draw out the relevant distinctions between human 
values and object value; subjective and objective interests. By taking all of these 
issues into account this discussion has deepened and broadened the 
understanding of environmental conflict resolution, based on a clear articulation of 
the distinctive roles that interests, human values and object value play in 
environmental conflicts. In particular, it has contributed to the provision of a 
conceptual analysis within which decisions that emerge from the resolution of 
environmental conflicts can be properly analysed and understood.  
To begin with, I examined the standard approach to conflict resolution and 
concluded that it is inadequate in some important respects in dealing with some 
environmental conflicts (e.g., where there are environmental effects at stake as 
opposed to conflicts about mere access to resources). It is understandable, as the 
standard approach suggests that it might be convenient to avoid the human 
values that may underlie some conflicts and to focus instead on interest in an 
attempt to make the resolution of conflicts more feasible. However, taking into 
account the fact that there are environmental impacts to be considered also, the 
proposal in this thesis is that attending to object value has a fundamental role to 
play in the resolution of environmental conflicts. The understanding of 
environmental conflict resolution in this thesis is therefore different from the 
standard approach which only takes into account human values and interests.  
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I have also explored the concern that approaches such as the EIA 
framework do not deal adequately with conflicts involving human values. This 
thesis appreciates the fact that human values can pose a challenge in the process 
of resolving conflicts. Nevertheless, it has recognised that it is essential to be clear 
about what kind of human values might pose difficulties, given that not all human 
values may be difficult to deal with. In addition, and in contrast to claims under the 
SDM approach, I have further argued that dealing with multiple dimensions of 
value requires sensitivity to the distinction between human values and object 
value. Furthermore, the thesis has maintained that understanding the 
interconnections between human values and object value is essential in dealing 
with the multiple value dimensions that characterise some environmental conflicts.  
In maintaining that an adequate basis for environmental conflict resolution 
should take into account interests, human values, and object value as well, I am 
at the same time mindful of the fact that these issues can often be in conflict. 
Therefore we should take into account the following recommendations: (1) 
attending to subjective interests as opposed to focusing on human values may be 
helpful in the resolution of some conflicts; (2) a pursuit of certain objective 
interests may be preferred to adhering to some human values; (3) certain human 
values should be adhered to at the expense of certain subjective interests; and (4) 
ultimately, object value has a central role to play in an informed attempt to resolve 
environmental conflicts. This is because object value can (and does) inform both 
interests and human values. 
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